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 This dissertation presents a new definition of propaganda using the massively 
viral internet video KONY 2012 as an example. KONY 2012 was produced by the 
nongovernmental organization (NGO) Invisible Children, which was founded by three 
young Americans in order to inform the American public about the crimes of the 
Ugandan warlord Joseph Kony. Within a few days of its release on the internet, KONY 
2012 had become the most viral video of all time up to that point, garnering almost 100 
million views on the popular video sharing website YouTube. Contrary to the concept of 
propaganda as simplistic lies, this dissertation argues that KONY 2012 demonstrates 
that propaganda is a sophisticated technique for governing and managing the behavior 
of individuals towards political ends in a literate, information-saturated, liberal 
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Propaganda is a concession to the wilfulness [sic] of the age…The new antidote 
to wilfulness [sic] is propaganda. If the mass will be free of chains of iron, it must 
accept its chains of silver. If it will not love, honour [sic] and obey, it must not 
expect to escape seduction. Propaganda is a reflex to the immensity, the 
rationality and wilfulness [sic] of the modern world. It is the new dynamic of 
society, for power is subdivided and diffused, and more can be won by illusion 
than by coercion. It has all the prestige of the new and provokes all the animosity 
of the baffled. To illuminate the mechanisms of propaganda is to reveal the 
secret springs of social action, and to expose to the most searching criticism our 
prevailing dogmas of sovereignty, of democracy, of honesty, and of the sanctity 
of individual opinion. The study of propaganda will bring into the open much that 
is obscure, until, indeed, it may no longer be possible for an Anatole France to 
observe with truth that "Democracy (and, indeed, all society) is run by an unseen 
engineer" (Lasswell,1938, p. 222) [emphasis added] 
 
Lasswell’s “antidote”, propaganda, is most necessary in the societies that allow 
the greatest degree of political freedom. It is a cure for a condition that has afflicted 
modern, post-Enlightenment, liberal democracies since they began appearing more 
than 200 years ago. This condition results from a tension between the stated ideals 
upon which democratic republics are founded, such as popular sovereignty and the 




and the necessity of stable governance of society. Engels (2011) explains that, 
“contrary to the misperception cultivated by politicians and pundits today, the United 
States was not born a democracy; quite the opposite, for democracy was portrayed as 
an enemy to political virtue and national stability in the years following the American 
Revolution. In the 1780s, democracy was compared to a volcano, a plague, a cancer, a 
storm, and a wild fire” (p. 131). This fear of democracy, called “demophobia” by Robert 
L. Ivie (2005), “imagines the demos as an undisciplined mass, a murderous horde that 
is not only deaf to right speech but exudes its own toxic speech that spreads demotic 
violence” (Engels, 2011, p. 134). Such was the fear of the democratic horde that 
founding father Elbridge Gerry posited at the Constitutional Convention of 1787 that: 
“The evils we experience flow from the excess of democracy” (Engels, 2011, p. 131). 
During the founding period democracy was associated not with popular suffrage, nor a 
tripartite federal government with a system of checks and balances, but with mob rule 
and armed conflict like Shays’ Rebellion. The rhetoric of demophobia, exemplified by 
the Federalist Papers and Alexander Hamilton, birthed a counter-narrative, demophilia, 
most famously championed by Thomas Jefferson. While demophilia, the love of the 
people, rejected the fear of democracy prevalent during the founding period, Engels 
(2011) points out that even this counter-narrative was concerned with the correct 
governance of the democratic impulse: “Like demophobia, demophilia is ultimately a 
discourse that can be used to tame democracy—for it shapes how democracy is lived, 
altering what is sayable and thinkable, who can speak and in what ways” (p. 134).  
The uneasiness caused by the possibility of democracy has remained until the 




authored by three researchers from the Trilateral Commission. The Report, The Crisis 
of Democracy (1975), written in the wake of the politically tumultuous 1960s expressed 
many of the same reservations about democracy that were prevalent during the 
founding period of the nation, arguing that, “some of the problems of governance in the 
United States today stem from an excess of democracy” (p.113). The authors argue that 
the social upheaval of the 1960s had led to contradictory claims on the government, 
weakening its authority and leading to a “crisis of democracy”. On one hand, diverse 
groups began to criticize the actions of the government, while on the other, many of 
these same groups made increasing claims on the government to rectify social ills such 
as racism and wealth inequality. Such claims present an unresolvable dilemma that led 
to pessimism about the future of the viability of democracy, according to the authors.  
The authors identified two challenges internal to the Western democracies that 
posed a threat for the future of democracy; “adversary intellectuals” and “related 
groups” and a parallel degradation of social values, and intrinsic contradictions within 
the system of democracy itself. Of the first challenge, the report says: “The development 
of an "adversary culture" among intellectuals has affected students, scholars, and the 
media… In some measure, the advanced industrial societies have spawned a stratum 
of value-oriented intellectuals who often devote themselves to the derogation of 
leadership, the challenging of authority, and the unmasking and delegitimation of 
established institutions, their behavior contrasting with that of the also increasing 
numbers of technocratic and policy-oriented intellectuals. In an age of widespread 
secondary school and university education, the pervasiveness of the mass media, and 




development constitutes a challenge to democratic government which is, potentially at 
least, as serious as those posed in the past by the aristocratic cliques, fascist 
movements, and communist parties (Crozier, Huntington, & Watanuki, 1975, pp. 6-7).  
The authors also noted a concomitant change in the values of the non-intellectual 
public: “a shift in values is taking place away from the materialistic work-oriented, public-
spirited values toward those which stress private satisfaction, leisure, and the need for 
belonging and intellectual and esthetic self-fulfillment… [These values} often coexist 
with greater skepticism towards political leaders and institutions and with greater 
alienation from the political processes. They tend to be privatistic in their impact and 
import (Crozier, Huntington, & Watanuki, 1975, p. 7).  
The above developments are both challenges that arise from within a democratic 
society, and indeed, such developments are perhaps bred and encouraged by the 
freedom of political expression given to individuals in such societies, and the relatively 
high degree of affluence that obtains in the “trilateral nations” (the US, Western Europe, 
and Japan). The authors of the report make this very argument, saying that: “there are 
the intrinsic challenges to the viability of democratic government which grow directly out 
of the functioning of democracy. Democratic government does not necessarily function 
in a self-sustaining or self-correcting equilibrium fashion. It may instead function so as to 
give rise to forces and tendencies which, if unchecked by some outside agency, will 
eventually lead to the undermining of democracy...The more democratic a system is, 
indeed, the more likely it is to be endangered by intrinsic threats (Crozier, Huntington, & 




Like the demophobes of the founding period of the United States, it is obvious 
that the authors of the Trilateral Commission report think that the “crisis of democracy” 
is really democracy itself. Whereas the demophobic founders identified democracy with 
mob rule and armed insurrection, the authors of the report feared the increasing 
critiques of government and capital coming from the demos in the wake of the civil 
rights struggles of the 1960s and the public outrage over the Vietnam War.  
The argument of this essay1 is that propaganda, properly understood, provides 
Lasswell’s “antidote to willfulness”, in other words, a type of technology for the 
successful governance of a society, particularly those of the liberal democratic type. In 
post-industrial, affluent, liberal democracies with high rates of literacy and education, 
propaganda is more useful that cruder forms of social control. Direct use of force would 
be counter-productive since, if those who govern a society possessed legitimate 
authority, they would not need to use force. Likewise, crude lies and misinformation 
would be of limited use since an educated, literate, population would eventually find 
contradictory evidence exposing the lie. Both of these methods would illicit massive 
resistance. Rather than follow either of the aforementioned paths, propaganda effects 
the governance of a democratic society by avoiding truth claims and, when not making 
appeals to emotion, skillfully using statistical and quantifiable data to persuade. The 
social changes described by Crozier, Huntington, and Watanuki (1975) in The Crisis of 
Democracy make this technique necessary. The populations of the wealthy liberal 
democracies, especially the young, now seek not only material well-being, but also 
intellectual and aesthetic fulfillment, and in many ways oppositional politics, which came 
                                                 
1 I use the term “essay” in the older sense of “to attempt” or “to try” (From the Middle French essayer, cognate 




as a shock in the 1960s, has become valorized in the popular culture. Propaganda 
today works not by opposing this societal shift, but by harnessing it; it uses the desire 
for a meaningful, stimulating life, and the commodification and banalization of radical 
politics to direct popular energies in ways that maintain the stability of the status quo 
and achieve the political goals of society’s governors.  
The necessity of propaganda as a technology of governance, and its efficacy, are 
both demonstrated by the relative social stability of the liberal democracies, especially 
the United States, despite the degradation of effective democratic control of the 
government and increasing levels of such destabilizing factors as wealth inequality, 
unemployment, and poverty. In a report published for The United Nations University 
World Institute for Development Economics Research, Davies, Sandström, Shorrocks, 
and Wolff (2008) investigated income and wealth inequality globally and at the national 
level. The authors report that the Gini coefficient (a measure of wealth inequality within 
a society) of the United States is 0.801, near the top of the list for the countries listed 
(the global Gini coefficient was 0.892). The Gini scale runs from 0 to 1, and higher 
values signify greater wealth inequality. For comparison, the same study reported the 
Gini coefficient for Japan at 0.547, and for China at 0.550.  
In the realm of legislation and policy, in the United States, democracy has all but 
disappeared for the average citizen. In a study which used a multivariate analysis to 
gauge the effect of economic elites and interest groups on U.S. government policy, 
Gilens and Page (2014) found that: “The central point that emerges from our research is 
that economic elites and organized groups representing business interests have 




groups and average citizens have little or no independent influence” (p. 565). In contrast 
to majoritarian pluralist theories of American democracy that posit that “all interests 
have at least a minimum of influence in group-dominated policy making” and that the 
“wants or needs of the average citizen tend to be reasonably well served by the 
outcomes of interest-group struggle,” Gilens and Page argue that: “When the 
preferences of economic elites and the stands of organized interest groups are 
controlled for, the preferences of the average American appear to have only a 
minuscule, near-zero, statistically non-significant impact upon public policy” (pp. 566-
567, 575).  
When the alarming findings of Davies, Sandström, Shorrocks, and Wolff (2008) 
and Gilens and Page (2014), among others, are considered, one would be hard pressed 
to reach any other conclusion than that, at least in the United States, contrary to the 
argument of the authors of the Trilateral Commission’s Crisis of Democracy, the real 
crisis of democracy is not an excess of democracy, but a near total lack of democracy. 
One must also ask how the United States can maintain such a relatively stable, 
peaceful society in the face of such inequality and lack of political power for the majorit 
of citizens. Of course, there is no single reason for this. Surely, one reason is that, 
although wealth and income are highly unequally distributed, the general level of wealth 
is quite high and the needs of most of the population are met, and even their political 
desires are sometimes achieved, if only because, as Gilens and Page (2014) explain, 
some of the political desires of the average citizen are shared by the elites who truly 
affect policy. However, there are other reasons, and the one offered here is that 




 Gilens and Page (2014) discuss this very explanation. They identify three “faces 
of power”: the first “face” refers to “the ability of actors to shape policy outcomes on 
contested issues”; the second “face” refers to “the ability to shape the agenda of issues 
that policy makers consider”, in other words, the spectrum of  that are able to make it to 
the stage of even being desired or opposed by the public; and, the third “face” of power 
refers to “the ability of elites to shape the public’s preferences” (p. 576). The argument 
presented here is that propaganda works to affect all three of these “faces”, but, as a 
technology of governance, it particularly affects the second and third “faces” of power. 
In a highly unequal, but affluent and well-educated society like the United States, the 
governors of society maintain the status quo more effectively by influencing desires, 
preferences, opinions, and standpoints in general, and by controlling what issues and 
ideas achieve visibility for public consideration.  
 The forms that propaganda takes are varied and range from influencing 
the reporting of the news and the framing of discussions on important political issues as 
outlined by Chomsky and Herman (2002), to influencing and creating the content for 
entertainment products such as cinematic films and video games. In the United States, 
the military and the national security apparatus are deeply involved in creating 
propaganda in the form of entertainment media for the purpose of inculcating a positive 
opinion of the U.S. military and the “intelligence community” and projecting an image of 
strength and competency at home and abroad. In an editorial for a special issue of the 
American Journal of Economics and Sociology dealing specifically with the relationship 
between the Department of Defense, the CIA, and Hollywood, Cobb (2017), describing 




makes sense as part of a broader effort to limit dissent in the United States by 
managing the information available to citizens,” adding that, “The obvious reason the 
national security establishment has become imbedded in the production of 
entertainment products is to persuade the public to view the world in a way that is 
compatible with the ideology of DoD and the CIA” (pp. 243, 263). The relationship 
between Hollywood and the military and security apparatus takes the form of the latter 
providing access to material such as weapons or aircraft and physical sites in exchange 
for the ability to review and edit scripts for films. Access to actual material and locations 
is important to Hollywood because it helps film producers create the illusion of realism 
that contemporary audiences demand. Without the access provided by the Department 
of Defense and the CIA, recreating such material would cost millions, increasing 
productions costs and eating into profits. In this arrangement both sides benefit; 
Hollywood gets to make ultra-realistic blockbusters more cheaply, and the military and 
security apparatus gain the ability to shape the way they are perceived. Films are 
especially effective for propagandistic purposes, since “movies can overcome doubts 
and reservations that arguments cannot touch. Movies are thus a powerful form of 
propaganda. The public watches them because they are entertaining, but while we are 
being entertained, we are also being conditioned to see the world in a way that aligns 
with the views of the U.S. national security establishment” (Cobb, 2017, pp. 238-239). 
Propaganda efforts extend past entertainment. A key target of propaganda 
efforts in the United States has been intellectuals. Cobb (2017) mentions the possible 
involvement of the CIA in influencing the attitudes of conservative intellectuals toward 




due to its excessive involvement in the politics of foreign nations. However, by 
supporting William F. Buckley’s magazine, National Review, during its struggling early 
years, the CIA helped to create a brand of conservativism that was expansionist and 
interventionist. The CIA’s efforts to influence both the conservative and liberal sides of 
the spectrum in the US is explored in much greater detail by Saunders (2013) who 
reveals how the agency sponsored organizations such as the Congress of Cultural 
Freedom in a bid to combat the growth of communism by supporting the efforts of 
artists, writers, and intellectuals of the non-communist left (NCL). 
The main argument of the dissertation is that the pejorative connotation that the 
term “propaganda” now evokes, and that the equation of propaganda with lies, are both 
incorrect and unhelpful in understanding what the propaganda is and how it works. 
Instead, the dissertation will argue that propaganda is an activity more akin to what is 
normally considered education. This will be done by examining the viral internet video 
KONY 2012 as an example of a new type of propaganda. Several researchers have 
analyzed this video from varying standpoints including critical cultural studies, group 
psychological, and anthropological frameworks. The analysis of the KONY 2012 show 
that, far from being merely lies meant to deceive, propaganda can more adequately be 
explained as a type of technology of governance, or, a tool for carrying out the “conduct 
of conduct” (Wimberly, 2017).  
There are many types of activity which can be described as “educational” and 
what is meant by education here is not the narrow type of education that exists to 
transmit technical or manual skills (vocational or “social efficiency” education), but rather 




and the world. This broader sense of the word education is closer to how the pragmatist 
philosopher John Dewey conceived of education. Indeed, this connection was noted by 
the French philosopher Jacques Ellul in his study of propaganda: “Stalinist propaganda 
was in great measure founded on Pavlov’s theory of the conditioned reflex. Hitlerian 
propaganda was in great measure founded on Freud’s theory of repression and libido. 
American propaganda is founded in great measure on Dewey’s theory of teaching” 
(Ellul, 1968, p. 5).  
 Obviously, Ellul does not mean that Dewey’s educational philosophy is 
essentially propaganda, or that his philosophy is sinister and therefore more conducive 
to being repurposed for propaganda techniques and is furthermore an ineffective or 
“bad” philosophy by virtue of this association. In fact, there is much evidence to show 
that Ellul had much respect for the educational philosophy of Dewey and other 
“progressive” educators. More likely the case is that Dewey’s educational philosophy 
was, if Ellul is to be believed, used as a template by American marketers and 
propagandists precisely because of its effectiveness at achieving its aim, namely, to 
prepare students to live in a particularly type of society or way-of-living; a democracy, in 
Dewey’s case.  
The insight from Ellul that the dissertation will take advantage of is that a holistic 
educational philosophy such as Dewey’s may also be useful in preparing the mind for 
life in a type of society very different from that which Dewey thought ideal, if the merely 
the form of that educational method is utilized and not its spirit. Therefore, returning to 
the point of how propaganda will be defined in the dissertation, I characterize 




world within its targets (the audience). I do not argue that all education is propaganda, 
but rather that all propaganda is a type of educational enterprise or undertaking that, 
like moral or ethical education, seeks to cultivate a new type of human subject with new 
opinions and desires.  
 Following from this it must be said what I am not arguing. I am not arguing that 
everything is propaganda. Such a facile and loose definition would make any further 
examination of propaganda quite pointless. However, the definition of propaganda 
cannot be so simple in the opposite way either, that there is a simple and clear 
delineation between propaganda and “true” information. It is not true that propaganda is 
always and only lies and falsehoods meant to deceive, or that it is an activity carried out 
only by repressive totalitarian regimes. We must realize that there exists are range of 
different types of propaganda, from the crude anti-German posters and fliers of World 
War I, to Hitler’s campaigns against “decadent” art and music, to the subtle influence 
exerted on Hollywood productions by the US Department of Defense’s film liaison’s 
office.   
The range of types propaganda is paralleled by the description of persuasive 
rhetoric given by the literary theorist Kenneth Burke: “All told, persuasion ranges from 
the bluntest quest for advantage, as in sales promotion or propaganda, through 
courtship, social etiquette, education, and the sermon, to a ‘pure’ form that delights in 
the process of appeal for itself alone, without ulterior purpose” (Burke, 1950: xiv). 
 Now, if we cannot say that “everything is propaganda”, and if we accept that 
there exists a range of propaganda that includes crude forms and the subtle and 




definition of propaganda as an educative enterprise as stated above, the dissertation 
will take the position that propaganda is a persuasive (rhetorical), educational enterprise 
which can be produced by an individual or by a group, and which is targeted towards a 
group and not just a single individual. Propaganda must be created with some specific 
agenda in mind, to affect some concrete result, and its target must be a mass of 







































INTRODUCTION: PROPAGANDA: THE ANTIDOTE TO WILLFULNESS 
 
 
Research investigating the educational uses of technology outside of the 
traditional categories of LMSs (learning management systems) and MOOCs (Massive 
Online Open Courses) has started to increase and now many researchers are 
investigating the effects of using social media on learning outcomes, student 
engagement, etc.… (DePietro 2013; Dumpit & Fernandez, 2017; Manca & Ranieri, 
2016; Ricoy & Feliz, 2016; Bernot, Jacquemin, & Smelser, 2014). In accordance with 
the first stated goal, the dissertation will not address this new development in 
educational technology but will rather address how these technologies are “educational” 
outside of the classroom. 
Much of the literature and discussions about both new learning technologies and 
social media is optimistic, with many educators and researchers proclaiming the 
emergence a “convergence culture” that allows “produsers” the ability to create and 
share and of the ability of new education technologies to bring accessible education to 
more people (Jenkins, 2008; Ricoy & Feliz, 2016); while others note that these new 
technologies offer “...opportunities to move away from the last century's highly 
centralized, industrial model of learning and toward individual learner empowerment 
through designs that focus on collaborative, networked interaction” (Mcloughlin & Lee 
2008). While the importance of social media technology has been recognized and there 
exists much anecdotal evidence of its benefits researchers are now beginning to focus 




effective strategies for utilization (Gao, Luo, & Zhang, 2012; Greenhow & Askari, 2017; 
Manca & Ranieri, 2016),  
 These assessments of the potential of social media technology are valuable 
since these technologies do present a whole new set of challenges for educators but 
also hold the potential to aid educators in overcoming traditional educational challenges 
such as student engagement and accurate assessment of student progress. However, 
what the current discussion misses is the broad field where social media technology, 
entertainment, and education overlap outside of traditional learning spaces. The use of 
social media for educative purposes is not the preoccupation solely of those within the 
traditional professions of teaching and school administration. My argument is that 
purposeful education, in the broader sense I hope to convey, is carried out by actors 
outside the traditional institutions of learning and that the field in which they operate is 
the world of technologically-mediated ideology and representation. My argument is 
therefore in favor of the centrality of a critical literacy approach to social media as 
entertainment and education. My position thus broadly echoes that of Masterman 
(1983), but updated for our current time in which social media and social networking are 
ubiquitous:  
The case for media education must rest upon the idea that the media are 
actively involved in constructing 'reality' rather than neutrally transmitting 
it. That is, they deal in representations and the ideological power of the 
media is roughly proportional to the apparent naturalness of these 
representations. The ideological potency of a medium arises precisely 




'true' an inevitably partial and selective (and, in Britain, almost always 
white, male, middle class, middle-aged and heterosexual) view of the 
world. (p. 45) 
In its analysis, my dissertation draws upon the fields of British cultural studies, Frankfurt 
School critical theory and the work of the Prague Linguistic Circle, new media studies, 
critical media literacy, visual rhetoric, and semiotics.  
 This dissertation participates in the perennial discussion of the extent to which 
media affect audiences. A historical predecessor of some of the issues that will be 
addressed in the dissertation is the response of the American pragmatist philosopher 
John Dewey to the ideas of his contemporary, the public intellectual Walter Lippmann, 
concerning the feasibility of participatory democracy. In his book, Public Opinion (1922), 
Lippmann addressed the difficulty of governing a complex, democratic society in an age 
when communications technology was rapidly improving. It was in this book that he 
coined the phrase “the Manufacture of Consent” to refer to the media’s role in shaping 
the opinions of the public and policy makers. Lippmann’s ideas were later manipulated 
to great effect by Edward Bernays, the “father” of the field of public relations who 
applied his experience creating propaganda for the American government during the 
First World War to the nascent field of marketing and advertising. Later, this phrase 
became important for critical media studies when Edward S. Herman and Noam 
Chomsky used it in their 1988 book of the same name. 
 The contemporary context for this dissertation is the cluster of discussions and 
debates about popular media like video games and films. Several researchers have 




involved in the development, creation, and dissemination of several popular media 
within many formats (Mirrlees, 2015; Schiller, 1992; Der Derian, 2000). The purpose of 
this involvement is to create media that will shape the way audiences view the military 
and its actions.  
 The U.S. military is not the only one participating in the creation of media. The 
military itself is concerned with the increasingly savvy use of media by terror groups 
who not only use terror attacks to create media spectacles—which is what terrorist 
attacks, in fact, are—but who also create their own media to further their own messages 
(Dauber, 2009). 
 
Social Media and Its Effects 
The advent of social media and post-web 2.0 social networking sites has 
changed the way that both audiences and media producers participate in media. Video-
sharing sites like YouTube are of particular importance. YouTube, with its unparalleled 
number of users and videos been recognized as a catalyst for a change in the 
relationship between media producers and audiences (Blatterberg, 2015). YouTube’s 
own statistics show that site has over one billion users and reaches more young people 
than any cable network in the US. The site has been credited with dismantling the 
hierarchical relationship and monopolistic control of the flow of information held by 
traditional media.  
 Even if the effects were small, it is obvious that media, of all kinds, have a much 
greater access to viewers than any official educational institution (at least in wealthy, 




between 30 and 35 hours a week in class, about 140 hours a month. However, 
Americans spend almost 150 hours per month watching television, and almost 30 using 
mobile devices (Koblin, 2016; Nielson, 2014). Social media sites and entertainment 
account for around 35% of the activity of mobile device users in the USA. 24% of teens 
are online “almost constantly” and 92% go online at least once daily (Lenhart, 2015). 
Since these devices can be used anywhere and are used only when the owner is 
motivated to use them they present the best opportunity access those who access 
media when they are most motivated and receptive; whereas a student can spend 
hours in a classroom yet be disengaged for much or all of that time.  
 
Theoretical Approach 
The analytical framework of the dissertation will rest on three main pillars; the 
theories of British Cultural Studies in the tradition of the likes of Raymond Williams and 
Stuart Hall; The field of Critical Discourse Analysis pioneered by Norman Fairclough; 
and the semiotic theories of the Tartu-Moscow Semiotic School and of the Prague 
Linguistic Circle, particularly the work of Yuri Lotman and Roman Jakobson. The 
foundation on which these pillars rest in an explicitly Marxist understanding of cultural 
production exemplified by the Critical Theory of the Frankfurt School, especially the 
thought of Walter Benjamin and Siegfried Kracauer, and Adorno and Horkheimer’s 
notion of the “culture industry”. This Marxist foundation is highly inflected by the work of 
other theorists such as Walter Lippmann, Jacques Ellul, Guy Debord, John Dewey, and 




 The central theoretical thrust of the dissertation is the idea that propaganda and 
education must be understood as being essentially the same kind of activity; indeed, 
they may just be two different words for the same act in most cases. The differences 
between what we call “education” and what we call “propaganda” are mostly formal, 
pertaining to the kinds of institutions in which these activities take place, or to the 
subject matter that the activity concerns. Given the very pejorative, negative connotation 
the word “propaganda” has in contemporary English, this may seem an outlandish 
statement to some. However, if “propaganda” is taken back to its older, deeper meaning 
of “spreading” or “propagating” (versus “propagandizing”) then the comparison becomes 
much less implausible (Ross, 2002). 
 Therefore, much like the rote memorization of words and phrases only comprises 
a small portion of what we consider education, the production and dissemination of 
explicit slogans and lies with the naked intent to persuade only comprises a small 
portion of activity that can be considered propaganda. It will be the argument of the 
dissertation that the vast majority of propaganda consists in the building and the tending 
of an environment of information— what Walter Lippmann called a “pseudo-
environment”—, a world of accessible knowledge that connects (“mediates”) people to 
events and phenomena. Although crude forms of explicit propaganda do exist the most 
effective propaganda consists in constructing or altering a whole semiologic world in 
which people make sense of happenings. Real propaganda sets the boundaries of the 
rhetorical-conceptual space, by influencing the very assumptions and information 
people need to make rational decisions it separates the space of the “thinkable” from 




we call “education” in the sense of its modern, institutional form, as a transmitter of 
ideology and world views.  
 In addition to this world building, effective propaganda uses feelings or trends 
that are already present within a social grouping, amplifying and directing them to its 
own purposes. Other techniques of effective propaganda are the construction of an in-
group “identity” (what Kenneth Burke called “identification”) and the designation of an 
“other” against whom negative energies can be directed. By examining propaganda in 
this way the dissertation will show that propaganda happens throughout society, from 
advertisements to recreational games, and most pertinent, throughout social media. 
Indeed, the scope, reach, and intensity of propaganda have increased tremendously as 
a result of the advent of social media and social networking sites. 
 One perennial issue which concerns any study of media and its effects is the 
question of just how effective, if at all, media is in shaping the beliefs and opinions of an 
audience. A related question concerns not just what kinds of effects media have but 
how audiences interpret or “read” the media texts they experience. In his seminal paper, 
“Encoding/Decoding”, Stuart Hall (2006) presents a tripartite model of audiences’ 
decoding of media texts. Hall argues that audiences can interpret media in one of three 
ways; a dominant/hegemonic reading which is the “preferred” reading and aligns with 
the position of the media creators/encoders, a negotiated reading which is a mixture of 
adaptive and ambivalent positions, and the oppositional reading which in a direct 
contradiction to the ideological position encoded by the media creators. Hall’s model 




Network (1976); a media landscape dominated by huge conglomerates and driven by 
the hunt for ratings. 
 Hall’s model brought an understanding of the importance class difference and 
ideology to the study of communications, although he didn’t address other factors 
affecting audience interpretations (Schrøder, 2000). However, in response to the 
increasing popularity of his theory other scholars began to argue that audience 
reactions could not be categorized so simply, and these scholars promoted a 
“polysemic” approach to analyzing audience responses. Analysts like Fiske (1989) 
emphasized the “power and pleasure” of individuals making their own readings of 
media.  
One famous example that complicates Hall’s schema is the “Archie Bunker 
Effect”. This effect refers to the show All in the Family and its protagonist, Archie 
Bunker, who was racist and sexist. The show’s creators intended for Bunker to be a 
negative example; however, the character became popular with a sizable portion of the 
audience that agreed with his views (Singhal and Rogers, 2004). The Archie Bunker 
Effect shows the difficulty of determining exactly the difference between a “preferred” 
reading and a reading that is “dominant/hegemonic”. All in the Family’s creators, 
following the general social shift against overt racism and sexism, intended that viewers 
would come to view Bunker negatively, but some viewers read the character in a way 
that was against both the prevailing social trends and the intents of the show’s creators. 




 One way to remedy this conundrum without rejecting Hall’s brilliant insights is to 
broaden his framework to include the possibility of each viewer or audience member 
occupying a multiplicity of positions relative to media at any one time while at the same 
time understanding that these positions exist within the matrix of a culture which is 
shaped by history and continues to morph through time. This would account for the 
changing nature of the definitions of what is “dominant/hegemonic” and “oppositional” 
while at the same time making possible a concrete analysis of different interpretive 
positions for specific social/temporal contexts.  
 This kind of approach is important and useful as the messages encoded in media 
and the nature of media themselves have changed in a manner similar to the changes 
that have affected the ways that media are created and distributed. Our culture can be 
said to now be in a period of “cultural explosion”, a period when social arrangements 
and structures are radically changed. During a period such as this, Ideologies and sub-
cultures that exist at the periphery of the dominant culture may move to the center as 
the center seeks to stabilize and maintain the system (Semenenko, 2012). During a 
period of explosion, a position at the periphery become the very thing that allows certain 
ideologies and ways-of-being to occupy a new position near the center of the culture.  
 Understanding messages encoded in a variety of media—not just news 
programs, for example—in this way allows for more flexible explanations of how 
“dominant” or “preferred” readings in Hall’s framework can still exist in an environment 
like our present social media landscape where a multiplicity of media producers and 
different preferred readings exists. We no longer live in the world of Network, despite 




conglomerates still exist to be sure, but now the possibility exists for any person with 
access to the internet and an Instagram or YouTube account to offer competition with 
these legacy media giants. Theories of media must account for an environment in which 
idiosyncratic ideologies and messages are encoded but also exist within the matrix of a 




 This essay argues that propaganda should properly be understood as a 
rhetorical activity. Such a definition provides a better explanation of what propaganda is 
than the commonsense notion that propaganda is merely “lies produced by our 
enemies”. This definition also explains, in part, why propaganda has such a negative 
reputation. Aristotle defines rhetoric as the: “ability, in each…case, to see the available 
means of persuasion” (Aristotle, 2007, p. 37). Thus, he defines as a skill, a potential or 
capacity, rather than the realized product of that capacity. The ability to see what is 
persuasive also gives one the ability to see what is only “apparently persuasive”, and by 
this Aristotle means the ability to recognize fallacious arguments that have the form of a 
valid argument.  
However, for Aristotle, rhetoric is also practical and useful art and he compares 
the ability to defend oneself by means of words to the ability to defend oneself 
physically. Perhaps the most important reason rhetoric is useful is that by understanding 
persuasion one will gain the ability to defend what is just and true and therefore lead the 




correct manner. For Aristotle (2007), the true and the just are “nature stronger than their 
opposites,” the bad and the unjust, and to allow the unjust to prevail over the just would 
be condemnable (p. 35).  
 In Book 1 of the Rhetoric identifies three “intrinsic” pisteis, or means of 
persuasion: ethos, factors relating to the character of the speaker; pathos, the emotional 
disposition of the listener; and logos, the ability to show the truth from what is 
intrinsically apparent in the situation (logic).  Aristotle believes that it is wrong to “warp 
the jury by leading them into anger or envy or pity,” therefore he believes that the use of 
logic is preferable to the first two pisteis. In Book 1 of the Rhetoric (but not in the later 
books) Aristotle seems to argue that rhetoric should be completely based on the use of 
logical argumentation. Throughout the book he disparages other teachers of rhetoric 
who advocate using emotion or the introduction of “outside” factors and situations into 
an argument. Among these teachers are the Sophists; concerning them, Aristotle says 
that their style of rhetoric “is not a matter of ability but of deliberate choice… [of 
specious arguments] (p. 36). For Aristotle a sophist lacks the ability to discern the 
proper means of persuasion and therefore does not practice the true art of rhetoric, 
which he calls an “offshoot” of Socratic dialectic and ethical studies.  
 Aristotle was no doubt influenced in his opinions of rhetoric by his teacher Plato, 
the author of the Socratic dialogues. In the Phaedrus Socrates emphasizes the 
importance of knowledge of the subjects about which one argues and stresses logical 
argument. In the Gorgias Socrates and says that rhetoric is a part of flattery and a 
shadow of politics and that the rhetoric that the Sophists practice is not a true art since 




any argument. He gives an analogy, saying that rhetoric is to justice what cooking is to 
medicine. In other words, without a knowledge of what is healthy cooking and eating 
what merely tastes good, but is not good to the body, will cause harm to the body, just 
as the use of the power to persuade will cause great damage to an individual or nation if 
the wielder of that power does not have a clear concept of what is good. Socrates 
argues that the difference between philosophers and dialectic is that the former have a 
concept of the good and the latter is a method for coming to know the good; whereas 
Gorgias, in the eponymous dialogue, praises rhetoric forgiving its practitioners the 
power to best even experts in a certain field in an argument.  
 The conflict between the philosophers and the sophists explains in great part the 
negative connotations associated with propaganda (of course, a great deal of the 
hostility is due to the fact that no one likes to feel deceived are duped into believing or 
agreeing to something false or inferior). The modern propagandists, starting with men 
like Ivy Ledbetter Lee and Edward Bernays, can be thought of as modern sophists. In 
the ancient debate the philosophers, the followers of Plato and Aristotle, were the 
historical victors and we now know of the sophists primarily through the works and 
opinions of the philosophers. Although the 20th century saw a change in this trend, for 
most of its history Western philosophy has been concerned with the search for concrete 
answers and rhetoric only offers the ability to persuade.  
 One real weakness of rhetoric is that persuasion is difficult, sometimes 
impossible, unless the speaker and the audience share a common frame of reference 
linguistically, culturally, or ideologically. The philosopher Hans Blumenberg (1987) notes 




fellow Greeks the appropriate means was persuasion, but when dealing with barbarians 
(foreigners) the appropriate means is force. Blumenberg explains this difference as “one 
of language and education, because persuasion presupposes that one shares a 
horizon, allusions to prototypical material, and the orientation provided by metaphors 
and similes” (pp. 435-436). 
 In order to persuade more effectively, the propagandist must engineer common 
frames-of-reference. Rather than lying, what the propagandist really does is to frame a 
discussion, frame information and the possibilities of thought, and create a common 
way to think about a problem for the target audience. The propagandist draws the 
boundaries of what is thinkable and, as a result, conditions the conclusions the 
audience will reach;  
Propaganda is more a matter of “framing” information so as to induce people to 
draw desired conclusions than it is a matter of feeding people faulty information 
and insulating them against truthful information. Framing is typically conceived of 
as the careful selection of a vocabulary that prejudges the issues under 
discussion (Callaway, Clary-Lemon, Ramage, & Waggoner, 2009, p. 127)  
In the process of setting the bounds of an issue, propagandists create publics 
(Bratich, 2014, Terranova, 2007). With modern data science and communications 
technology this is much easier than in previous times, but the basic goal is to create 
those groups for whom the propagandists can successfully generate a frame-of-
reference to effect successful persuasion. Kenneth Burke (1969) called this 
“identification”, the act of emphasizing certain traits or characteristics of the speaker and 




propaganda shares with more commercial forms of persuasion like advertising and 
marketing:   
One of the most important lessons propagandists learn from advertisers’ 
concerns techniques for carefully dividing one’s audience, an art perfected by 
legions of demographic and psychographic researchers employed by marketers. 
Propaganda is, to use Ellul’s social scientific term, ‘partitioned’ (Callaway, Clary-
Lemon, Ramage, & Waggoner, 2009, p. 129)  
At least one commonality joins both lies and what can naively, in an 
epistemological sense, be called truths, or facts; that is, that those who receive both 
facts and lies and apprehend them with their minds, treat both as information to be 
processed. Lies are effective because those who believe them accept them as “truth”, 
and do not suspect that they could be otherwise; they have the same epistemic status 
as “truths”. Since human beings use not only information gained from direct experience 
to understand their worlds, but also make use of immaterial “information” such as “facts” 
and ideas to gain an understanding, the world in which they live can be molded to the 
extent that the information they receive can be controlled. This “informational world” is 
akin to what Walter Lippmann (1922) called the “pseudo-environment”.  
By controlling the informational world or pseudo-environments that people’s 
minds inhabit, propagandists gain a large measure of control over their actions and 
opinions. The use of lies is one way this is possible, but it is not the most effective, since 
outright lies will readily be disbelieved once direct, contrary evidence is encountered. 
Much more effective is the manipulation of the way information is presented. In the 




and judges affect their decisions, he also recognizes that the ethos, or ethical and 
physical qualities of a speaker can sway an audience, and people who encounter 
information in a museum or library or more likely to believe than if they had encountered 
the same information during a comedy sketch. Propagandists recognize these effects 
and make use of them rather than using simple lies. On this point, Jacques Ellul (2010) 
is quite insightful  
It is apparent that the relationship between propaganda and information is 
complex and difficult to assess. Their boundaries are vague and 
undefined. Almost inevitably information turns into propaganda; it makes 
propaganda possible, feeds it, and renders it necessary…Once again, let 
us refrain from erecting the kind of Manichean world that propaganda 
suggests—one side white, the other black, a good side, a bad side—
saintly information, on the one hand, diabolical propaganda, on the other. 
The truth about the devil is that he created ambiguity (p. 223) 
The propagandists and the rhetorician share the ability to see the possible 
means of persuasion and to exploit these possibilities. Whereas in ancient times these 
possibilities consisted mainly of speech, writing, and art and the power of these was 
limited by time and space—there was no recording or broadcasting technology—these 
days instantaneous digital communications, broadcasting, and recording technology 
have greatly amplified the possible means of persuasion. People who live in wealthy, 
developed, post-industrial nations now live in a near-ubiquitous, digitally-mediated, 




know and will never meet. The difference between the modern propagandist and the 
ancient rhetorician is thus one of scale and scope but not one of essence or kind.  
 
The KONY 2012 Campaign and Invisible Children 
 
Invisible Children is an NGO that was founded in 2004 by three young American 
college students; Jason Russell, Bobby Bailey, and Laren Poole. The three travelled to 
Africa for adventure and to get video footage, but in Northern Uganda they claim they 
met child refugees who were fleeing the Lord’s Resistance Army, which made use of 
child soldiers. The three friends were moved by the sight of the refugees and decided to 
learn more about the conflict and to spread awareness at home. They used their film-
making skills to create a documentary called, eponymously, Invisible Children.  
They screened their film across the country and worked to educate decision-
makers, celebrities, and politicians about Kony. Along with other NGOs, Resolve 
Uganda and the Enough project, Invisible Children successfully lobbied President 
Obama to sign into law the Lord’s Resistance Army Disarmament and Northern Uganda 
Recovery Act of 2001 (Enough Project, 2010). The law states that “it is the policy of the 
United States to work with regional governments” by “providing political, economic, 
military, and intelligence support,” to, “apprehend or remove Joseph Kony and his top 
commanders from the battlefield in the continued absence of a negotiated solution, and 
to disarm and demobilize the remaining Lord’s Resistance Army fighters” (Lord’s 




founders of Invisible Children were in the Oval Office when Obama signed the bill into 
law (Richardson, 2010). 
In early March of 2012 Invisible Children released another documentary, KONY 
2012. This documentary was released on YouTube and was a part of the NGOs plan to 
massively raise awareness of Kony in 2012. It became a hit and spread virally, grossing 
over 100 million views in the first six days, making it the most successful video 
campaign of its kind (Wasserman, 2012). Time Magazine ranked the video the most 
viral video of all time and a poll by the Pew Research Center suggested that 
approximately 50% of all American youth had seen the video (Goddard, Hall, Lala, 
McGarty, Stuart, & Thomas, 2015). The campaign encouraged participants to share the 
video with friends; to buy an “action kit” filled with campaign-branded goods like t-shirts 
and a military-style, dog tag bracelet; and to participate in global event called “Cover the 
Night” on April 20, 2012. Those who participated in the Cover the Night event were 
exhorted to cover public spaces with stickers and posters of Joseph Kony, obtained 
from Invisible Children, in an attempt to “make Kony famous”. The Cover the Night 
event failed to draw the same participation as the KONY 2012 video. A sequel to the 
film, titled KONY 2012 Part II, was released on April 5, 2012. On October 25, 2012 IC 
also released another YouTube video, entitled Move, which chronicles the creation of 
KONY 2012, and through this lens, the building of a youth movement that is not over 
and still has important work to do.  
 Invisible Children has been particularly successful in their efforts to lobby the US 
government. Their website boasts that IC has “mobilized thousands of young activists to 




protection and recovery of communities in central Africa targeted by the LRA and other 
violent threats,” which has resulted in $30 Million in U.S. foreign assistance to programs 
in Central Africa (Invisible Children, 2014). The NGO also claims that it was intimately 
involved in pushing Congress and President Obama to pass two bills into law; one, the 
aforementioned Lord’s Resistance Army Disarmament and Northern Uganda Recovery 
Act, and the second being S. 2318, the Department of State Rewards Program Update 
and Technical Corrections Act of 2012, a law that expands the State Department’s 
Reward’s for Justice Program, which financially remunerates individuals who provide 
information that leads to the arrest of persons wanted for war crimes and crimes against 
humanity. An official statement from the Obama White House regarding the expansion 
of S.2318 specifically mentions Joseph Kony and the LRA as examples of individuals 
and organizations that are targets covered by the legislation (The White House, Office 
of the Press Secretary, 2013). 
 
The KONY 2012 Video 
 
The KONY 2012 video is a story with a narrative arc that resembles a feature 
film. The video is an example of a mixed-genre media artifact and blends techniques 
from different styles film; the perspectives of documentary film-making,  the pacing and 
imagery of action films, a storyline that blends an Avengers-style superhero team-up 
film with the emotional highs of feel-good movies about disadvantaged youth. According 




uses several different documentary “modes”. He finds that the film is poetic in its 
cinematography and script, participatory in that it shows interactions between Russell 
and several organization and individuals, expository in the way it shows graphic scenes 
from Uganda, and reflexive in the way that Russell speaks about the purpose of the film 
directly to the viewer. However, he finds that the film does not employ an observational 
mode and lacks, “any sustained first-hand exploration of the war itself, in the villages of 
northern Uganda and other places directly affected by Kony’s atrocities” (p. 477).  The 
film starts with a promise Jason Russell made to a Ugandan child named Jacob that he 
would get help for Jacob and return to Uganda. The video shows how Russell gathers 
the forces of good to go to rescue Jacob and the other Ugandan children threatened by 
Kony.   
Symbolically, the film sets up a contrasting binary between Uganda, its people, 
and Kony on one hand, and America, Russell’s life, and Russell himself on the other. 
For example, there is a duality between Jason Russell's son, Gavin, and his nourishing 
home environment in middle-class America, and Jacob, the Ugandan boy who fled from 
Kony’s LRA. Uganda is a kind of shadow world of Jason’s life, and Jason’s counterpart 
in that world is the villain of the story, Joseph Kony.  
In the film Uganda is portrayed as a hellish world where, unlike Russell's son 
Gavin, children live in constant fear and insecurity. Kony is the villain of this story and 
he is portrayed as the source of evil in Uganda, and must be defeated if the children of 
Uganda are to have the kind of lives that Gavin enjoys. In the film Jason Russell is the 




American youth who will join forces with Russell to convince the US government to 
intervene in Uganda in order to “stop Kony”.  
While the video shows images of child refugees, child soldiers, and Kony's army, 
the LRA, except for excerpts of interviews with Ugandan associates of IC, the viewer is 
presented with virtually no other images or information about Uganda except those 
relating to Kony and his crimes. What the viewer is presented with is the typical 
representation of Africa and Africans as “black, masculine and barbaric; victims are 
vulnerable, black women and children; and saviours are white, rational, Western men,” 
and “The state is…constructed as the savage ‘other’ for failing to control barbaric 
behavior” (p. 99). 
Five minutes and 57 seconds into the film, Jason Russell exclaims that, 
regarding the situation in Uganda, “If that happened one night in America, it would be on 
the cover of Newsweek” (Invisible Children, 2012). At four minutes and 40 seconds, a 
uniformed Ugandan man appears from out of the shadows and orders Russell to stop 
filming an interview with Jacob. The purpose of these images is to elicit a sense of guilt 
and urgency from the target audience who, according to Fitzgerald (2013), is largely 
young, affluent, White-American, and female.  As mentioned above, propaganda is 
“partitioned”, or targeted towards certain demographics and segments of the population, 
in much the same way that consumer goods are and these affluent American youth are 
the target audience for this film. The images of suffering, poverty, and state censorship 




Musically, visually, and in terms of overall aesthetics the video are clearly 
marketed towards post-millennial American youth. The video and online campaign 
materials are quite inclusive and do not only show White youth but also include images 
of children of various ethnicities.  This multi-racial/multi-ethnic inclusion gives the 
campaign a much broader appeal. But the use of racist imagery and “White Savior” 
logic demonstrates that this is simply a veneer of inclusion and the film makers’ 
understanding of racial inclusion, much like their understanding of the complex political 
situation in Uganda, is shallow. The presence of youth of color in the campaign is 
similar to the “inclusive” marketing campaigns carried out by companies such as Italian 
clothing manufacturer The Benetton Group’s “United Colors of Benetton” campaign 
(Barela, 2003; Tinic, 1997) .  
In order to appeal to youth the film includes of-the-moment cultural artefacts with 
which young people would be familiar. For example, during the section of the film that 
introduces IC's plan to launch the “Cover the Night” guerilla marketing campaign on 
April 20, the music of electronic music producer Flux Pavilillion plays in the background. 
Flux Pavillion creates music in the genre known to most young Americans as "EDM" 
(Electronic Dance Music), which had exploded in popularity around the time of the 
video. The use of this particular style of music shows that the filmmakers understand 
their audience well and have strategically fashioned the film to appeal to this audience's 
sensibilities.  
The film also heavily exploits the American concept of youth as a time of 
rebellion and participation in social causes. The film feeds back to its audience images 




2012 campaign can be seen as a commodification of popular conceptions of radical left 
revolution. The images of youth running through urban environments while spray-
painting political slogans on concrete, the red and black color scheme—traditionally the 
colors associated with Communism and the left—and the $30 "action kit" are clear 
examples of the appropriation of radical imagery in order to lend the campaign an aura 
of “radical chic”.  
The "action kit" could be purchased from the IC website and contained bracelets, 
t-shirts, bumper stickers, and buttons branded with the logos and colors of the KONY 
2012 campaign. An IC advertisement for the kit declares: “People will think you're an 
advocate of awesome with this official Action Kit. Since KONY 2012 is a yearlong 
campaign, you can decorate yourself and the town all year long with this one-stop shop” 
(Kennedy, T. M., Middleton, J. I., & Ratcliffe, K., 2017, p. 97). The "action kit" is a 
“revolution-in-a-box”, an off-the-shelf “solution” borne of a consumer culture in which 
identities are formed through purchases. It represents revolution as a brand, as a 
lifestyle, but not as a means of actual challenging the dominant institutions of society. 
Such branding and commodification are not unique to the KONY 2012 campaign. Other 
politically-orientated campaigns that targeted youth with slick branding and marketing 
will be discussed in Chapter 5.  
 





The KONY 2012 video and campaign immediately drew interest and scrutiny 
from journalists, activists, and researchers. Many considered it a perfect example of 
clicktivism, or what Evgeny Morozov (2009) calls “slacktivism”. The failure of the Cover 
the Night event to generate the same general enthusiasm as the online video has been 
explored by Goddard, Hall, Lala, McGarty, Stuart, and Thomas (2015), who ask: “Are 
online mobilization and traditional socio-political action qualitatively different phenomena 
that need to be explained in different ways, or are they aspects of the same thing?” (p. 
356). In order to answer this question, they explore whether online and traditional 
mobilization phenomena have the same psychological underpinnings and explore the 
nature and function of social identity in modern forms of social action. Their study found 
support for the idea that movements like KONY 2012 operate by creating a sense of 
solidarity amongst those who share similar opinions about justice and the way the world 
should be that crosses social categorical group boundaries.  The researchers did not 
find, however, evidence that participation in the campaign was dependent on some type 
of “global identity”.  
These findings are corroborated by Finnegan (2013a) who interviewed 60 
Invisible Children student activists and employees. Finnegan found that Invisible 
Children was “very successful in mobilizing affluent, Christian, and largely female 
activists to ‘save Africa’ from itself” (p. 31). Finnegan found that most IC activists were 
affluent and aware of their privilege, and, as a result, probably felt some guilt about the 
discrepancy between their own lives and those of the Ugandans portrayed in the video. 
One activist she interviewed admitted that participating in the campaign afforded her “an 




concludes that Invisible Children offered its mostly affluent, White female supporters “an 
easy, non-contentious form of activism that does not threaten the students’ futures”, nor 
directly challenge existing institutions and authorities; as one male activist said, Invisible 
Children are unlike anti-WTO protestors in that they want to “work within the system” 
(pp. 33-34). 
Finnegan (2013b) argues that Invisible Children’s KONY 2012 campaign is a part 
of a  
Noncontentious form of activism for privileged young Americans that is unlikely to 
lead to sustainable social change in Africa or the United States because it 
sponsors a narrative in which Africa remains an object to be manipulated by 
outsiders instead of a dynamic context with talented and knowledgeable actors, 
compelling ideas, and potential resources (p. 137) 
Finnegan performed ethnographic fieldwork with IC activists in Uganda and the United 
States. The fieldwork was carried out in two phases, during which Finnegan interviewed 
forty-eight people involved with IC. Through the many interviews and time spent 
observing IC operations in the US and in Uganda Finnegan concludes that, “In the end, 
Invisible Children’s efforts are much more about the privileged young American 
participants and their journeys of identity than real sustainable social change in Africa,” 
and that the KONY 2012 campaign reinforces the trend of U.S. militarism and 
imperialism on the African continent, represented by the establishment of the AFRICOM 




Attempting to explain the appeal of Ugandan tragedy to Western audiences, 
Edmonson (2012) conjectures that, whereas the problems of South Sudan or the Congo 
are too extreme, and those of Kenya and Tanzania are too tame, those of Uganda are 
within a Goldilocks “just right” level of tragedy such that keeps Westerners interested 
without shocking them too much. Edmonson ponders the reasons why KONY 2012 
does not delve into the actions of Joseph Kony’s LRA in neighboring countries such as 
Congo and the Central African Republic which are more current and more devastating 
that the LRA’s activity in Uganda.  
Harsin (2013) approaches the video and its viral phenomenon from a 
Communication and Critical/Cultural Studies (CCCS) framework, asking “WTF was 
KONY 2012?”, Harsin argues that no theory has sufficiently explained the online viral 
success of the video yet its subsequent failure to mobilize masses in the “Cover the 
Night” event (beyond alluding to the well-publicized mental breakdown of IC co-founder 
Jason Russell). Harsin posits that the KONY 2012 viral phenomenon offers scholars of 
CCCS a chance to create the “digital age equivalent” of David Morley’s (1986) landmark 
Family Television study. Harsin also explores the importance of affect, emotional 
contagion, and social media and conjectures that recent work on mirror neurons might 
be helpful in explaining the bandwagon effect seen in phenomena like KONY 2012. 
Harsin suggests that KONY 2012 could be a powerful example that would allow a return 
to thinking about ideology after a turn in towards cultural populism in Critical Theory that 
“romanticized the audience-agent as resistant to hegemony”, but failed to understand 
that “resistance was not really politics, especially when it was reduced to reading text 




Engelhardt and Jansz (2014) explore the moral pressure the Kony video exerted 
on viewers and how the media and online backlash mitigated its effects. The authors 
discuss the ability of Invisible Children to overcome a “post-humanitarian” “crisis of pity” 
which has caused a heightened suspicion of towards the authenticity and 
representations of suffering. In the post-humanitarian period humanitarian organizations 
focus on branding and shift from challenges to political structures towards more 
apolitical, issue-specific appeals (p. 471). The authors performed an email survey of 
204 participants in which only two had not heard of the KONY 2012 campaign. The 
authors conclude that the success of the KONY campaign is a result of IC’s focus on 
individuals—Jason Russell, his son, and the Ugandan boy Jacob—rather than on the 
complex political situation within Uganda; Russell stands as an intermediary between 
the largely Western audience and the Ugandan turmoil portrayed in the video. The 
authors conclude that this is how IC was able to circumvent the problem of what 
Chouliaraki (2013) calls the “Ironic Spectator”, an ambivalent figure who is both 
skeptical to moral appeals yet open to offering help.  
Archer-Brown, Bal, Hall, and Robson (2013) use a theory of viral marketing to 
analyze the Kony 2012 video in order to help marketers better understand how to use 
YouTube and other such platforms to spread their messages. They use Mills’ (2012) 
SPIN framework— spreadability, propagativity, integration and nexus—to analyze the 
KONY 2012 phenomenon and to compare the viral spread of the KONY 2012 video to 
the infamous video of Invisible Children co-founder Jason Russell’s mental breakdown. 




marketing (WOMM) they use a definition of viral marketing from Mills (2012), defining 
viral marketing as:  
The strategic release or seeding of branded content into the socially networked 
online consumer ecosystem, followed by the potentially multiplicative spread of 
the content through the ecosystem as hosts (consumers) receive the content and 
are motivated to share the branded content with other consumers (p. 203)  
This definition of viral marketing is preferable to the WOMM definition since it 
recognizes that a viral phenomenon is self-propelled, exponential, and based on an 
artifact (like a video) rather than on information alone.  
Briones, Janoske, and Madden (2016) explore social media as a double-edged 
sword that both helped IC’s cause and caused trouble for the organization. The authors 
found that social media allowed IC to spread its message quickly but that it also allowed 
for criticism and negative feedback to inundate the organization. Their study found that 
several factors contributed to the meteoric success of KONY 2012, including: 
connection to a global audience, tapping into key influencers (celebrities and policy-
makers), and IC’s ability to bring a new issue to global awareness.  
In the wake of an announcement by Invisible Children that due to falling 
donations and revenue the organization would have to cease operations by the end of 
2015, Cheney (2015) examines the lasting effects Invisible Children and the KONY2012 
campaign might have on future international youth activism. Cheney notes that while 
most people over the age of 30 had probably never heard of Invisible Children, the NGO 




their pre-KONY 2012 documentary, Invisible Children: The Rough Cut. Cheney, like 
Engelhardt and Jansz (2014) sees the KONY 2012 video as an example of 
“spectacular” or “ironic” spectatorship that operates on a politics of pity while 
perpetuating global inequality. Cheney also echoes the critique that KONY 2012 was a 
“post-humanitarian” commodification and corporatization of activism. Cheney explains 
that the “distinction between non-governmental organizations (NGOs) like IC, and 
businesses, is…increasingly blurred,” and that this blurring was a conscious strategy on 
the part of IC (p. 9). According to Cheney, the KONY 2012 campaign was successful in 
part because it operated on a politics of fear, and that IC had “built an anti-intellectual 
organizational culture” in which members prided themselves on “at least doing 
something” about problems in Uganda.  
Sebastian and Titeca (2014) examine the failure of the KONY 2012 campaign 
and Invisible Children’s eventual reduction of activities using an all-too-appropriate 
private sector business model. The authors mention the influence on Invisible Children’s 
leaders of the ideas of entrepreneur-philanthropist Dan Pallotta. Pallotta, who also was 
a member of IC’s advisory board, argues that charities should be run according to 
private sector principles. Pallotta advocates “multiplication philanthropy”2, the idea that 
charities should employ “market-based models [that] prioritize surplus-centered risk and 
large investments in personnel as a way of generating the largest possible return on 
their investment”. Sebastian and Titeca argue that, under the sway of this paradigm, IC 
made “Dubious, exaggerated, and sometimes incorrect casual relations and 
information…in order to simplify the conflict and inflate Invisible Children’s role in 






stopping it”. The authors note that, ironically, KONY 2012, which was intended to 
increase IC’s audience and extend their influence, actually led to the failure of the 
organization’s operations since the exaggerations presented in the video generated 
criticism and a backlash that interfered with IC’s fundraising efforts at their huge national 




The dissertation will proceed in a series of chapters analyzing different 
propagandistic facets of the KONY 2012 humanitarian campaign. The dissertation will 
analyze the use of images, sounds, and words used in these cases but will also 
investigate the stories behind this instances of social media use by asking the 
questions: For what purpose was the media used? Who was the target audience?, 
What kind of change in the viewer was desired by the creators of the media? What 
follows is a summary of each chapter. 
Chapter 1: The History of Propaganda  will contain a discussion and clarification 
of the definition and history of propaganda; questions concerning the ambiguity of the 
status of propaganda will be discussed and different definitions of propaganda given by 
various researchers will be examined. Particularly in Anglophone countries the word 
“propaganda” conjures up images of Orwellian totalitarian regimes strictly controlling 
individual expression and constantly pumping slogans into the people’s brains. This 
reaction to the concept of propaganda itself is a result of propaganda, since after the 




been the target of propaganda from the United Kingdom and their own government, 
therefore attaching a negative connotation to the term (Bernays, 2005; Taylor, 2003). 
Those who are quick to associate propaganda with lies propagated by “unfree regimes” 
have forgotten (or, perhaps they never knew) that many of the pioneers of propaganda 
were Americans like Ivy Ledbetter Lee, George Creel, Walter Lippmann, and Edward 
Bernays. In truth, both the aforementioned pioneers of propaganda and modern 
practitioners employ much more subtle means and techniques that mere falsehoods 
(Wimberly, 2017). In order to dispel the myth of propaganda as lie this first chapter will 
examine the history of propaganda from its inception in the post-Reformation Catholic 
Church and present an overview of the theories of prominent researchers of 
propaganda that offer a fuller understanding of how it operates.   
Chapter 2: Dewey and Lippmann: Propaganda as a Technology of Governance 
and the Place of Education will deal with the early history of propaganda and public 
relations in America, illustrating the necessity for conceiving of propaganda more 
broadly in an age inundated with instant electronic communications and social media. 
This chapter will begin with a discussion of John Dewey’s response to Walter 
Lippmann’s ideas about communication and society in his book, Public Opinion, and its 
implications for understanding propaganda and education today. Chapter 2 will 
conclude by examining the ways that propaganda has transformed in the contemporary 
age of social media using the KONY 2012 phenomenon as a guide. 
In Chapter 3: Analyzing Kony 2012: Augmenting Stuart Hall's En/De-Coding 
Model with a Multidimensional Model and Lotman's Semiosphere, Stuart Hall’s model of 




environment will be discussed. Using a multidimensional model of audience reception 
and Yuri Lotman’s ideas about cultural explosion some possible reasons for why the 
KONY 2012 campaign reached such popularity will be discussed. The real life example 
of the television program All in the Family will be introduced to illustrate the difficulties 
encountered by adhering strictly to the model as proposed by Hall. The Multi-
dimensional model for audience reception studies developed by Christian Schroder 
(Schrøder, 2000) and concepts of the semiosphere and “cultural explosion” developed 
by Russian-Estonian semiotician Yuri Lotman (2009) will be discussed as theoretical 
frameworks that can be used in conjunction with Hall’s insights for the purpose of 
analyzing texts and audience receptions of texts. 
Chapter 4: The Military-Entertainment-Complex and Kony 2012 as Militainment 
Recruitment Strategy for Virtuous War examines the KONY 2012 phenomenon as an 
expression of the Military-Entertainment-Complex (MEC) or the Military-Industrial-
Communications-Complex. These concepts refer to the nexus of military, industrial, and 
communications/media interests and powers that cooperate and serve to further the 
interests of the US military and empire. These powers are focused not only towards 
foreign populations but also toward America’s domestic population. The MICC concept 
was formulated by Herbert Schiller in the late 1960s and provides a means of theorizing 
and explaining the ways in which the nominally independent “fourth estate” buttresses 
and supports the goals of the military and government within the planes of the mind and 
ideology (Schiller, 1992). The MIME-NET concept, formulated by James Der Derian 
(2000), is a development of Schiller’s MICC concept and focuses on the incorporation of 




propaganda activities. Many critical media scholars now use the term “militainment” to 
describe this overlap between military marketing/propaganda and pop culture 
entertainment (Mirrlees, 2015; Stahl, 2010).  
The militainment concept is very similar to the main conceptual proposition of the 
dissertation in that militainment is not a crude, explicit form of propaganda but the 
incorporation of militaristic themes into popular culture and pop culture into the military, 
leading to an entertainment media environment in which players and audiences absorb 
the ideology of the military without having to think about it directly. Similar to Walter 
Benjamin (1973) calls “distraction”, audiences or gamers can form “habits” of thought or 
deal with new concepts while they watch or while they play. The manipulation of 
semiotic space to cultivate certain opinions and habits of thought—even motor skills if 
one thinks of combat simulator video games—is educative in the sense of “drawing 
forth” these habits and values from target audiences. Indeed, America’s Army, a military 
shooter game developed for the purpose of recruitment by the US Army that will be 
discussed in this chapter, is described as an “educative” or “informative” game by its 
creators. Viewed from the standpoint of education we could call this the network the 
Military-Industrial-Media-Entertainment-Education-Network (MIMEE-NET). The 
implanting of these themes and messages is not happenstance or just simply “giving the 
market what it wants” but is a conscious, deliberate activity:  
Media images of and messages about wars do not emerge out of thin air, 
but are often produced by military public affairs officers in conjunction with 
the cultural workers of media corporations. These representations of war 




media products that justify and legitimize the state’s monopoly on violence 
(Mirrlees, 2015, p. 74) 
This chapter will end by analyzing KONY 2012 as a MICC/MEC text by means of 
comparing certain sequences in KONY 2012 to a famous scene from a game in the 
popular Call of Duty series. This scene, and the overall aesthetic of the KONY 2012 
video will be analyzed as an example of the shift in culture from what Guy Debord 
(1994) calls “the spectacle” to a more first-person, virtual aesthetic experience that 
places the viewer “within” the media.  
Chapter 5: The Integrated Spectacle: Manufacturing Dissent with Networks and 
Propaganda will analyze KONY 2012 as a propaganda product influenced by 
discourses of “people power” and “digital diplomacy” emanating out of the United States 
government around the time of the release of the video. This chapter will show that 
KONY 2012 was not an isolated event but was just one instance of an established US 
policy to influence the opinions of target populations in order to effect social change in a 
way beneficial to the United States. This chapter will demonstrate that the KONY 2012 
campaign satisfies the definition of propaganda developed in this essay and largely 
borrowed from Ellul; that propaganda is a rhetorical activity directed toward a politically 
significant group in order to persuade said group to carry out some action. 
In the Conclusion, Propaganda in a Post-Social Media Age, the major points 
expressed in the preceding chapters will be covered and the material covered will be 
used to examine contemporary trends in social media and to extrapolate some possible 
implications these trends might have for exercise of propaganda of the type defined in 




Facebook to spread social contagion and affect users’ mental states will be examined 
as examples of the development of social media affording the potential for more 
intensive propaganda. The implications of these developments for society and the role 






















CHAPTER 1: THE HISTORY OF PROPAGANDA 
 
Thus all art is propaganda and ever must be, despite the wailing of the purists. I 
stand in utter shamelessness and say that whatever art I have for writing has 
been used always for propaganda for gaining the right of black folk to love and 
enjoy. I do not care a damn for any art that is not used for propaganda. But I do 
care when propaganda is confined to one side while the other is stripped and 
silent (Dubois, 1994, p. 103) 
 
Propaganda is usually regarded as an evil; this in itself makes a study difficult. To 
study anything properly, one must put aside ethical judgments. Perhaps an 
objective study will lead us back to them, but only later, and with full cognizance 
of the facts (Ellul, 1965, p. x)  
 
Wartime propaganda was a form of rhetoric. Its goal was to rally us to the 
colours, to persuade men and women to die for our cause, not to explain the 
facts or to weigh evidence objectively (Williams, 2004, p. 14)  
 
         
The words in the first quotation above were spoken by W.E.B. Dubois at an 
NAACP annual conference in 1929, held to celebrate Carter G. Woodson’s receipt of 
the Twelfth Spingarn Medal. At the meeting Dubois spoke on art and its importance for 
the struggle of African Americans and their future. In his speech Dubois uses the word 




usage is strange in two ways. First, Dubois identifies art as a type of propaganda. This 
is strange because the general understanding is that art is devoid of the type of partisan 
and mendacious motivations that characterize of propaganda. Second, the usage is 
strange because Dubois speaks of propaganda in a neutral, if not positive, way. He 
even claims that his own writing is propaganda for the cause of Black rights. If Dubois 
had any problem with propaganda, it is that it has been used as a tool by only one side 
in a struggle, in this case by White Americans against African Americans.  
Dubois’ unabashed usage and promotion of propaganda for the purpose of social 
justice would seem strange today given propaganda’s connection in the popular 
consciousness to oppressive regimes like Nazi Germany or the Soviet Union. But, 
Dubois was writing in the early 20th century, when the word and the act had very 
different meanings. Although, at the precise time that he made his speech, the word had 
begun to take on the connotations which it has today. Before the two world wars of the 
first half of the 20th century propaganda was a very much neutral term and Dubois’ 
usage of the word to describe African-American counterpropaganda would not seem out 
of place.  
In fact, many social movements which might today be considered positive made 
extensive use of propaganda. For example, the anti-slavery and abolition movements in 
the United States and Brazil used posters, tracts, cartoons, and chapbooks to argue the 
case against slavery (Wood, 2013). Many of the most iconic images and artifacts from 
the period or the Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade—such as the famous diagram of the slave 




a Man and a Brother?—were part of campaigns against the institution of slavery and the 
slave trade (Glickman, 2015). 
In order to understand why Dubois advocated propaganda for African-Americans 
the concept of propaganda in a fuller sense must be salvaged. Propaganda should be 
understood as a type of speech or a genre; or, as a specialized type of purposeful 
behavior. By understanding propaganda in this way, we are able to understand Dubois 
statement as he would have understood it: He was advocating for purposeful, rhetorical 
activity in favor of the cause of social justice and anti-racism. 
In order for the term “propaganda” to be useful in effectively identifying a 
particular type of speech the pejorative connotation and the history of the word must be 
traced. The pejorative connotation is that “propaganda” signifies mere lies or “tall tales”. 
According to this particular gloss, “propaganda” is a type of speech which consists of 
falsehoods and is used to persuade—or trick—people to do or believe something, 
usually of a malicious nature. Although this describes much of the speech that can be 
designated as propaganda such a simplistic definition several key aspects of 
propaganda. 
Identifying propaganda is more difficult than simply demonstrating that a certain 
statement is counter-factual and proposes a state or situation which is in obvious 
contravention of some manifest, mutually-recognized state of affairs about which all 
people agree3. If differentiating between truth and falsity were such simple matter 
                                                 
3 Even those who doubt the veracity of matters of scientific consensus such as global warming and Darwin’s theory 
of natural selection frequently make appeals—however inaptly— to scientific or quasi-scientific theories and 
techniques. Speech does not have to be composed of falsities in order to be persuasive. More and more, speech 
that is logical in form—avoidance of rhetorical and formal logical fallacies—and liberally peppered with facts and 
information is the most persuasive. This trend was remarked upon by French philosopher, Jacques Ellul: “Modern 




human life would be much simpler; there would be almost no need for courts of law, 
police investigations, financial audits, or deliberative bodies of any sort. Unfortunately, 
discriminating between what is “false” and what is “true” is not so simple, and one does 
not have to subscribe to radical philosophical skeptical theories4 to understand that 
many disagreements are not simply disagreements over facts but rather disagreements 
over interpretations of happenings, situations, and data5.  
Even when two well-informed individuals are in agreement about the “facts” there 
is usually still disagreement deriving from competing interpretations of those facts. An 
interesting example of this in the field of science is an anecdote from Nuell Pharr Davis 
(1968), quoted in Harris’ (1993) Linguistics Wars, concerning the theoretical physicists 
Luis Alvarez and J. Robert Oppenheimer. Alvarez is, anecdotally, supposed to have 
said of Oppenheimer:  
Oppenheimer and I often have the same facts on a question and come to 
opposing decisions...Oppenheimer has high intelligence. He can’t be 
analyzing and interpreting the facts wrong. I have high intelligence. I can’t 
be wrong. So with Oppenheimer it must be insincerity, bad faith—perhaps 
treason (p. 160)  
Thus, two individuals can have available the same information and come to differing 
conclusions based on that information, for whatever reason. And, in some cases, the 
difference is attributed to some disingenuity on the part of one or the other. 
                                                                                                                                                             
believes that facts in themselves provide evidence and proof, and he willingly subordinates values to them; he 
obeys what he believes to be necessity, which he somehow connects with the idea of progress…” (Ellul, 1965: xv)  
4 philosophical voluntarism—the theory that reality “can be manipulated at will” 
5 Despite the colorful example given in George Orwell’s 1984, propaganda in the real world really only exists within 
the realm of assertoric and problematic statements. It is not used to change a person’s perception or belief in the 




Following from this it should also be obvious that a person may espouse a 
minority opinion which is taken to be pure falsehood by his peers, but which is believed 
wholeheartedly by the person himself. If such a person were to publish his ideas in the 
form of a book or some tract we could not say that he is “lying” as such, since the 
position he espouses is not for him consciously or obviously contrary to fact. Following 
from this it is also quite obvious that the same person will not see his own ideas as false 
(if he is sincere) but might use that adjective to describe the ideas of those in the 
majority. A lie, then, should be defined as statements, representing a state of affairs 
which even the liar believes to be contrary to fact, made deliberately and consciously, 
most likely to the benefit of the one telling the lie. It would be helpful to remember some 
insights from Harry Frankfurt’s (2005) essay, On Bullshit. Frankfurt posits that liars 
make their statements with a particular state of mind, the intent to deceive (mens rea), 
and, in contrast to bullshitters, quite concerned with truth-values. After all, to 
successfully lie, one must already have a firm notion of what the truth actually is in order 
to evade it; the bullshitter does not share this concern. Frankfurt argues that those who 
undertake bullshit are free from the constraints of truth and falsity and are concerned 
neither with reporting the truth nor misrepresenting it; and, while bullshitters and liars 
both represent themselves as telling the truth, the bullshitter’s main goal is to conceal 
his true aim, which is to obfuscate and muddle inquiry and the search for truth. 
Therefore, propaganda is not a lie but analogous to what Frankfurt (2005) calls 
“bullshit”, but they are not necessarily equal according to the definitions of propaganda 




There are some major differences between Frankfurt’s (2005) description of 
bullshit and propaganda as defined here. Perhaps most important, Frankfurt’s position 
toward bullshit is normative; he obviously believes that we ought not engage in it and 
that it is an enemy of truth. The present definition of propaganda takes no such 
normative stand for or against propaganda but identifies propaganda as a rhetorical 
activity and a technology for the management of society. Another difference follows 
from the first, namely, that Frankfurt’s normative stand in relation to bullshit assumes a 
much more clearly delineated distinction between truth and bullshit than exists in 
practice. As Wakeham (2017) explains, Frankfurt’s position: “Presumes a kind of 
privileged epistemic position in order to readily identify and discern which claims are 
true and which are bullshit” (p. 18). By contrast, the understanding of propaganda 
presented here recognizes that the power of propaganda is derived from the inevitable 
epistemic ambiguity and divergent interpretations that compromise most of what people 
claim to “know”. If this were not true, propaganda would have no effect. Wakeham’s 
(2017) comments on bullshit reflect the present presentation of propaganda:  
One might argue that bullshit tends to work more effectively in those areas of 
reality that are more complex and harder to grasp and where people’s knowledge 
is less certain. Those aspects of reality marked by a high degree of uncertainty, 
ambiguity, or complexity are thus more susceptible to the problem of bullshit (p. 
18) 
Here, the word “bullshit” could be replaced by the word “propaganda” and the result 




The most effective propaganda usually avoids addressing questions of truth and 
falsity, tending rather to work on emotions or other such mental states like belief. 
Appeals to emotion or appeals to shared common interest and identity are not in the 
strict sense “lies”, although they may be called “rhetorical fallacies” in many cases. A 
person who has been manipulated or persuaded by means of clever appeals to emotion 
to believe a certain thing or act a certain way may later feel that he has been deceived, 
but though he might be justified in feeling thus he cannot say that he had been lied to. In 
the final analysis, assigning a pejorative connotation to the word “propaganda” makes 
value judgments of all statements that designate certain speech acts as propaganda. 
Value judgments cannot be true or false, they are basically indicators of the attitude of 
the one making the judgement about the thing that is judged.  
An insistence in clinging to the pejorative connotation of the word “propaganda” 
therefore lacks analytical utility. Such usage reveals more about the person(s) labelling 
an instance of speech or activity as “propaganda” than it does about that speech itself. 
Using the word “propaganda” with a pejorative meaning is logically roughly equivalent to 
some kind of ad hominem attack or simple name-calling levelled at some particular 
example of speech or communication but does not aid in any analysis of the content, 
intent, or effects of that communication. Conceiving of propaganda as a purposeful 
rhetorical activity strips away the value judgments allowing for a better analysis of how 
propaganda, both particular and general, works.  
 





In order to identify and analyze propaganda meaningfully the pejorative 
connotation must be discarded. A neutral view of propaganda as a set of techniques 
and tactics that can be used by anyone espousing any position is more useful. In order 
to understand why this is so, a recapitulation of the history of the term and the activities 
which it describes is helpful. The term “propaganda” was first used by the Catholic 
Church. “Propaganda” was first used to refer to the Sacra Congretio de Propaganda 
Fide, a special ministry within the Catholic Church that was formally established by 
Pope Gregory XV in 1622 with the Papal Bull “Inscrutabili Divinae”. The mission of the 
new congregation was twofold: the reconquest of lands the Church lost as a result of 
the Reformation; and also, the evangelization of the peoples in newly discovered lands 
in the Americas, Africa, and Asia. Therefore, the jurisdiction and powers of the new 
congregation were vast, since all lands that were not under the authority of a Catholic 
government fell within its purview. 
Pendergast and Pendergast (2013) show that the term, “propaganda”, itself 
comes from the gerundive form of the Latin verb “propagare”, however, Gregory uses 
several forms of the verb throughout the bull. The verb had several meanings in Latin: 
“It could mean ‘to propagate or generate,’ or, by extension, it could mean ‘to increase, 
enlarge’. It appears to have been most often used by Cicero…to signify ‘conquest’ or 
spreading one’s territory out into new areas” (p. 24). Prior to the issuance of the bull and 
the establishment of the bull and the establishment of the congregation the word had 
many neutral connotations but was uncommon and “It seems to have been carefully 
chosen by the Pope, or one of his writers, to add to the sense of a religious Crusade 




This figurative connection to waging war and conquest stemmed, no doubt, from 
Gregory XV’s purposes in establishing the congregation. It is clear from the bull that the 
pope was concerned with the success of the Reformation in Europe. He refers to 
Protestantism as “the enemy” that has “sown weeds over the good seeds throughout 
the North, and in this way has spread dreadful infections and has already destroyed 
innumerable souls, provinces, and even kingdoms” (Pendergast and Pendergast, 2013, 
p.  21). The language used by Gregory XV portrays Protestantism as a destructive force 
that must be combatted, thereby giving to the previously neutral term, “propaganda”, 
“something akin to its modern meaning of actively spreading one’s ideological truths to 
those who are either ignorant of these truths or allied to other, quite opposed, truths.” 
(Pendergast and Pendergast, 2013, p. 23)  
Gregory XV also uses the term with other connotations that are instructive for 
understanding propaganda in our time. His call to establish a specific congregation of 
the Church tasked with spreading the Catholic faith throughout the world shows the 
explicitly purposive nature of propaganda. Also, the pontiff uses the verb in a particular 
form, the present passive infinitive “propagari”, which means “to be perpetuated or 
increased. The pope uses this form of the verb to refer to the activities of Protestants in 
their proselytizing and generating of lost souls, turning men into “beasts” who are 
destined for “the eternal fires prepared by the Devil and his messengers” (Pendergast 
and Pendergast, 2013, p. 21). Therefore, Gregory XV reframes propaganda as a neutral 
activity, that could be carried out by both Catholics and Protestants and could be 




fold—or it could be terribly malicious, leading nations (nationes) to renounce their 
humanity” (Pendergast and Pendergast, 2013, p. 25). 
This recapitulation of the history of the term helps us to understand propaganda 
in the way described above, as Dubois would have understood it. Pope Gregory XV’s 
bull both initiated the widespread use of the term and anticipated the various 
connotations the word would acquire later. In the bull, propaganda is used in neutral, 
almost horticultural or agricultural ways; as the seeding, spreading, and cultivating of 
the true faith throughout the world. However, Gregory XV also uses the word in ways 
that show that he thinks that the propaganda of the Protestants is evil. He likens the 
spread of Protestantism to an infection that turns men into beasts and propagates 
damned souls. Thus, within one, foundational document we have a demonstration of the 
richness of the meaning of this word. 
Therefore, in the final analysis, to cling to the pejorative use of the term is to 
commit the fallacy of presentism by assuming that the connotations the word has today 
it has always had. In addition, or petitio principii, a form of begging the question, is 
committed since bound up with the idea of propaganda is the related notion that the 
person whose speech is described as propaganda is untruthful. Thinking of propaganda 
in this way lacks any analytical power since the term can only be used to designate the 
ideas or speech of someone we disagree with. The propaganda scholar Philip M. Taylor 
(1995) is particularly insightful on this point: 
We must thus beware the dangers of extrapolating twentieth-century perception 
on to our understanding of earlier periods. The same might equally be said for 




regard it as a neutral process of persuasion. If we do this, we fall into the trap of 
labelling something ‘good propaganda’ or ‘bad propaganda’, as a persuasive 
process which we judge from the standpoint of our own core values. Thus, the 
process earns approval because we agree with it, and disapproval because we 
disagree with it. Propaganda becomes something which is done by others we 
differ from who are selling a cause which we repudiate; hence they are telling lies 
or, at best, not telling us ‘the truth’—and we are back to where we started from. 
When one person’s beliefs become another’s propaganda, we have already 
begun to take sides in a subjective manner. Propaganda analysis demands 
objectivity if it is to be undertaken effectively (pg. 5)  
Now, having demonstrated that propaganda is best understood in neutral terms 
as a purposive, rhetorical type of speech or activity by means of an analysis of its 
etymological origins, an overview of some of the major conceptions of propaganda is 
fitting. Beginning in the early 20th century, soon after the First World War propaganda 
became an object of interest and intense study, no doubt owing to its widespread use 
during that conflict. In order to explain propaganda’s power to influence people’s 
thought and to move them to action, theorists began to build frameworks and models of 
propaganda. In this section the frameworks of Harold Lasswell, Noam Chomsky and 
Edward S. Herman, and Jacques Ellul and the importance of each for understand 







The intentional circulation of ideas by propaganda helps to overcome the psychic 
resistances to whole-hearted participation in war (Lasswell, 1938, p. 11) 
 
 Writing in the aftermath of the First World War, and with another war in Europe 
looming on the horizon, Lasswell (1938) clearly prioritized the relation of propaganda to 
war. In his study, Propaganda Technique in the World War, he enumerated the military 
powers of the state:   
Propaganda is one of the three chief implements of operation against a 
belligerent enemy: — Military Pressure (The coercive power of the land, 
sea and air forces). Economic Pressure (Interference with access to 
sources of material, markets, capital and labour power). Propaganda 
(Direct use of suggestion) (p. 9) 
 For Lasswell, propaganda’s military utility lies in its power to affect the 
psychology of its targets and to boost morale. He contrasts the use of propaganda to 
affect mood to the other factors during wartime that can affect the public’s opinions of 
war, such as those factors stemming from the physical hardships and deprivations 
caused by war:  
By propaganda is not meant the control of mental states by changing such 
objective conditions as the supply of cigarettes or the chemical 
composition of food. It refers solely to the control of opinion by significant 
symbols, or, to speak more concretely and less accurately, by stories, 
rumours, reports, pictures and other forms of social communication. 




by the direct manipulation of social suggestion rather than by altering 
other conditions in the environment or in the organism (pp. 8-9). 
 Symbols and information and their effects on the way people think—and thus, 
presumably, act—are therefore the focus of Laswell’s analysis of propaganda. The 
manipulation of symbols and mind are necessary for the furtherance of military aims. 
War was the context in which Lasswell studied propaganda and therefore he 
concentrates on its uses during World War I: “The intentional circulation of ideas by 
propaganda helps to overcome the psychic resistances to whole-hearted participation in 
war” (Lasswell, 1938, p. 11).  
This manipulation of the mind is necessary because civilians are not trained in 
the same way as soldiers. Laswell (1938) recognizes that soldiers are utilities that have 
to be made. He explains that the manufacture of the soldier takes place in the 
“dehumanizing environment” of the military camp. Civilians are not subject to the harsh, 
transformational process that is the military training camp. Therefore, in order to achieve 
a unity of action for civilians “a repetition of ideas rather than movements” is necessary 
(p. 11). Laswell states that: “The civilian mind is standardized by news and not by drills. 
Propaganda is the method by which this process is aided and abetted” (p. 11). It is 
important to note that during World War I, and in Laswell’s analysis, the “whole-hearted” 
participation in war is not manifested by all of the citizens becoming literal soldiers. Of 
course, propaganda was used for purposes of recruitment, but for those who never 
went to the battlefield participation was characterized by actions such as failing to 
challenge—if not actively supporting—the rationale given for the war or accepting a 




Lasswell thus identifies news as (one form of) propaganda and a key to 
regimenting the collective civilian mind in wartime. This move to the psychological plane 
is necessary since, in Laswell’s mind, unlike times past peace, and not war, is now 
regarded as the normal state of society. Therefore, in order to draft non-combatant 
civilians into a war not the physical body but the mental plane is where battle must take 
place; the war occurs within the mind. As Laswell (1938) says, “Propaganda is the war 
of ideas on ideas” (p. 11-12). This war on ideas is not only directed towards the enemy, 
but towards a state’s own population as well.  
 
Lazarsfeld and Merton 
 
After Laswell two other theorists of importance are Paul Lazarsfeld and Robert K. 
Merton (1948). Their article “Mass Communication, Social Taste, and Organized Social 
Action” contains a section on propaganda. Lazarsfeld and Merton identify three 
conditions, any or all of which can be satisfied, that make propaganda effective: 
monopolization, canalization, and supplementation. “Monopolization” refers to the 
absence of counterpropaganda within the media environment. “Canalization” means 
that propaganda exploits existing feelings and opinions rather than creating wholly new 
one ex nihilo. “Supplementation” refers to the use of face-to-face contact to increase the 
efficacy of propaganda. Lazarsfeld and Merton claim that it was not control of mass 
media alone that allowed the Nazi regime to control Germany, but the use of organized 






Chomsky and Herman’s Propaganda Model 
 
 Chomsky and Herman’s (2002) Manufacturing Consent is a landmark work in the 
study of propaganda. The book caused a great deal of controversy when it was 
released and largely left out of the discussion of media studies by most academics and 
specialists. Rather than focusing on psychological effects, like Lasswell did, Chomsky 
and Herman analyze the structure of the mass media, specifically news and journalism, 
in the United States. Their claim is that the structure of the ownership and funding of the 
major media outlets conditions the kind of reporting and analysis they produce, and 
what they do produce will invariably be reporting that justifies and perpetuates the 
status quo. Propaganda is thus a function of the media apparatus, a function that serves 
to protect elite interests. 
 The propaganda model posits that news is conditioned through five filters: 
1. The ownership and profit motive of the media; 
2. Advertising sources; 
3. Official sources and “experts” are drawn from the same milieu as those who 
control the media and the state;  
4. “Flak”; which is a negative reaction to aberrant opinions or reporting; 
5. Anti-communist ideology. 
Although their model has been criticized as a type of “conspiracy theory” this 




individuals in the upper echelons of media conglomerates and government collude in 
secret to produce particular programs with a particular ideological bent for the purpose 
of deceiving the populace. Rather, they analyze the media apparatus in the United 
States as a system of disciplining behavior; the filters are constraints that condition, 
rather than determine, the output of the media. One of the ways that the media do this is 
by controlling the boundaries of what is acceptable debate. By framing the discussion of 
important topics in narrow terms certain alternatives are excluded from even being 
thought about, let alone discussed; therefore, no direct censorship is necessary. 
Although the propaganda model is not a theory of media effects or audience 
reception the title of the work in which it appears, Manufacturing Consent, is instructive. 
The phrase is borrowed from the work of the early 20th century American intellectual 
Walter Lippmann who used it to refer to the use of the control of information to modify, 




Jacques Ellul’s (1965) theory of propaganda, introduced and developed in his 
work Propaganda: The Formation of Men’s Attitudes, is quite different from the others 
mentioned described above, although it does have some points of intersection with 
them. Ellul mentions, for example, the psychological effects of propaganda discussed 
by and Lazarsfeld and Merton (1948), and Lasswell (1938). But Ellul’s concept of 
propaganda is much broader and generalized than that of any of the theorists 




of his insights are sometimes not clearly defined. For example, it is difficult to clearly 
delineate between Ellul’s definitions of propaganda and ideology.  
The broadness of Ellul’s theory of propaganda is more readily accessible from 
the original French title of his book, Propagandes. The French title is plural and 
therefore demonstrates that Ellul had multiple types of propaganda in mind. But, in 
English, we have no plural for the word propaganda and the French title can only be 
rendered in the singular, unfortunately giving the impression that Ellul sought to deal 
with some single, overarching theory of “Propaganda”. Ellul deals with propaganda “in 
the broadest sense” and his definition includes various aspects, such as: psychological 
action, psychological warfare, re-education and brainwashing, and public and human 
relations (Ellul, 1965, p. xviii). He states that propaganda in the broad sense includes all 
of these characteristics but that propaganda in the narrow sense “is characterized by an 
institutional quality”.  
 For Ellul, propaganda is a totalizing force that permeates advanced, 
industrialized societies. It is a type of governmental technique used by the State —and 
non-state entities, we should add—and it is an “indispensable condition for the 
development of technical progress and the establishment of a technological civilization” 
(Ellul, 1965, p. x). He believed that previous theorists of propaganda had erred by 
studying propaganda in isolation, or merely as a collection of gimmicks or tricks. Ellul 
emphasized that “the study of propaganda must be conducted within the context of the 
technological society,” because, “Propaganda is a good deal less the political weapon of 
a regime...than the effect of a technological society that embraces the entire man and 




 Ellul mentions some of the definitions of propaganda given by theorists such as 
Laswell, Marbury B. Ogle, John Albig, Antonio Miotto, and Leonard W. Doob but demurs 
to give his own definition of propaganda until the sixty-first page of his work: 
“Propaganda is a set of methods employed by an organized group that wants to bring 
about the active or passive participation in its actions of a mass of individuals, 
psychologically unified through psychological manipulations and incorporated in an 
organization” (Ellul, 1965, p. 61). 
In contrast to the psychological focus of propaganda scholars like Lasswell 
(1938), Ellul argued that the real purpose of propaganda was not to change the minds 
of the target population, but to induce them to action. Whereas Lasswell compared 
military drills for the purpose of the regimentation of the bodies of soldiers to the use of 
propaganda for the regimentation of the minds and opinions of civilians, Ellul believed 
that propaganda is used for the regimentation of civilian bodies as well.  
Ellul categorizes propaganda using four contrasting pairs of aspects: 
political/sociological, agitation/integration, vertical/horizontal, and rational/irrational. 
Political propaganda consists of techniques used by government or parties to change 
public behavior whereas sociological propaganda is “the penetration of an ideology by 
means of its social context” (Ellul, 1965, p. 63). Sociological propaganda does not rely 
on slogans or direct appeals but affects individuals through political structures and 
general culture; “Such propaganda is essentially diffuse...it is based on a general 
climate, an atmosphere that influences people imperceptibly without having the 
appearance of propaganda” (Ellul, 1965, p. 63). Ellul says that the purpose of 




society and also to spread the style of life of a particular society abroad. Whereas 
propaganda as traditionally understood is the dispersion of an ideology or message 
throughout a society, sociological propaganda works in reverse  
The existing economic, political, and sociological factors progressively allow an 
ideology to penetrate individuals or masses. Through the medium of economic 
and political structures a certain ideology is established, which leads to the active 
participation of the masses and the adaptation of individuals (Ellul, 1968, p. 64) 
Sociological propaganda is not created deliberately but is expressed in many forms 
such as advertising, movies, technology in general, and education, which work together 
to produce a general conception of society. The way Ellul describes sociological 
propaganda implies a kind of totalitarian quality and he includes many things as 
sociological propaganda that most theorists would not. For example, he gives the 
example of a film producer who, while not intending to create propaganda, does so 
anyway by virtue of the way the “American way of life” permeates him and he transmits 
its values through the film. This is one of the most insightful and vital aspects of his 
theory of propaganda.  
Agitation propaganda is what comes to mind when most people think of 
propaganda. The distinction between “agitation” and “propaganda” can be traced back 
to the Soviet Union. Agitation referred to propagandistic activity meant to mobilize the 
people for some explicit goal. The propaganda of Nazi Germany or the Soviet Union are 
good examples of agitation propaganda. Agitation is conspicuous, highly visible, and 
meant to have proximate efficacy. Integration propaganda, however, “aims at stabilizing 




used to excite a population, integration propaganda is used to calm it and to maintain 
the present state of society. Ellul said that the most important use of integration 
propaganda was in the United States.  
 Vertical propaganda is also propaganda as is traditionally thought; it is 
propaganda that is created by a leader or some type of authority and is disseminated 
top-down throughout society. Horizontal propaganda comes from inside a group and the 
leader and producer of propaganda are not known. Ellul says that this propaganda 
happens in small groups in which all members have the same social standing.  
Rational propaganda breaks the convention of what is normally considered 
propaganda. It consists of facts, “knowledge”, information, statistics, and data. Rational 
propaganda is different from irrational propaganda, which consists of appeals to 
emotion, and Ellul says that irrational propaganda is disappearing: “the more 
[technological] progress we make, the more propaganda becomes rational and the 
more it is based on serious arguments, on dissemination of knowledge, on factual 
information, figures, and statistics” (Ellul, 1965, p. 85). This observation is contrary to 
the now-accepted, simple-minded, misconception of propaganda as pure falsehood, 
and is quite prescient in light of the contemporary political climate in the United States in 
which frequent appeals to quantitative data and “fact-checking” to settle political 
debates has become the norm. Irrational propaganda, is of course a commonly 
understood aspect of propaganda and such propaganda has by no means disappeared, 
but Ellul’s insight is that in a highly technologically developed society such propaganda 
is less effective than data and “facts”, or, rather, information that is perceived to be 




authority science gains as a society becomes industrial, and eventually, post-industrial. 
As traditional sources of authority such as the church or the community give ground to 
science and technology, people learn to take the “language” of science and technology 




Ellul (1968) says that pre-propaganda—or as he also calls it, “sub-propaganda” 
is a necessary condition for all successful propaganda. He contrasts pre-propaganda 
with active propaganda. Ellul argues that propaganda is “continuous and permanent” in 
nature and this permanence characterizes pre-propaganda. Ellul explains that  
Pre-propaganda does not have a precise ideological objective; it has nothing to 
do with an opinion, an idea, a doctrine. It proceeds by psychological 
manipulations, by character modifications, by the creation of feelings or 
stereotypes useful when the time comes. It must be continuous, slow, 
imperceptible. Man must be penetrated in order to shape such tendencies. He 
must be made to live in a certain psychological climate (p. 31)  
Whereas active propaganda is intense and occurs during crises, pre-propaganda 
occurs before such intense propaganda by mobilizing individuals, “in order to thrust 
them into action at the appropriate moment” (p. 30). This mobilization is the period of 
pre-propaganda, and is necessary because, “we cannot simply throw a man into action 
without any preparation, without having mobilized him psychologically and made him 




propaganda, this mobilization, as a period of priming the individual, in order to make him 
both psychologically, and even physically, ready to receive active propaganda and then 
to act. Ellul posits the concept of pre-propaganda as a way to explain the ability of 
propaganda to incite people to act. He calls the actions elicited by propaganda “reflex 
actions” and says that they are achieved by short-circuiting the intellectual process. 
Ellul’s description of pre-propaganda make clear that he does not think that propaganda 
wholly consists of explicit statements or arguments. Rather, propaganda is a continuous 
process of creating the proper environment in which propaganda messages will be 
received and interpreted by a population in the desired way.  
In Ellul’s schema, pre-propaganda is akin to forming a culture, or at least, a 
cultural “climate”; a certain worldview with mental biases. This is why he states that pre-
propaganda does not have a precise ideological objective and is not related to doctrine. 
Ideology and doctrine possess, at least in the sense of an “orthodoxy” or body of 
teaching, explicit and distinct concepts that can be analyzed rationally. Pre-propaganda, 
however, seems to produce a general orientation towards certain things. To facilitate 
this development of this orientation, Ellul says that propagandists create myths, which 
he defines as   
[an] all-encompassing, activating image: a sort of vision of desirable objectives 
that have lost their material, practical character and have become strongly 
colored, overwhelming, all-encompassing, and which displace from the 
conscious all that is not related to it (Ellul, 1965, p. 31). 
Ellul claims that the creating of such myths are powerful enough to take complete 




all the methods of propaganda, not by any immediate propaganda operation” (Ellul, 
1965, p. 32).  
The distinction between sociological propaganda and pre-propaganda (sub-
propaganda) is vague, since, while Ellul says that sociological propaganda “is not 
merely preliminary sub-propaganda”, he also says that, “[sometimes] sociological 
propaganda will appear to be the medium that has prepared the ground for direct 
propaganda; it becomes identified with sub-propaganda” (Ellul, 1968, p. 66). It may be 
that Ellul’s concept of pre-propaganda was more influenced by the way that propaganda 
operated in Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union, following a pattern of mobilization-
agitation/propaganda-action. In this pattern, pre-propaganda maps roughly onto the 
“mobilization” stage. His concept of sociological propaganda, however, is much more 
expansive. It illustrates how all aspects of a society, from its technology, to its media 
and its public institutions combine to produce certain values and orientations to the 
world that make people in the society susceptible to certain kinds of overt 
propagandistic actions. In this way it anticipates the argument of this essay that 
propaganda is a type of technology used to integrate, unify, stabilize, and govern 




 Ellul breaks with previous theorists who concentrated on how propaganda works 




older propaganda in the 19th century but is no longer true of the new propaganda. He 
introduces the concept of “orthopraxy” to explain the way propaganda works today: 
if the classic but outmoded view of propaganda consists in defining it as an 
adherence of man to an orthodoxy, true modern propaganda seeks, on the 
contrary, to obtain an orthopraxy—an action that in itself, and not because of the 
value judgments of the person who is acting, leads directly to a goal, which for 
the individual is not a conscious and intentional objective to be attained, but 
which is considered such by the propagandist. The propagandist knows what 
objective should be sought and what action should be accomplished, and he 
maneuvers the instrument that will secure precisely this action (p. 27) 
Modern propaganda operates to create “orthopraxy”, or the readiness to participate in 
activity unreflectively. In order to achieve orthopraxy a change in the deeply held beliefs 
of the individual is not necessary. As a result, a person may participate in actions with 
which he disagrees in light of his own ideology. Ellul says that participation need not be 
active but can also be passive when a person supports or encourages an activity. He 
uses the example of fans at a sports game. Even though they do not actually participate 
in the playing of the game their cheers of encouragement are a form of participation. 
Orthopraxy is one of Ellul’s most intriguing concepts and the move toward orthopraxy is 
important for understanding both the vision of propaganda offered here and the KONY 
2012 phenomenon.  
 Of all the theorists discussed above, Ellul is the one whose ideas most closely 
resemble the arguments put forth in the present essay. Ellul’s understanding of 




of his day, his own ideas push forward into the future and reveal aspects and 
developments in propaganda that were far ahead of their time. As such, his work 
provides one of the major theoretical pillars upon which the argument in the present 
essay shall be built. 
 
The Epistemic Merit Model 
 
 Sheryl Tuttle Ross (2002), in the article, “Understanding Propaganda: The 
Epistemic Merit Model and Its Application to Art”, offers a model for characterizing 
propaganda that she argues is more effective than simply labelling all propaganda as 
untruths. She reproduces several definitions of propaganda, including this one from 
Harold Lasswell’s Institute for Propaganda Analysis: "Propaganda is an expression of 
opinion or action by individuals or groups deliberately designed to influence the opinions 
and actions of other individuals or groups with reference to a predetermined end” (p. 
17). Ross introduces the concept of “epistemic merit” as a way to characterize the 
particularity of propaganda. For Ross, something is “epistemically defective” if  
Either it is false, inappropriate, or connected to other beliefs in ways that are 
inapt, misleading, or unwarranted. False statements, bad arguments, immoral 
commands as well as inapt metaphors (and other literary tropes) are the sorts of 
things that are epistemically defective (p. 23) 
Ross’ model outlines four criteria for classifying a message as propaganda: 1) 
the message itself is “epistemically defective”, 2) the sender has an intent to persuade, 




significant, and 4) that the sender is an organization or institution working on behalf of a 
political cause. Ross’ model seeks to account for the pejorative sense that is associated 
with propaganda and therefore focuses on the quality of the message. 
Specifically, Ross (2002) asserts that what defines the quality of a propagandistic 
message is not the fact that it is false but the fact that it is what she calls “epistemically 
defective”. Epistemic defectiveness is different than outright lies and Ross designates 
“false statements, bad arguments, immoral commands as well as inapt metaphors (and 
other literary tropes)” as the types of things that are “epistemically defective” (p. 23). 
Ross believes that focusing of epistemic defectiveness rather than the truth of a 
message helps in categorizing propaganda because it accounts for the role of context in 
and because much propaganda, such as commands, do not directly address truth-
values. 
Ross’s concept of epistemic defectiveness is important because it is a clear and 
logical explanation of why the traditional view of propaganda as lies is inadequate. 
Propaganda is communication that is meant to be persuasive. Persuasion can be 
effected in many ways, and truth-claims and logical syllogisms are just two ways that 
this happens. Ross realizes that persuasion can, and maybe mostly, happens by means 
of other types of statements and arguments, most of which may be lacking in terms of 
logical validity or may rely solely on logical/rhetorical fallacies. Her definition also allows 
for the consideration as propaganda of various types of communication, such as art, 
since arguments can be made visually as well, and these arguments can also be 
epistemically defective by her definition. Her ideas are important for the present essay 




large part because of its moving imagery, and the argument transmitted through that 
imagery. The video also makes an argument that cannot be easily analyzed by the rules 
of logical argumentation, but which may qualify for what Ross calls epistemic 
defectiveness.  
 
New Working Definition of Propaganda 
 
 All of the above definitions of propaganda give us useful insights for how we can 
understand propaganda in a 21st century, online, social-media-saturated context. Pope 
Gregory XV’s foundational statement shows that propaganda has not always been a 
negative activity—except in the hands of one’s ideological opponents. Lasswell’s focus 
on the psychology propaganda as an instrument of policy is also instructive. Chomsky 
and Herman give a much broader concept of propaganda as a function of the mass-
media apparatus that limits the range of discussable and conceivable topics and 
protects the status quo. Ellul’s rich and innovative theory of propaganda combines all of 
these but also adds a detailed typology of different types of propaganda and key 
concepts such as orthopraxy or propaganda’s ability to incite individuals to unthinking 
action. Tuttle-Ross’ concept of epistemic merit further emphasizes the idea that most 
propaganda is not analyzable for explicit truth values but argues instead that the logic of 
propaganda is usually inapt or otherwise faulty. Tuttle-Ross’ analysis also stipulates that 
propaganda must be used against some politically significant target population towards 
tangible political goals. This aspect of her theory is compatible with Ellul’s concept of 




In light of the insights of these theorists it is possible to come up with a definition 
of propaganda for a new communications technology context that does not rely on value 
judgements and does not rely on outmoded understanding of propaganda from the First 
and Second World Wars—although, those types of propaganda are still very much in 
existence. For the purposes of this analysis propaganda shall be defined as a genre of 
persuasive, rhetorical speech that is used by some actor to achieve a tangible political 
effect from some target population. Propaganda does not inject completely new ideas 
into people but builds upon a pre-existing substrate of ideologies, prejudices, and myths 
that are already present in the target population. The theory of propaganda at use here 
recognizes that as persuasive speech and action, propaganda must convince its targets 
by working on their beliefs and worldviews but retains Ellul’s concept of orthopraxy as 
the goal of propaganda today. Here, propaganda overlaps with marketing and 
advertising since, for the advertiser, it is not enough for the target to change his opinion 
about a product; he must act on his new feelings about the product by purchasing or 
subscribing. So too, the contemporary propagandist strives toward eliciting a desired 
action in the target. 
One area where the present theory diverges from the above theorists—except 
Chomsky and Herman—is the focus on states as the major producers of propaganda. It 
is true that in the past states were the chief producers of propaganda, but this is no 
longer the case. Private entities, whether corporations, NGOs, and pressure-groups 
now make a great deal of propaganda aimed at affecting some kind of political change. 
The example of the NGO Invisible Children and their KONY 2012 is a perfect example 




CHAPTER 2: DEWEY AND LIPPMANN: PROPAGANDA AS A TECHNOLOGY OF 
GOVERNANCE AND THE PLACE OF EDUCATION 
 
John Dewey’s book, The Public and its Problems (1927), is a direct response 
and attempt to deal with the ideas of put forth by Walter Lippmann in his own books 
Public Opinion (1922) and The Phantom Public (1925). Dewey’s response to 
Lippmann’s ideas has been characterized as a “debate” or a “dialogue” however 
Lippmann never publically engaged with Dewey either in an oral discussion or even a 
direct written response to The Public and its Problems. The “debate” has come to be 
understood as a conflict between democratic ideals, represented by Dewey, and elitist 
technocracy, represented by Lippmann. However, the interpretation of Dewey’s 
response to Lippmann as a “debate” is mostly a creation of later scholars, in particular 
communication studies scholar James Carey (Schudson, 2008). Dewey actually read 
and favorably reviewed Lippmann’s books and he said of Public Opinion that it was 
“perhaps the most effective indictment of democracy as currently conceived ever 
penned” (Dewey, 1922, p. 337).  
 Although the idea of a “debate” is a creation of later scholars, and despite 
Dewey’s admiration of Lippmann, Dewey did disagree with Lippmann on some very 
important concepts. Lippmann, a liberal, was concerned about the state of America’s 
democracy and anxious about its viability in the chaotic and distracting environment of 
20th century industrial society. This anxiety and disappointment was in large part a 




In Public Opinion, and, The Phantom Public, he develops a vision of democracy 
in which a class of “experts” study society and deliver information and insights directly to 
the administrative/managerial class, who then go on to make decisions based on that 
information. Lippmann reserves a role for the public only during occasional elections in 
which would vote in favor or against proposed policies or particular politicians.  
 Lippmann developed this schematic as a result of his lack of faith in the ability of 
any one person to achieve “omnicompetence”; the ability to completely know and 
understand any issue. He wrote that we are all “outsiders” to most issues and therefore 
form imperfect “pictures” of the various problems and issues facing society. In light of 
this understanding of society, Lippmann thought it best that experts who had the time to 
fully examine issues inform administrators.  
 Dewey, although agreeing with many of Lippmann’s concerns, disagreed with a 
democratic structure in which experts passed information directly to administrators and 
the action of the public was minimized. Dewey’s opinions on this matter are a direct 
outgrowth of his theories of knowledge. Dewey rejected the view of knowledge and 
inquiry as the product and activity of an isolated, insular subject; he believed all 
knowledge to be social. Even when people make new discoveries they are building on a 
stock of social knowledge that is accumulated within a society, culture, or group. 
Therefore, the question of “omnicompetence” loses its importance. The question for 
Dewey is not whether individual citizens en masse can gain the requisite knowledge in 
order to make informed decisions, but how can society and its constituent groups be 




draw when making decisions. Dewey’s metaphor is primarily auditory, conversation-
based, while Lippmann’s is visual, based on privately-held images within the mind.  
 In Dewey’s answer to Lippmann’s anxieties, journalism has a special part to play 
in keeping the populace informed of important issues. Dewey envisions a press that 
does not report the “news” are a series of “facts” but one that communicates information 
in such a way as to help foster in the public a certain orientation or attitude towards 
problems. In this way the function of the press would be essentially educative, in the 
democratic sense of the word “education” the way that Dewey used it.  
 I would argue that this conception of the role of journalism is not necessarily 
democratic. There are ways in which a particular orientation toward particular issues 
can be fostered within the populace that actually contradict and work against the 
Deweyan conception of democracy. The function of propaganda, public relations, 
advertising, and marketing is also to create within the populace certain ways of thinking 
and certain orientations towards issues. The traditional notions of the difference 
between propaganda and education is that propaganda teaches people what to think 
while education teaches people how to think (Taylor, 1995). It is true that the early 
propaganda used by the United States and Great Britain during the First World War 
concentrated on transmitting very specific notions about German evil. However, as 
propaganda and public relations became more sophisticated those attempting to sway 
popular opinion started to create climates of opinion and to foster worldviews which 
were harmonious to their aims. In fact, even the very basic transmission of specific 
ideas or “facts” eventually creates such changes in how people think. In much the same 




individuals to draw upon a socially created stock of knowledge, the injection of bits of 
information into that stock of social knowledge will eventually lead to individuals having 
certain orientations and attitudes towards issues that are amenable to the aims of those 
who originally injected the information.  
 The issue of propaganda is important here because of the background of 
Lippmann and his effects on the intellectual climate of the early 20th century. Lippmann 
advocated US entry into the First World War and participated in efforts to propagandize 
German soldiers during the war and he also participated in The Inquiry, a group formed 
by President Wilson to draw up plans for peace negotiations following the war. 
Lippmann intended that his propaganda work in the war would not be deceitful but 
would be,  
Getting away from propaganda in the sinister sense, and substituting it for a frank 
campaign of education addressed to the German and Austrian troops, explaining 
as simply as persuasively as possible the unselfish character of the war, the 
generosity of our aims, and the great hope of mankind which we are trying to 
realize. (Steel, 1999, p.138)  
Though the precise details are unclear, some think that Lippmann was also a 
member of the Committee on Public Information—also called the Creel Committee— 
during the war (Chomsky, 2014; Arndt, 2006), while others claim he was never a 
member (Jansen, 2008), or, was even antagonistic to the committee (Sproule, 1977; 
Blumenthal, 2007).  
 Before the US entered the war on the side of the Allies, its citizens were targeted 




war, most Americans were isolationist, and had no interest in becoming involved in the 
war in Europe. Indeed, Woodrow Wilson won the presidency largely on his promises to 
keep the United States out of the war. The Committee was also responsible for 
propaganda activities in Europe (Steel, 1999). The Germans first attempted to target the 
American public through German-American social clubs or “bunds”, but as Taylor 
(1995) explains, that strategy was “counter-productive” and the British learned from the 
German attempts that the best way to wage the “campaign against American neutrality” 
was to appeal to key individuals who could influence others, rather than attempting a 
“direct appeal to the mass of population” (pp. 177-178).  
 The British set up a secret war propaganda bureau at Wellington House 
(Sanders, 1975, Taylor, 1999). Wellington House was “the single most important branch 
of the British propaganda organization between 1914 and 1917 and its work was so 
secret that even most members of parliament were unaware of it” and the “massive bulk 
of paper materials [Americans] were receiving from Britain about the war” came from 
the organization (Taylor, 1995, p. 177). Wellington House took advantage of German 
actions like the sinking of the Lusitania and the Zimmerman Telegram to propagandize 
American citizens for the British cause. Upon the US entry into the war the American 
government began to set up its own propaganda apparatus which included a body 
called the Committee on Public Information (CPI), commonly referred to as the “Creel 
Committee” because it was under the direction of the journalist George Creel (Creel, 
1920). 
The Committee on Public Information was a group of American intellectuals and 




the United States. The CPI “operated in full view of the public” and was staffed by 
“liberal, reform-minded intellectual authors who often seemed more determined to 
reaffirm the ideals of the American Republic than to combat Prussian militarism” (Taylor, 
1995, p. 183-184). The CPI was divided into two sections, one foreign and the other 
domestic, and the foreign division was subdivided further into a press bureau, cable 
services and a foreign film service. The CPI even directed its activities toward schools 
publishing The National School Service, “a sixteen-page semi-monthly periodical going 
free of charge to every public-school teacher in the United States about 600,-000 [sic] in 
all” (Creel, 1920, p. 111). Creel and the committee realized that “the national morale 
would need the support of a message that went without fail into every home” and that, 
“For this purpose there was no other agency so effective, so sure, as the public schools 
with their twenty millions of pupils” (Creel, 1920, p. 111).  
One confirmed member of the committee was Edward Bernays. Bernays has 
been called “the Father of Public Relations” for his work in repurposing the insights he 
gained from his experience from his time in the committee to work within the world of 
corporate capitalism. Bernays drew legitimacy for his new public relations techniques by 
claiming to be directly influenced by the ideas of Lippmann, although there is much 
evidence to show that such a relationship is spurious and that Bernays merely used 
Lippmann’s fame and popularity as a means to boost his own, in a move that can be 
termed “PR for PR” (Jansen, 2013).  
Edward Bernays was the nephew of Sigmund Freud, and although he had no 
formal training in psychoanalysis, he certainly had an understanding of human 




relations, Propaganda, is partly an attempt to make the idea of propaganda and public 
relations more palatable for a public that had grown weary of the term and practice as a 
result of the propaganda campaigns of the first World War, many of which Bernays 
participated in directly. In his introduction to the 2005 edition of Bernays’ Propaganda, 
Mark Crispin Miller explains that the rather non-controversial history of the term pre-war; 
“Far from denoting lies, half-truths, selective history or any of the other tricks that we 
associate with ‘propaganda’ now, that word meant, at first, the total opposite of such 
deceptions” (p. 9).  
In effect, for Bernays and others before the war, “propaganda” was akin to 
education, or rather, was an educational endeavor, an activity undertaken with the goal 
of informing—and of course persuading—some part of the population about a topic, 
ideology, political issue, or cause. Bernays (1928) quotes a “recent issue” of Scientific 
American—no citation information was given—that explains the origin and “technical” 
nature of the term:  
There is no word in the English language…whose meaning 
has been so sadly distorted as the word ‘propaganda.’ The change took 
place mainly during the late war when the term took on a decidedly 
sinister complexion 
If you turn to the Standard Dictionary, you will find that the word was 
applied to a congregation or society of cardinals for the care and 
oversight of foreign missions which was instituted at Rome in the year 
1627. It was applied also to the College of the Propaganda at Rome that 




priests. Hence, in later years the word came to be applied to any 
institution or scheme for propagating a doctrine or system. (p. 49) 
 Bernays’ ulterior motives notwithstanding, the etymology he references for the 
term “propaganda” is useful in regaining an understanding of the simultaneously almost 
innocuous yet deep connotations the word originally held. He also understood that 
whether propaganda is good or bad depends upon the standpoint of the individual and 
the quality of the information presented: “I am aware that the word propaganda carries 
to many minds an unpleasant connotation. Yet whether...propaganda is good or bad 
depends upon the merit of the cause urged, and the correctness of the information 
published (Bernays, 1928, p. 48).  
Therefore, the role of perception is key. A major factor in determining if 
propaganda is considered to be negative is the perception people have of the things 
being propagandized. As Miller states in his introduction, “A campaign to improve public 
health through vaccination, sanitary cooking or the placement of spittoons was, or is, no 
less a propaganda drive than any anti-clerical or socialist or nativist crusade” (Bernays, 
1928, p. 11). These days information campaigns in favor of causes that are perceived 
as positive or helpful would not be termed “propaganda” but simply as being educational 
or informative and therefore “neutral”.  
The importance of the necessity of creating messages that appear “neutral” and 
therefore “unbiased” and “factual” was evident during to war to men like Creel (1920), 
who did not refer to his own efforts as propaganda but framed them as an educational 




we had such confidence in our case as to feel that no other argument was needed than 
the simple, straightforward presentation of facts” (p. 3).   
In fact, it was this distancing and refusal to use the word propaganda on the part 
of the Allies that reveals part of the reason why the word gained such a negative 
connotation. Miller (2005) explains that the Allies purposefully associated the word with 
the propaganda efforts the Germans, preferring to maintain the appearance of justified 
objectivity for their own side:  
In World War One it was the propaganda of our side that first made 
‘propaganda’ so opprobrious a term. Fouled by close association with ‘the 
Hun,’ the word did not regain its innocence—not even when the Allied 
propaganda used to tar ‘the Hun’ had been belatedly exposed to the 
American and British people. Indeed, as they learned more and more 
about the outright lies, exaggerations and half-truths used on them by their 
own governments, both populations came, understandably, to see 
‘propaganda’ as a weapon even more perfidious than they had thought 
when they had not perceived themselves as its real target” (pp. 14-15)  
Ironically, the Allied effort to demonize the propaganda activity of the Germans 
had caused the American and British populations to view all propaganda 
activities with suspicion, even those of their own governments.   
 Bernays uses the phrase “manufacture of consent”, which he borrows 
from Walter Lippmann, to refer propaganda and says that this type of 
manipulation of public opinion has become indispensable in the post-war 




are controlled by hidden elites, although, he does not oppose this state of affairs 
and even thinks that the wise businessman/statesman should take advantage of 
the situation  
In almost every act of our daily lives, whether in the sphere of 
politics or business, in our social conduct or our ethical thinking, we 
are dominated by the relatively small number of persons…who 
understand the mental processes and social patterns of the 
masses. It is they who pull the wires which control the public mind, 
who harness old social forces and contrive new ways to bind and 
guide the world” (pp. 37-38) 
Bernays (2005) refers to this “small number of persons” who control the public 
mind as an “invisible government” of powerful and influential individuals, politicians, 
bureaucrats, businessmen, intellectuals, and journalists, who are not necessarily 
connected to or aware of each other. And, he states that “Propaganda is the executive 
arm of the invisible government” (p. 48). Here, he anticipates Lasswell’s idea of the 
propaganda as “the antidote to willfulness” and Ellul’s observation that propaganda is a 
necessary tool of governance in modern, democratic societies with educated, literate 
populations. Technological changes and changes in education have changed the 
structure of society and redistributed power, giving the majority of common people to 
ability to express their will: 
But times have changed. The steam engine, the multiple press, and the public 




kings and given it to the people. The people actually gained power which the king 
lost (p. 47) 
In order for the minority invisible government to effectively manage the “crisis of 
democracy”, the increasing desire of the masses influence the governance of society, 
propaganda, “Mold[ing] the mind of the masses [so] that they will throw their newly 
gained strength in the desired direction,” has become “inevitable” (Bernays, 2005, p. 
47). 
In keeping with the concept of the manufacture of consent, Bernays (2005) 
describes the ability of propaganda to shape public opinion in terms of a mass-
produced, industrial product, the rubber stamp 
But instead of a mind, universal literacy has given him rubber stamps, rubber 
stamps inked with advertising slogans, with editorials, with published scientific 
data, with the trivialities of the tabloids and the platitudes of history, but quite 
innocent of original thought. Each man’s rubber stamps are the duplicates of 
millions of others, so that when those millions are exposed to the same stimuli, 
all received identical imprints. It may seem an exaggeration to say that the 
American public gets most of its ideas in this wholesale fashion (p. 48)  
While his illustration of the power of propaganda to regiment the minds of the masses 
may be a bit overstated, Bernays presents an analysis of mass education here that is 
close to criticisms voiced by Jacques Ellul and progressive educators like John Dewey. 
Education that merely teaches literacy, giving an individual the ability to access 




vulnerable to information that has been crafted for the express purpose of influencing 
opinion and action.  
 
Torches of Freedom 
Although in Propaganda Bernays was no doubt attempting to sway his own 
target audience, businessmen and politicians who would potentially seek his services as 
a shaper of public opinion, and therefore presents a somewhat exaggerated picture of 
the powers of propaganda, the validity of his arguments was borne out in his actual 
practice as a public relations specialist. An oft-cited example of Bernays’ ability to 
“manufacture consent” or socially engineer opinions and behaviors is his work 
promoting the habit of cigarette smoking for women. In the early 20th century the habit of 
smoking was considered dirty and was taboo for women, being associated with loose 
morality. That began to change during the First World War as women began to take 
men’s places in factories and occupations. Many women began to use smoking as a 
sign of liberation and the tobacco companies wanted to take advantage of the 
opportunity to expand into a new market; as G. W. Hill, president of the American 
Tobacco Company, said, “It will be like opening a new gold mine right in our front yard” 
(Brandt, 1996, p. 64) . Hill was aggressive in his desire to capture the female market 
and sought the aid of Bernays. Bernays helped the tobacco industry to achieve this goal 
by marketing cigarettes as a weight-loss method and as a healthy alternative to sugar, 




Hill was concerned that women were mostly smoking in private and wanted to 
increase the visibility of women smoking in public. As Bernays recalls his conversation 
with Hill,  
Hill called me in. “How can we get women to smoke on the street? They’re 
smoking indoors. But damn it, if they spend half the time outdoors and we can 
get ‘em to smoke outdoors, we’ll damn near double our female market” (Bernays,  
1965, 849)  
This initiated what is probably Bernays’ most famous PR stunt. Bernays sought the 
advice of psychoanalyst A.A. Brill to help him fulfill Hill’s request. According to Bernays 
(1965), Brill explained the unconscious psychological significance of smoking for 
women, “Some women regard cigarettes as symbols of freedom. Smoking is a 
sublimation of oral eroticism…It is perfectly normal for women to want to smoke 
cigarettes” (p. 849). Brill also suggested that many women associated cigarettes with 
men, and therefore they represented “torches of freedom”.  
Armed with this knowledge, Bernays engineered an event to associate 
fashionable, liberated, young women with cigarettes, hiring a group of women to march 
in the 1929 Easter parade in New York while smoking. This event has become famous 
as an example of successful social engineering through strategic marketing. Speaking 
of his experience convincing women to become smokers, Bernays said, “Age old 
customs, I learned, could be broken down by a dramatic appeal, disseminated by the 
network of the media” (Amos and Haglund, 2000, p. 4). However, there is much 
evidence that Bernays significantly exaggerated the success of the “Torches of 




Murphee (2015) has shown that there is little evidence that the event attracted 
significant media or public attention, and that the reception story of the event’s success 
is the result of Bernays’ own efforts at “Constantly reframing the event as a history-
making example of effortlessly fooling the press and changing society within a few 
months. The story is not true, but it is certainly a credible rendition” (p. 260). The stunt 
may have had some great effect on the public, but the record does not give evidence of 
this. The real public relations success of the event was not its immediate effect on the 
numbers of women smokers—although, Bernays’ long-term efforts to promote 
cigarettes were effective—but the way Bernays shaped the collective memory of the 
event itself.  
His exploits in the service of the tobacco industry are just one example of the 
way that Bernays and his clients attempted to steer the opinions of a group by 
identifying and using tastemakers and leaders. Although the effectiveness of the 
“Torches of Freedom” episode was exaggerated by Bernays, what the totality of his 
public relations work with the industry demonstrates is not that Bernays and Big 
Tobacco simply “duped” women into believing that smoking is good for them, such a 
conclusion is simplistic and attributes too strong a causal relationship between the 
industry’s marketing efforts and the spread of the habit of smoking among women, while 
at the same time overlooking the much more subtle and nuanced ways the industry 
achieved this goal.  Bernays’ operated with a long-term, complex strategy that included 
tactics such as the “Hiring of celebrity spokeswomen, aligning cigarettes with fashion 
and slender figures, and convincing hotels and restaurants to include cigarettes on their 




increase in cigarette sales in 1928 alone” (Murphee, 2015, p. 278). His work with the 
tobacco industry demonstrates how a propagandist like Bernays operates not (usually) 
by crude direct appeals, but by cultivating a population—remember the agricultural 
origin of the term “propaganda”—, changing the way individuals in the population view 
the world, their place in it, and proper behavior in that world.  
This activity of cultivating a population is, I would argue, essentially the same 
kind of activity as what is called “education”, both in the sense of “informing”, and of 
“molding” minds and tastes. The dubious quality of Bernays’ information extolling the 
health benefits of cigarettes notwithstanding, the molding aspect of Bernays’ public 
relations efforts for the tobacco industry should be readily apparent. In fairness to 
Bernays, it should be mentioned that, “Once the toxic side effects of smoking had 
become impossible to talk away, Bernays not only gave up working for tobacco 
companies, but became a vocal critic of tobacco” (Miller, 2005, p. 25).  
If the objectionable nature of the push by the tobacco lobby to garner new 
addicts/customers, causes some to balk at labeling such efforts as “educational”, it 
should be recognized that the same methods can, and have, been used to influence 
populations to embrace healthy or benign positions and behaviors. The most 
appropriate example in this case would be the anti-smoking campaigns that persist to 
this day, with wide exposure on television, internet, and print media. Another example of 
positive social relations work which pre-dates Bernays is the work of the American 
Social Hygiene Association (ASHA) to combat sexually transmitted diseases during the 




found that ASHA employed communication strategies that anticipated Bernays’ own 
tactics, such as  
Segmenting audiences, utilizing events to reach appropriate audiences, using 
visual media, and creating house organs to arouse public sentiment, influence 
attitudes, and promote desired behavior. The group attempted to engineer public 
sentiment years before Bernays started crystalizing public opinion (p. 13)  
An understandable resistance to the connection—not equation—of education and 
propaganda comes from the very real differences in their ends or desired results. 
Bernays’ work for the tobacco industry had as its end the increase in the number of 
smokers; even if smoking were not unhealthy the achievement of this end would have a 
negligible positive benefit for society. Education and public health campaigns, however, 
have ends that are intended to bring clear positive benefits to the public, in the form of a 
more informed and healthy society. However, this distinction misses the point that the 
connection comes from the methods employed, even if the content and ends are 
different. The real barrier to recognizing Bernays’ campaigns as a type of educational 
activity is value judgment. Like propaganda, people have attached negative value to 
public relations activity and see it as manipulative, and therefore bad. This is 
understandable, since no one likes to be manipulated, especially to one’s own 
disadvantage, but viewing propaganda or education neutrally allows for a clear analysis 
of how both work on society, without ideological barriers.  
One important aspect is the use of social groups and opinion-makers within 
those groups as starting points to disseminate new ideas and behaviors. With his 




“hijack” or “co-opt nascent movements for women’s liberation and succeed in 
overturning conservative social norms. If the circumstances were different this 
achievement might even be described as “liberal”. This observation will become 
important later in chapter 5 when the use of branded and commodified politically radical 
iconography in order to generate mass political movements is discussed. 
 
KONY 2012 and Subject Formation 
 
The above underlines the argument that propaganda is not equal to falsification. 
Appealing to a desire for liberation or a desire to be considered a trendsetter may be 
disingenuous, it may be manipulative, but it is not the same as lying. What Bernays did 
was to transform the way people thought and behaved in relation to women smoking. 
Although greatly influenced by Lippmann Bernays did disagree with him on a few key 
points concerning propaganda. One point of difference was that, according to Bernays, 
Lippmann argued that propaganda is dependent upon censorship. Bernays (1923) 
claimed that the opposite is true; He defined propaganda as a “purposeful, directed 
effort to overcome censorship—the censorship of the group mind and the herd reaction” 
(p. 122). Bernays meant by this that prejudices instilled by culture and custom had to be 
overcome in order to introduce some new behavior or opinion into the public, and that 
this is the true work of propaganda. He argued that “the average citizen is the world's 
most efficient censor” and that a person’s "‘logic proof compartments,’ his own 
absolutism are the obstacles which prevent him from seeing in terms of experience and 




Bernays sought to shape information, not to hide it. His understanding of the role 
of propaganda and the propagandists was quite sophisticated. His model of 
communication was not unidirectional, from source to receiver, but an interaction of 
forces between the public and those that sought to affect it: “Action and interaction are 
continually going on in between the forces projected out to the public and the public 
itself. The public relations counsel must understand this fact in its broadest and most 
detailed implications” (Bernays, 1923, p. 77). In other words, for Bernays “…public 
opinion was precisely a spot of contestation and struggle formed by the interaction of 
relations of force. Public opinion was the domain formed by the struggle between the 
public and a variety of agencies to constitute each other and each other’s conduct 
according to their own agenda” (Wimberly, 2017, p. 109).  
The goal of the propagandist is to govern this “spot of contestation” and to 
change the way people viewed themselves and the world. Bernays and his colleagues 
wanted to “…transform subjects and their conduct. His propaganda aimed to be not just 
a film of falsehood that was laid over the truth but a transformation of who we are and 
how we comport ourselves” (Wimberly, 2017, p. 108).  
 This deeper understanding of what propaganda is helps us to understand why 
KONY 2012 can be viewed as a propaganda campaign and why it was so successful. 
The information about Uganda contained in the video was, while not completely false, 
very faulty and a misrepresentation of the situation in Uganda. But the point goal of the 
video and the reason it was so effective is that it motivated its target audience. The 
video made them see themselves not simply as passive spectators watching a tragedy 




Children wanted to empower young people to “do more than just watch”, but to “take 
steps towards ending injustice” (Karlin and Matthew, 2012, p. 257). This subject 
formation was aided by Invisible Children’s skillful and savvy use of marketing and 
branding. The bracelets, t-shirts and other branded products sold by Invisible Children 
allowed its young targets to “wear their involvement” and facilitated “identity formation” 
(Karlin & Matthew, 2012, p. 258).  
 The campaign also sought to “partition” the audience. Invisible Children made 
extensive use of surveys and polls and gained a good understanding of their 
constituents. According to Karlin and Matthew (2012), the survey results indicated that 
over eighty-eight percent of their supporters were under the age of twenty-six. The 
campaign performed bi-annual tours that focused heavily on schools. During the tours 
the organization would screen its films and around half of those screenings were 
presented to school groups. The organization intentionally targeted celebrities and 
famous musicians who were popular with youth, they even created a band relations 
department and coordinated their campaign with the touring, album release, and video 
release schedule of famous bands.  
Obviously Invisible Children had mastered many of the techniques men like 
Bernays pioneered. For example, Bernays (1923) explains how a public relations 
counsel careful segmented the possible audience for the Russian Ballet at the 
Metropolitan Opera House, making a different type of appeal to each segment 
depending on their tastes and identities. Areas of overlap between different 
demographics were identified in order to maximize the number viewers reached. He 




women, who composed the largest potential market, and by marketing the product 
differently to different segments of women:   
Thus, to the members of women's clubs, silk was projected as the 
embodiment of fashion. To those women who visited museums, silk was 
displayed there as art. To the schools in the same town, perhaps, silk 
became a lesson in the natural history of the silkworm. To art clubs, silk 
became color and design… Each group of women was appealed to on the 
basis of its greatest interest” (p. 145-146) 
Likewise, Invisible Children performed extensive market research to discover the 
characteristics of population segments amongst whom they would have the greatest 
appeal. After learning this they created an extensive campaign tailored to the interests 
of this demographic.  
 
Dewey’s Reply to Lippmann and the Place of Education 
 
Although he never faced Lippmann in a public debate John Dewey did respond 
to his arguments contained in Public Opinion. Dewey wrote an article for The New 
Republic, entitled Education as Politics, which was published on October 4, 1922. In 
response to Lippmann’s criticisms of democracy and the near-impossibility of its actual 
practice Dewey calls for educational reform. He criticizes the education of his day as 
backward and inappropriate for the changing social situation of an industrialized 




Our schooling does not educate, if by education be meant a trained habit 
of discriminating inquiry and discriminating belief, the ability to look 
beneath a floating surface to detect the conditions that fix the contour of 
the surface, and the forces which create its waves and drifts. We dupe 
ourselves and others because we have not that inward protection against 
sensation, excitement, credulity and conventionally stereotyped opinion 
which is found only in a trained mind (Dewey, 1922, p. 140) 
Dewey identifies two major failing in the education of his day. First, education 
was burdened with the “persistence, in the body of what is taught, of traditional 
material which is irrelevant to present conditions” which resulted in a public which 
had “no protection against being duped in facing the emergencies of today” (p. 
140). Dewey claimed that even specialists in a field were as susceptible to “bunk” 
as an uneducated layperson since the education of the day was so inadequate in 
the face of modern challenges; he said that the schools of the day graduated 
men who were “clothed in the chain-armor of antiquity” who were proud of their 
awkward movements in the modern world (p. 140).  
The second major failure of education Dewey identified as the failure to 
teach critical thinking skills. He locates the origin of this “avoidance of the spirit of 
criticism” in the belief that the avoidance of teaching students to be critical of their 
nations and their nations’ history would produce better citizens. The avoidance of 
addressing social ills resulted in students who had a condition of what he called 




 Dewey (1922) concludes that a solution is almost hopeless but indicates 
that the only solution would be greater confidence in intelligence and the 
scientific method. Dewey’s solution seems nigh-unobtainable and would entail a 
radical restructuring of democratic society. He says that education, as he defines 
it, is the answer and that “education means the creation of a discriminating mind, 
a mind that prefers not to dupe itself or to be the dupe of others” (p. 141). 
Furthermore, he argues that educators, and presumably all citizens, “will have to 
cultivate the habit of suspended judgment, of skepticism [sic], of desire for 
evidence, of appeal to observation rather than sentiment, discussion rather than 
bias. Inquiry rather than conventional Idealizations” (p. 141). He ends the article 
by stating that when education has achieved this then education and politics will 
become the same thing and leaves a glimpse of an idea that would combat the 
work of propagandists. He says that when education and politics become “one 
and the same thing” then politics will become the “intelligent management of 
social affairs”. This presents a vision of a critical education-for-democracy, or 
politics as a pedagogical project, as the technological antithesis of propaganda 
as a technology of governance. Since, whereas the propagandist shapes 
information to manipulate irrational desires and drives, education as government 
would eschew appeals to emotion and reified traditional prejudices and be a 
scientific process of constant testing and observation without a search for 
conclusive solutions.  
 Dewey’s solution is quite radical and attractive, but problems may be 




modern society necessitates the utilization as a technology of governance, 
saying that:  
The bulk and the careful organization of propaganda are testimony to two 
outstanding facts: the new necessity governments are under of enlisting 
popular interest and sentiment; and the possibility of exciting and directing 
that interest by a judiciously selected supply of ‘news’” (Dewey, 1922, p. 
139)  
But, he then understates propaganda’s importance in relation to other factors, 
such as entrenched prejudices, stereotypes, and lazy thinking, saying that these 
are much more damaging to the public mind that propaganda. In Dewey’s day 
this may have been correct, but the media apparatuses of Dewey’s time had 
nowhere near the ability to reach audiences that today’s media possess. 
Compared with twenty-four-hour cable news, ubiquitous social media with 
constantly updated live feeds accessed by mobile devices, the effect of 
prejudices and “mental habits” caused by bad education are either dwarfed or 
drastically amplified. If examined, the time most people spend in formal 
education would be much less than the time they spend watching television, 
listening to the radio, or accessing bits information, rumor, and images from 
social media. In such an environment the power of clever marketers and 
propagandists is amplified exponentially, especially if they are as savvy and 






CHAPTER 3: ANALYZING KONY 2012: AUGMENTING STUART HALL’S EN/DE-
CODING MODEL WITH A MULTIDIMENSIONAL MODL AND LOTMAN’S 
SEMIOSPHERE 
 
In the truly insightful essay, Encoding, Decoding, Stuart Hall (2006) brilliantly 
analyses key aspects of language, images, and media such as television and then 
proposes a system for classifying and explaining the differing ways that audiences/ 
message recipients can “decode”, or yield meaningful, messages. Hall’s analysis of 
message transmission can apply to any semiotic activity broadly speaking, but in the 
essay itself it is clear that when speaking of mass communications institutions his 
analysis was formulated with broadcast mass media--especially television--in mind.  
 Most previous communication models posited three stages/entities in the 
communication act; sender-message/transmission-receiver but Hall’s model consists of 
four “moments” or stages: production, circulation, distribution/consumption, 
reproduction. Hall proposes that instead of viewing communication as a linear process 
with only three elements, it might be better to conceive of communication in terms of 
“...a structure produced and sustained through the articulation of linked but distinctive 
moments…” and further, “...as a 'complex structure in dominance', sustained through 
the articulation of connected practices, each of which, however, retains its 
distinctiveness and has its own specific modality, its own forms and conditions of 
existence” (Hall, 2006, p. 163). In contrast to the linear, three-step model, Hall’s 




process and structure all its own, although in complex interaction with the other 
moments.  
 Since in Hall’s construction each stage is a process in itself, the other steps can 
become material for the production process themselves; “circulation and reception 
are...'moments' of the production process in television and are reincorporated...into the 
production process itself. The consumption or reception of the television message is 
thus also itself a 'moment' of the production process in its larger sense…” (Hall, 2006, p. 
165). This insight recognizes that the production of media and mass communication 
happens within a society, within a culture (the media of a society will no doubt be a 
reflection and outgrowth of the culture of that society, drawing on language, shared 
concepts, and shared history) filled with individuals who receive and interpret the 
messages being broadcast. The reactions and responses of these individuals are a part 
of the production of yet more media. However, the production and the reception stages 
are not identical although they are deeply related; they are “...differentiated moments 
within the totality formed by the social relations…” differing in terms of process and the 
structure of the institutions that constitute these stages. 
 Following Barthes (1977[1980]), Hall makes a distinction between two levels of 
linguistic meaning; denotation and connotation. Denotation is “widely equated with the 
literal meaning of the sign…” and connotation refers to “...less fixed and therefore more 
conventionalized and changeable, associative meanings, which clearly vary from 
instance to instance and therefore must depend on the on the intervention of codes” 
(Hall, 2006, p. 168). The denotation of a word can be said to be its “dictionary” 




“senses” or glosses it takes due to different cultural and historical processes. However, 
Hall does not use this classic distinction and instead opts for a purely analytic one 
saying that there are few times in any discourse when signs have only a 
denotative/literal meaning and that “in actual discourse most signs will combine both the 
denotative and the connotative aspects” so that the two terms are “merely useful 
analytic tools for distinguishing...between…. the different levels at which ideologies and 
discourses intersect” (Hall, 2006, p. 168). Hall believes that misunderstands can occur 
at the denotative level, but for his television and other mass media analysis he 
concentrates on the connotative level where class struggles over meanings occur.  
Hall’s other major concept within the essay is the proposition of three categories 
or different types of “readings” of messages that he says are possible for media; 
dominant-preferred, negotiated, and oppositional6. The dominant-preferred position can 
also be called the “preferred” reading, or the decoding of the message which yields a 
meaning which corresponds to the “reference code” and therefore is “operating inside 
the dominant code”. The opposition reading is a decoding of the reference code which 
yields an interpretation which is “globally contrary” to the reference code that 
“detotalizes the message in the preferred code in order to retotalize the message within 
some alternative framework of reference” (Hall, 2006, p. 172). In other words, whereas 
a person who makes a dominant-preferred reading of a media text is logically and 
ideologically aligned with the ideology expressed and encoded within the reference 
code, a person making an oppositional reading is operating outside the dominant logical 
                                                 
6 Another important point Hall makes is the idea that “the [communication] even must become a ‘story’ before it 
can become a communicative event” (Hall, 2006, p. 164). This means that any message must be some kind of “text” 
before it can be transmitted to receivers who will decode it; it must be received as something meaningful that is 




space using a different, perhaps contrary ideology—set of attitudes and foundational 
assumptions about the world—or “framework of reference” in Hall’s words.  
 The third position, the negotiated, is a mixture of “adaptive and oppositional 
elements”, a middle position between the two aforementioned. Hall describes his 
position as operating “with exceptions to the rule” because it gives “the privileged 
position to the dominant definitions of events while reserving the right to make a more 
negotiated application to ‘local conditions’” (p. 172). In other words, at one level, those 
who make negotiated reading of a text decode in a two-leveled ideological space; on 
one level they accept the dominant assumptions and meanings encoded into the text 
but on a second level, closer to their own personal experience, they make modifications 
where the dominant view does not correspond to their own personal experience. Hall 
says that it is probable that the “great majority of so-called ‘misunderstandings’ arise 
from the contradictions and disjunctures between hegemonic-dominant encodings and 
negotiated-corporate decodings” (p. 172).  
 Hall’s analysis and framework of decoding strategies is important for many 
reasons, but probably the most important is that his analysis gives a good answer to the 
question “how do you know that this or that media text is meant to convey this or that 
message”? This question is usually asked whenever a critical reading of a media text as 
ideological, racist, sexist, etc..., is given. Hall provides an analysis of the ways that the 
production of media messages encodes the views and ideologies of certain institutions 
and social classes and how the communication itself acts as a system of domination 




historically it is clear that he is responding other theories and critics who pose the 
question above to critical communications theorists.  
 Two of the theories or notions Hall was responding to are the psychological 
theory called the “selective perception” hypothesis, and the other is the concept of 
“polysemy”.7 I will deal with the selective perception hypothesis first and polysemy later. 
Selective perception is the idea that media users with different degrees of certain 
psychological biases have different reasons for liking or disliking the same media. For 
example, a racist person might view a television program and find it to be a fair and 
accurate picture of the world, while an anti-racist person might find the program to be 
highly prejudiced. In other words, “selective perception” states that media 
users/receivers perceive “what they want to perceive” when they encounter and decode 
certain media and this perception is conditioned by psychological biases.  
 When reading Hall’s (2006) essay it is fairly clear that he has developed his 
theory in part in response to the selective perception hypothesis, stating;  
In recent years discrepancies...have usually been explained by reference to 
‘selective perception’. This is the door via which a residual pluralism evades the 
compulsions of a highly structured, asymmetrical and non-equivalent process. Of 
course, there will always be private, individual, variant readings. But ‘selective 
perception’ is almost never as selective, random or privatized as the concept 
suggests. The patterns exhibit, across individual variants, significant clusterings. 
                                                 
7 Another communications theory that seeks to explain why people choose certain media, how they use that media, 
and what that media does for them is the Uses and Gratifications Theory, which is based in the socio-psychological 





Any new approach to audience studies will therefore have to begin with a critique 
of ‘selective perception’ theory (p. 172)  
This passage demonstrates that Hall was addressing proponents of the selective 
perception theory directly. Hall’s theory was formulated to explicitly address issues of 
social class; therefore he draws his three decoding categories directly from Parkin’s 
groupings of individuals’ responses to injustice in society (Parkin, 1971). Hall’s problem 
with selective perception is that it psychologizes audience interpretation and therefore 
personalizes the issue of how media receivers decode, ignoring the institutions and 
social process that underlie the process of media creation and dissemination.  
 However, the selective perception theory does pose some interesting challenges 
to Hall’s framework when tested in real-life circumstances. One of the best examples of 
a media text which seems to defy Hall’s framework--and one which he undoubtedly was 
aware of--is the popular American sitcom All in the Family (AITF). AITF was a comedy 
whose protagonist was Archie Bunker, a White, Anglo-Saxon, Protestant, blue collar 
man living with his wife, Edith, his daughter and his out-of-work, liberal son-in-law, Mike. 
The show caused much controversy when it aired because of Archie’s use of racial and 
ethnic slurs, and Archie’s verbally abusive, sexist treatment of his longsuffering wife, 
Edith.  
Many viewers and intellectuals thought that Archie’s behavior normalized racism 
and that he was a bad role model. However, despite the controversy the show was a hit. 
Addressing the controversy, the show’s creator/producer, Norman Lear (1971), claimed 
that it was his goal to use Archie’s behavior and prejudice to bring those topics “out into 




also believed that the show would combat racism by showing its irrationality because 
Archie’s liberal son-in-law Mike “was always the one making sense” while “Archie at 
best will work out some kind of convoluted logic to make a point. But it’s always foolish. 
Totally foolish” (Lear, 1971, p. 17).  
Lear’s purpose in crafting the Archie Bunker character was to show the illogic or 
racism, and also to reveal the intimate and casual racism that is expressed in private. 
He wanted to create a character that viewers could relate to, a character in whom they 
could see reflections of themselves and their friends and family members. He believed 
that characters such as the “white sheriff who rapes a black woman in the back of his 
squad car” were ineffective at combating casual racist attitudes because “We’ve had 
these bigots through the years—one-dimensional, stereotypes—ad nauseam” (Lear, 
1971, p. 30). He therefore avoided depicting Archie in such an obviously negative 
manner and created a character described by certain viewers as “a lovable bigot who 
helps us all to laugh at ourselves and view our own behavior with new insights” (p. 30) 
 Applying Hall’s framework to analyze Archie Bunker and All in the Family 
presents some interesting challenges. Clearly Lear created the show and the characters 
with for the purpose of combating racism, xenophobia, sexism, and all types of bigotry. 
For All in the Family there is a clear, documented “preferred” reading. However, the 
problems begin when the actual effects on the audience are examined. C. L. Sanders 
(1972), writing a critical review of the show in Ebony magazine, argued that contrary to 
Lear’s claims that exposing racist attitudes through the character of Archie Bunker 
would lead to audience introspection and less racism, the character Archie had become 




“elevated to sainthood” amongst many Whites and that there was anecdotal evidence 
that White children living in mixed neighborhoods who had never heard many racial 
slurs before were beginning to use them to refer to their black classmates. Sanders 
mentions that letters to CBS (the broadcaster) concerning the show were “100 to 1 in 
favor of Bunker”. Sanders quotes the famous syndicated columnist Leonard Lyons as 
writing that “Norman Lear...and the others behind the show have become deeply 
concerned that too many viewers are laughing with, not at Archie Bunker. Their fan mail 
is disturbing them because so much of it applauds Archie and his prejudices” (Sanders, 
1972, p. 188). 
It would seem that, far from making racism and bigotry unpalatable, AITF had 
made Archie Bunker popular. More evidence of this came from a study by Neil Vidmar 
and Milton Rokeach (1974), which specifically used the “selective perception” 
hypothesis to analyze and explain the character’s popularity. Vidmar and Rokeach 
administered a questionnaire to two different sample populations, one Canadian and the 
other from the USA and composed mostly of adolescents; all the participants the 
American sample were white. According to their findings over 60% of viewers in both 
samples admired Archie more than Mike (the liberal foil) but only 11%-13% thought that 
Archie made more sense than Mike. In both samples a minority thought that Archie was 
the most ridiculed (32% in the Canadian sample and 10% in the American). From the 
results of their study it was clear that despite the overwhelming majority of respondents 
who felt that Archie made little sense the character was still popular incredibly popular. 
To the question “Has watching the show made you aware that you had prejudices that 




“Yes”; there were no data for this item from the American sample. Vidmar are Rokeach 
wrote that “perhaps most disturbing” most viewers “saw nothing wrong with Archie’s use 
of ethnic and racial slurs” (p. 42). 
It appeared that Norman Lear had failed in his goal to make racism seem illogical 
and repugnant and to make viewers more aware of their own prejudices. Vidmar are 
Rokeach concluded that their “findings surely argue against the contention that All in the 
Family has positive effects” but rather “all such findings seem to suggest that the 
program is more likely reinforcing prejudice than combating it” (p. 46). Using the 
selective perception hypothesis to explain the results of their study they postulate that 
“perhaps prejudiced and non-prejudiced persons ascribe different meanings to the 
intent and outcome of AITH episodes: non-prejudiced viewers and minority group 
viewers may perceive and enjoy the show as satire, whereas prejudiced viewers may 
perceive and enjoy the show as episodes ‘telling it like it is’ (p. 37).  
 The selective perception hypothesis has points of both similarity and difference 
with Hall’s framework. Like Hall’s framework Vidmar and Rokeach’s analysis seeks to 
understand and explain why the same media can be interpreted in different ways by 
different people; Hall postulates the dominant-hegemonic, mediated, and oppositional 
readings and Vidmar and Rokeach split their sample groups into “prejudiced” and “non-
prejudiced”. However, whereas an analysis of social structure is inherent to Hall’s 
analysis, the selective perception hypothesis as represented in Vidmar and Rokeach’s 
study concentrates on the psychology of different individuals. While a social critique 




necessary and Vidmar and Rokeach do not bring questions of race and social class into 
their analysis of All in the Family. 
 It was this social blind spot of the selective perception theory that no doubt 
stimulated Hall to formulate his framework for decoding. However, the particular case of 
All in the Family presents some difficulties for that framework. Principally, the notion of 
“preferred reading” in this case does not match neatly with the analysis Hall offers. 
Although a basic question that could be asked regarding this aspect is “How does one 
know what exactly is the ‘preferred reading’”? I believe that Hall would have easily 
answered that question by replying that an analysis of the institutions and processes 
which generate media at the production stage. Given the stated intentions of producer 
Norman Lear to challenge racism and bigotry the “preferred reading” should be clear.  
However, the problem arises when we examine the wider context of the 
production stage at the time of the production of All in the Family. The production stage 
can be viewed as a series of level proceeding from the position of producer (Lear) to the 
broadcaster (CBS) to the wider structure of media production in American society as a 
whole. The cultural and social climate of the United States at the time of the production 
of the program must also be examined; the conversations and struggles about race, 
class, politics, the Vietnam War, the feminist movement, etc., are a crucial part of the 
production stage and this concept coincides perfectly with Hall’s framework.  
With this background we must ask, if Lear’s anti-racist/anti-bigotry agenda was 
the preferred reading, were those who like Archie Bunker making an oppositional 
reading? But, at the time Lear’s project was an outlier; the number of Black and other 




programs with that kind of explicitly anti-racist agenda. If the wider social and cultural 
context is taken into account, were those who liked Archie Bunker’s racial and ethnic 
slurs actually making a dominant-hegemonic or negotiated reading?  
Another theoretical concept which is in some ways opposed to Hall’s framework 
and the notion of a preferred reading is polysemy. Polysemy refers to “a textual property 
of openness that invites readers to actualize the meanings they want...to generate from 
the verbal and/or visual signs of the media message” and was developed 
As a challenge to the implicit or explicit monosemic perspective that has 
dominated much literary and cultural analysis, which assumes that the analyst is 
capable of discovering the meaning of the text, and that this (ideological) 
meaning is rather unproblematically transferred to those who read it. Adherents 
of the polysemic perspective thus celebrate the unpredictability and diversity of 
meanings that audiences may activate (Schrøder, 2000, p. 239)   
Polysemy can be opposed to “hypodermic” or “conveyor belt” theories of communication 
in which the message is accepted by the audiences in a direct, mechanical fashion, but 
in many cases, is also opposed to theories like Hall’s which posit one, privileged, 
“preferred reading” (Morley, 1992). Polysemic theorists such as John Fiske tend to de-
emphasize the text itself and to concentrate on the power of the receiver/audience to 
generate its own meanings from a text/signal. Thus, the idea that there is a preferred 
reading which can be accurately read by some audience members is contrary to this 
theoretical position, although the negotiated and oppositional readings are not. In fact, 
many times scholars blend Hall’s idea of oppositional readings with the concept of 




resistance to a preferred reading and readings that simply vary from the preferred 
reading (Dahlgren, 1998, p. 301). Theorists of the polysemic strain, like Fiske, even go 
so far as to disregard analysis of the text, or rather, to view the object of analysis as 
some kind of combination of the text and the audience as a unit. As Fiske argues, “we 
have now collapsed the distinction between ‘text’ and ‘audience’...There is no text, there 
is no audience, there are only the processes of viewing” (Fiske, 1989, pp. 56-7).  
One of the opponents of the polysemic view is David Morley, the British media 
theorist who used Hall’s framework extensively in his 1980 study of the British television 
series Nationwide. Writing about polysemic theories of audience reception, Morley 
criticized research that “romanticizes [sic] the role of the reader” and are “marred by a 
facile insistence on the polysemy of media products and by an undocumented 
presumption that forms of interpretative resistance are more widespread than 
subordination or the reproduction of dominant meanings” (Morley, 1992, p. 20). 
Morley follows Hall in rejecting the notion of a text that can be decoded 
completely freely by focusing on the structures that determine the creation of the text 
and that are within the text itself.  Morley (1992) argues that;  
The analysis of the text or message remains...a fundamental necessity, 
for the polysemy of the message is not without its own structure. 
Audiences do not see only what they want to see, since a message (or 
programme) is not simply a window on the world, but a construction. 
While the message is not an object with one real meaning, there are 




on privileged meaning, and suppress others, these are the directive 
closures encoded in the message (p. 21)  
Thus, Morley and Hall do not completely disregard the possibility of readings other than 
the preferred reading, but because they recognize that media are inherently ideological 
and therefore inherently reflect the worldview of the media creators and not some 
unmediated, directly accessible view of “reality” the ways that audiences respond to 
media will be conditioned by the “directive closures” structuring the media text. This is 
why Hall’s framework includes categories for negotiated and oppositional readings; Hall 
wanted to preserve the agency of audiences to construct their own understandings of 
texts but realized that the institutions and ideologies that produce media cannot simply 
be done away with.  
 The case of Archie Bunker and All in the Family would seem to reflect this 
understanding. Even viewers who liked Archie were thinking about the character in 
terms of race, class, ethnicity and the other socio-cultural factors that make up English-
speaking North American society. Their readings may have diverged from what 
producer-creator Norman Lear intended but the readings were conditioned by the 
issues he wished to address. 
 However, there is still the question of determining what exactly is the preferred 
reading and how the audience is supposed to know what that is. Even if we can accept 
that institutions and ideology structure the text, In the case of All in the Family was 
Norman Lear’s desired message actually hegemonic in the context of late 1960s/early 




reading or an oppositional reading? And if the reading was oppositional, what were they 
opposing, the anti-racist message?  
 Even Morley realized there were limitations to the Hall framework, especially 
when analyzing texts that were not purely informational, like news programs. Although, 
he still believed that Hall’s framework “offers the best alternative to a conception of 
media texts as equally ‘open’ to any and all interpretations...which readers wish to make 
of them,” even though he recognized that it needed “development and amendments in 
various respects” (Morley, 1992, p. 21).  
 The media theorist Kim Schrøder (2000) has attempted to make such 
developments and amendments to Hall’s framework by offering his own 
“multidimensional model” of mass media reception which “proposes that we distinguish 
between readers’ subjectively experienced agreement or disagreement with the media 
text on the one hand...and the researcher’s ‘evaluation’ of the role played by readers’ 
positions in hegemonic struggles” (p. 236). Schrøder gives the example of a mock ad 
campaign created to test audience reactions to corporate involvement in charitable 
causes to illustrate the limitations of Hall’s framework. In the study that used the mock 
campaign audience members read an advertisement which included the logo of the 
Mohawk Oil company as addressing the plight of Canadian aborigines although the 
creator of the advertisement did not intend to transmit that meaning. From this case 
Schrøder attempts to buttress Hall’s framework by focusing on various dimensions of 
audience reception studies that also take into consideration the attitudes and positions 




Schrøder (2000) argues that, “We can hardly claim that the ‘preferred reading’ is 
a property of the text,” and then asks whether the preferred reading is “The reading 
intended by the [media]’s creator, or the reading actualized by a majority of informants” 
(p. 236). Schrøder notes that one shortcoming of Hall’s model is that, “It sees 
‘polysemy’ solely as a feature of the connotative level of meaning, that is, the 
informants’ awareness of and attitude to the cultural meaning” (p. 236). This is an 
important point because, although Hall does admit that misunderstandings of denotative 
meanings can occur, he does not emphasize this point and concentrates his analysis 
solely on the connotative level.  
Another shortcoming of Hall’s model is that it focuses solely on differences in 
decodings as a result of social class while other social divisions such as race, ethnicity, 
and age are also important. This class focus is most likely a result of Hall transforming 
the work of Parkin (1971) for use in the field of media studies. Schrøder argues that this 
class focus “disqualifies the decoding part of the model from any claim to being a 
general model of reception, as it is simply not equipped to deal with other ideological 
scenarios, as for instance a ‘conservative’ reading of a TV programme encoded with a 
‘socialist’ preferred meaning” (p. 240). This criticism identifies the aspect of Hall’s model 
which makes it insufficient for a full analysis of a television program like All in the Family 
and the phenomenon of Archie Bunker’s popularity. In order to explain that kind of 
audience reaction aspects other than class must be examined as well.  
Another weakness of the model is that its focus on ideological struggle “appears 
to bias it in favour of those textual genres (like news and current affairs programmes) in 




another reason why Hall’s model is unable to explain media texts like All in the Family. 
Such a television program does not claim to deliver some kind of unbiased, value-free 
information about the world, rather its purpose is almost purely recreational (although 
this does not mean that the program is free of ideology and it has an educational 
component).  
Schrøder (2000) also takes issue with the notion of the “preferred reading” 
stating  
Epistemologically, the attempt to discover one privileged textual meaning 
is bound to fail, for the simple reason that any decoding, even that of a 
skilled textual analyst, is always already another encoding, that is, a 
product of the decoder’s cultural and communicative repertoires, and 
therefore marginally or substantially different from all other readings. (p. 
241) 
In order to address these weaknesses of Hall’s model Schrøder’s (2000) 
multidimensional model attempts to focus solely on the reception process and 
“takes the encoding process for granted, seeing it simply as the ‘moment’ that 
produces the media text encountered by the audiences” (p. 242). Schrøder also 
claims that the “multidimensional model” is less theoretical and more empirically-
driven than Hall’s model, relying on research about audience experiences and 
that it views reception in terms of dimensions and not a series of processes. The 
six dimensions of Schrøder’s model are: Motivations, Comprehension, 
Discrimination, Position, Evaluation and Implementation. These are divided into 




Comprehension, Discrimination, Position, and Motivation. The other groups are 
called “implications” and consists of Evaluation and Implementation.  Schrøder 
also claims that his model maintains the distinction between “polysemy” and 
“opposition”, something that many theorists fail to do when discussing or using 
Hall’s model.  
 Within the “reading” dimensions, Motivation refers to whether and how 
much people are interested in engaging with a particular media text. If people are 
not interested in watching a particular film or reading a particular book, then they 
can make no “reading” of that text (although, their lack of motivation is in itself an 
important object of research).  
 Comprehension refers to how people understand signs within media and 
Schrøder relies on Peirce's understanding of the sign as having a fundamental 
social-semiotic element (something that stands to somebody for something in 
some respect or capacity) “according to which specific encoded media meanings 
are differentially decoded denotatively and connotatively by audience members 
according to both macro-social factors...and micro-social/situational relations” 
(Schrøder, 2000, p. 246). This social aspect is represented in Peirce's semiotics 
by the concept of the “interpretant”, the “mental image” or unique interpretation a 
person has of a sign, not the actual sign itself.  
 The Discrimination dimension refers to the audience’s or receiver’s 
awareness of the constructedness of a text. To what extent does the audience 
recognize the ideological interests and aesthetic decisions that comprise a text? 




from immersion to critical distance; a person fully immersed would not recognize 
any constructedness and a person at perfect critical distance would read the text 
as being a complete creation of social and ideological forces.  
 The Position dimension refers to the social position and subjective attitude of the 
recipient/audience to a media text. Schrøder designates this dimension because of the 
inability of Hall’s model to deal with situations in which people reject or accept a media 
text based on an “incorrect” understanding of the ideological message and position of 
that text, thus ignoring “the analyst’s desire to position readings ‘objectively’ in the 
political-ideological landscape” (Schrøder, 2000, p. 249). An example demonstrating 
why this dimension is important can be taken from Morley’s Nationwide study. In the 
example, a group of trainee managers read the program as being socialist with a pro-
union bias, however Morley understood that “the program ‘really’ promotes a populist 
version of capitalist hegemony” (Schrøder, 2000, p. 249). This “objective” understanding 
of a text’s ideological position is developed by scholars and researchers and is dealt 
with by another dimension within the model, Evaluation. 
Evaluation is the dimension that deals with the “objective” domain of 
analysis created by the researcher/scholar. Scholars, unlike non-specialist 
audience members, use political and sociological analysis to develop their 
readings of the ideological positions of media texts. Indeed, the “Motivation” and 
“Position” of a scholar is different when engaging with media, and most scholars 
take a critical stand towards media, although this is by no means perfect. 
Through the distinction of the “Position” and “Evaluation” dimensions Schrøder 




negatively valorized ‘accepting’ and ‘hegemonic’ readings on the one hand, and 
between positively valorized ‘rejecting’ and ‘counter-hegemonic’ readings on the 
other” (Schrøder, 2000, p. 250).  
The last dimension, “Implementation”, refers to the political implications of 
audience readings of media texts. If audiences make “oppositional” readings of 
media texts, will this then spur them on toward some kind of political action or will 
the resistance remain internal only? Scholars with a polysemic focus such as 
Fiske (1989) may think that internal resistance to the ideology represented by a 
media text is potent in itself, while others like Morley or Condit (1989) may be 
more skeptical about the possibility of concrete resistance in the external world.8  
It is obvious how a multidimensional approach can buttress Hall’s model, 
ameliorating its deficiencies and helping us to make sense out of the audience 
responses to All in the Family and Archie Bunker, in particular the concepts of 
the dimensions of Comprehension, Discrimination, Position, and Evaluation. In 
the case of All in the Family an analysis of the social and cultural landscape of 
the nation at the time and of the remarks of the producer/creator reveals what the 
“preferred reading” of the program was, and also that the preferred reading was 
in fact not in alignment with the dominant/hegemonic attitudes of the nation as a 
whole. Depending on the “Position” of a viewer, including various attributes such 
as race, class, gender, ethnicity, etc., audience decodings were variable and 
therefore did not align neatly with the dominant/hegemonic-oppositional binary.  
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Those White American audience members who liked the character Archie 
Bunker understood the character to be “telling it like it is” even though his 
reasoning was “illogical”. They also failed to discern the satirical, anti-racist 
nature of the program. On one level they seemed to have been accepting of the 
program but rejected the “preferred reading”(the reading of Lear and the 
encoders of the text), therefore making an “oppositional reading”. Yet their 
inability to discern the anti-racism suggests they read the program from the 
dominant position of racial ideology in America. However, in some ways neither 
an oppositional, negotiated, nor dominant reading can be identified, since the 
preferred satirical message was not comprehended in the first place.  
Thus, the multidimensional model allows us to make use of information 
pertinent to the analysis of audience decodings that Hall’s model does not 
examine. While the multidimensional model when used in conjunction with Hall’s 
model is a formidable tool for media analysis, there is one other model, or way of 
conceiving of media, which meshes nicely with the previous two that I believe 
makes an excellent addition to our group of conceptual techniques. This model is 
the concept of the semiosphere conceived by Russian semiotician Yuri Lotman.  
Two of Lotman’s concepts are useful for media/cultural analysis: the 
semiosphere and cultural explosion. These two concepts are related in that they are 
three-dimensional metaphors for describing cultures and communication. Lotman’s 
(2005) semiosphere concept was influenced by Soviet biochemist V.I. Vernadsky’s 
concept of the biosphere, or the layer of living matter covering the Earth’s crust. By 




within a cultural system. These two concepts can be thought of in terms of a sphere 
moving in the fourth dimension of time. Being three-dimensional, the sphere has 
different regions along the vertical axis but also horizontally; taken together the 
semiosphere and cultural explosion illustrate diachronic, non-simultaneous development 
within a system.  
Following V.I. Vernadsky, who conceived of the biosphere as being not only the 
sphere of living matter, but also that which created the conditions which make life 
possible, Lotman defines the semiosphere as being not only the space in which 
communication takes place, but also that which makes any communication possible. 
The idea of space is also important, since Lotman claims that the semiosphere is not 
only abstract, existing only in the mind, but is also material and manifests in three-
dimensional space.  
Lotman updates a different communication model developed by Roman 
Jakobson. Jakobson’s model has six aspects, as opposed to Hall’s three: the 
addresser, the context, the message itself, the contact, the code, and the addressee. 
Jakobson also posits six functions of language that each refer to one of the six aspects: 
referential (orientation toward the context), emotive (focusing on the addresser), 
conative (the function of influencing the addressee) phatic (focusing on the context, the 
function of establishing and continuing communication), metalingual (the function 
referring to the code itself), and the poetic (a focus on the message itself).  
Lotman, on the other hand, focuses on the text itself, a hallmark of his 
theory being his assertion that the smallest unit of meaning in a language is the 




considers even Jakobson’s more elaborate scheme to be lacking since both 
addressee and addresser share the same code and there is only one message 
that is sent and later received, more or less intact, by the addressee. Lotman’s 
theory emphasizes translation; every reading of a text is the translation of 
information from one language into another, and the result will never be identical 
to the original text pre-translation. Also, for Lotman, the semiosphere comes 
even before the code or the context for any act of dialogue between an 
addresser and addressee. This is because before any messages within using 
any particular language can be sent the processes of communication—which is 
not necessarily linguistic—must exist.  
The concept of boundary is crucial for the semiosphere. Within the 
boundary of the semiosphere lies all that is intelligible, all content that is 
considered to be language or culture. Outside the boundary of the semiosphere 
everything is nonsense, non-linguistic, non-cultural. From the point of view of one 
semiosphere, the languages and culture of a semiosphere beyond its boundary 
is not language at all; the texts that it produces are meaningless until they are 
translated into the language of the first semiosphere.  
 Another of the key aspects of the semiosphere is the binary of center and 
periphery. The center represents the core of a culture or society, this is where the 
dominant ideologies, worldviews, behaviors, language, etc., reside and are produced. In 
Hall’s/Gramscian terms the center could be said to be hegemonic or dominant. The 
periphery is the realm of non-standard, subordinate cultures, languages, and ideologies. 




fact, Lotman’s concept of center and periphery was influenced by the ideas of the 
Russian formalist Tynianov and originally refers to literary texts. Tynianov and Lotman 
conceive of cultures as a series of concentric circles. In the center of the series are the 
authoritative, canonical texts while the periphery is occupied by experimental, irregular, 
non-standard texts.  
Lotman says that the center and periphery are in constant tension, and this 
tension is productive of meaning. Within the cultural system, there is a constant 
centripetal force created as the irregular texts on the periphery attempt to move toward 
the center and the center attempts to keep them away. This leads to changes in the 
culture of the system as the core, attempting to maintain equilibrium, incorporates some 
elements from the periphery, producing new meanings, texts, and ways of 
interpretation. The “explosions” are not necessarily instantaneous events and can take 
years to complete their cycles of transformation, and Lotman identifies slower, 
“continuous” explosions and sudden, disjunctive explosions.  
I believe that Lotman’s concepts are useful for understanding the reception of 
media texts, especially those like All in the Family and the popularity of its main 
character Archie Bunker. Lotman’s ideas about language, culture, and communication 
elaborate the areas of media production and reception that Hall’s model overlooks. 
Also, while Schrøder’s multi-dimensional model provides categories that analyze the 
positions of audiences within the society, categories that take into account audiences’ 
different levels of awareness of the constructedness of texts, and the ways that 




is constructed for reception studies and useful for understanding why and how different 
individuals within an audience decode texts in certain ways.  
Lotman’s ideas provide a way of looking at textual production and reception as a 
whole, as a part of a dynamic culture constantly in tension between new texts and 
codes and established texts at the core. They combine within them the basic concepts 
found within Hall’s and Schrøder’s model, but approaches communication and media 
using a visual and biological metaphor, viewing culture as an organism. He focuses not 
only on how audiences react, but the kind of system that produces texts, and the 
dynamic cultural processes that shape that text and how it is communicated.  
In the case of All in the Family, if we use Hall’s model directly, we are forced to 
designate the fans of Archie Bunker as taking an oppositional stance to the 
dominant/hegemonic text. But in the context of late 1960s North America Norman Lear’s 
intentions in producing the program were not necessarily “hegemonic”. So, if we 
designate the fans of Archie as making a dominant/hegemonic reading we are also in 
error. Using Lotman’s concepts of semiosphere and cultural explosion along with 
Schrøder’s multidimensional model helps us to understand how audience readings are 
made within the diachronic development of a culture and are conditioned by the internal 
tensions between a center that attempts to maintain its position and a cultural periphery. 
 
A Multi-Dimensional Approach to the KONY 2012 Phenomenon 
 
 A multi-dimensional approach along with the concepts of the semiosphere and 




and why it achieved such support and popularity. If we examine the campaign with a 
standard understanding of propaganda then we should be surprised that so many 
young people fell prey to the campaigns persuasion. For experts and journalists, and 
even those completely unfamiliar with Uganda, the film’s portrayal of Kony and Uganda 
was a gross oversimplification. Indeed, the film drew criticisms from Africa experts and 
common users of the web who made critical response videos or posted critical 
comments. Proponents of a cultural populist viewpoint would be hard-pressed to explain 
how millions of people could be swayed by such simplistic and, in some ways, 
mainstream political exhortations that basically amounted to pressuring government 
representatives to authorize military intervention without concluding that those millions 
were successfully deceived by skillful propagandists. However, using the 
multidimensional model we can see how and why so many viewers were attracted to 
the message of KONY 2012.  
 Schrøder’s dimension of “position” seems to be most relevant to the KONY 2012 
case. According to Finnegan (2013b) the “position” of most Invisible Children supporters 
within American society is surprisingly similar. In 2009 Finnegan performed twenty-six 
interviews with thirty-one students, activists, employees and critics of Invisible Children. 
Finnegan discovered that Invisible Children activists and supporters were “primarily 
white race, upper-middle class, female gender, evangelical Christian religious affiliation, 
and adolescent age” (Finneganb, 2013, p. 146). Finnegan also found that most of 
activists involved with Invisible Children were not puzzled by the demographic makeup 
of the movement. The location of these activists in the American semiosphere would be 




Given this information we can understand how so many people of this 
position made a preferred reading of the KONY 2012 video. The values shown in 
the video and its portrayal of the world aligns with their own experiences. As 
Finnegan notes, “The homogeneity of the privileged collective of Invisible 
Children activists…is reflected in a common understanding of the world, one 
premised on meritocracy and an acceptance that capitalist economic systems 
and strategic military operatives are viable” (Finneganb, 2013, p. 147). Invisible 
Children’s message in KONY 2012 was an appeal to the center of the American 
semiosphere. Given the position, these audience members would not have found 
much within the video that would cause them to give an oppositional reading. 
One interviewee told Finnegan (2013b) that Invisible Children: “Can be so 
effective in motivating people [because] they all share a common understanding 
of the world, common language, common experiences, that you can then use, 
common symbols essentially, that you can then use to motivate them” (p. 147).  
In relation to the text the reading of those who supported the campaign 
was “preferred”, but in relation to some aspects of society, for the supporters at 
least, the reading was oppositional. The KONY 2012 video gives an image of 
youth as a catalyst for revolution against the apathetic adults and politicians who 
control the nation. By clothing itself in the guise of a culturally oppositional text, 
Invisible Children was able to take advantage of the desire of certain audience 
members to break away from these traditional structures, even if only in a limited 
way. One of Finnegan’s interviewees contrasted Invisible Children to Amnesty 




group like Amnesty, I’m not dissing on Amnesty’s work—but—why isn’t Amnesty 
motivating more people? You know, you like don’t really see really excited 
Amnesty activists across the country” (Finneganb, 2013, p. 147). For affluent 
youth at the center of the American semiosphere, Invisible Children offered the 
opportunity to rebel and made them feel as if they had the power to change the 
world, but in what Finnegan calls a “non-wave-making” fashion that did not really 
challenge existing institutions.  
We can also examine the IC supporters’ reading using Schrøder’s 
dimension of “comprehension”. The “comprehension” dimensions refers to how 
audiences decode the “signs”—in Peirce’s sense—contained within media. 
Peirce’s concept of the sign is useful here because of the concept of the 
“interpretant” or the different ways that a sign is understood by each individual, 
and also because  
A Peircean perspective conceptualizes the analysis of media signifying 
processes not within a general, abstract linguistic system where meanings 
are fixed, and are assumed to be transferred to the recipients’ minds, but 
in a communicative context where meanings are only potential until 
actualized by socially situated human beings. For Peirce the social 
situatedness of sign users is a function of the interpretive communities 
they belong to (Schrøder, 1994, p. 344) 
Schrøder (1994) offers the examples of Brown and Schulze’s (1990) study of the 
different ways Black and White viewers understood the pop star Madonna’s 




were almost twice as likely as Black viewers interpret the video as being about 
teen pregnancy and Black viewers were twice as likely to interpret the video as 
being a story of father-daughter relationships. The study found that race and 
gender highly condition the way the video was interpreted. We can say that race 
and gender were conditions for the formation of “interpretive communities” that 
shared similar ways of viewing the same media.  
 Given what we know about the demographic makeup of the Invisible 
Children’s supporters and the images of Africa it portrays we can use the 
concepts of interpretive community and the “comprehension” dimension to 
understand why KONY 2012 was so popular with a large segment of the 
American population, but also generated such strong criticism.  
At least one of Finnegan’s (2013b) interviewees said that most Invisible 
Children supporters shared a common understanding of the world and common 
experiences; in other words, they constituted an interpretive community. This 
community was mostly affluent, White, young, and female. Finnegan found that 
the young females in IC often expressed fascination with the male protagonists of 
the organization’s documentaries. They also felt compassion for the children of 
Africa portrayed in these films. The portrayal of Uganda specifically, and Africa in 
general, as a defenseless child in need of help has a long history in the West. An 
1894 cartoon in the magazine Punch, entitled ‘The Black Baby’, depicted Uganda 




John Bull. A caption at the bottom reads: “What, another!!—Well, I suppose I 
must take it in!!”9  
The cartoon reveals a common understanding of Africa in the West that 
sees the continent as dependent and infantilized. This is the common 
understanding of the world, or at least of Africa, that the young supporters of 
Invisible Children drew upon when viewing the KONY 2012 video. The visions of 
Jacob, the young Ugandan boy Jason Russell met in northern Uganda before he 
started Invisible Children, would have elicited sympathy from viewers that shared 
the interpretive frame of the supporters of IC.  
These same concepts of interpretive community and “comprehension” 
also help to explain the backlash against KONY 2012. Obviously, Ugandans 
themselves would have read the video from a completely different point of view 
from Invisible Children’s young constituents. But also, by 2012, many of the 
traditional cultural understandings of Africa were already being challenged, and 
social media gave dissenting voices a greater ability to be heard. For example, 
as noted by Krabill (2012), after the release of KONY 2012, Nigerian-American 
writer Teju Cole criticized the video on Twitter as an example of what he called 
the “White Savior Industrial Complex”. In a post that echoes Finnegan’s 
observations, Cole stated: “The White Savior Industrial Complex is not about 
justice. It is about having a big emotional experience that validates privilege” (p. 
53).  
Positioned differently from the young, affluent, female, evangelical 
Christians that Invisible Children targeted, from outside of their interpretive 





community, Cole was able to render an oppositional reading to the KONY 2012 
video that was echoed by Ugandans and critics in the United States. Both Cole 
and IC’s supporters saw the same images of a helpless impoverished Africa, but 
their respective interpretations of these signs were completely divergent. An 
element of the “discrimination” dimension is also at work here, since Cole’s 
criticisms show that he was able to view the video not as an unbiased 
representation of Africa, but as a carefully constructed text produced to elicit 
emotional reactions, and action, from the audience.  
 
Conclusion 
 A multidimensional approach to KONY 2012 is helpful in that it avoids 
setting up a simple binary between a negatively-valorized “preferred reading” and 
a positively-valorized “oppositional” reading. This approach also avoids the 
simple notion of a strong version of polysemic and cultural populist approaches 
that posit that audiences are completely free to make whatever meanings they 
like from media. Viewed in this way, we can understand that KONY 2012 became 
so popular in part because while it did present a mainstream version of events in 
Uganda that in many ways was retrograde and neo-imperialist, for its target 
population it was viewed as being rebellious and non-conformist. In a maneuver 
that echoes the way the center incorporates elements of the periphery in 
Lotman’s semiosphere concept, the target audience was allowed to be 
oppositional without the danger of actually being in a position of direct 




 In the next chapter, the KONY 2012 video will be examined as an example 
of “militainment”, or media that features military themes or values in an 























CHAPTER 4: THE MILITARY-ENTERTAINMENT-COMPLEX AND KONY 2012 AS 




In the final scene of Stanley Kubrick’s (1987) Vietnam War film, Full Metal 
Jacket, a squad of marines march in the night, their shapes illuminated by the faint 
amber glow of a burning city—presumably Huế—in the distance. As they march in the 
twilight, they sing in unison the theme song to the popular children’s show, The Mickey 
Mouse Club. The juxtaposition of the image of the soldiers marching past the desolation 
of the historic Vietnamese city and the sounds of the carefree song is a powerful scene, 
but one that may be taken as either out-of-place or as just an obtuse insertion by a 
director famed for his complexity. However, the scene is a subtle and brilliant critique of 
American imperialism and consumer culture which echoes Ellul’s (1968) concept of 
social propaganda; and by doing so, in a single scene Kubrick shows the connection 
between entertainment, education, and the military.  
 Kubrick (1987) shows us the marines as young men raised and educated—in the 
true meaning of the word pedagogy—on the wholesome, middle-class values 
represented in the Walt Disney corporation’s media products, and turned into killers by 
the military apparatus of the nation whose values are supposedly represented in those 
products. As Schiller (1973) explains, the entertainment produced by the Walt Disney 
Corporation and other media companies is educational and not merely mindless fun: 




deceptions in history” (p. 80). Quoting historian of American radio and television, Erik 
Barnouw, Schiller says,  
Entertainment is a poisonous concept. The idea of entertainment is that it has 
nothing to do with the serious problems of the world but that it fills up an idle 
hour. Actually, there is an ideology implicit in every kind of fictional story. Fiction 
may be far more important than non-fiction in forming people’s opinions…popular 
entertainment…is basically propaganda for the status quo (p. 80) 
  Kubrick’s choice of the The Mickey Mouse Club theme song is significant. Even 
during the Vietnam War Era Disney was one of the most profitable media companies in 
the world, and since then its power and size have only grown. The educational function 
of Disney’s media was recognized decades ago. Dr. Max Rafferty (1965), two-time 
California State Superintendent of Instruction, called Walt Disney, the company’s 
founder, “the greatest educator of this century—greater than John Dewey or James 
Conant or all the rest of us put together” (p. A5).  
Rafferty (1965) praised Disney for the moral and ethical education Disney gave 
to viewers through the values represented in his media. These values were essentially 
middle-American and consumerist, seemingly eschewing controversial topics and 
politics. Mattelart (1973) argues that, “Disney uses animality, infantilism, and innocence 
to mask the web of interests that form a socially and historically determined and 
concretely situated system: North American imperialism” (p. 428). Mattelart analyses a 
Disney comic book featuring the character Donald Duck to show that the values 
expressed in Disney’s media are veiled supports for American capitalism. In one comic, 




enslave Donald Duck and his nephews also ship weapons to rebels based in the 
country. While trying to escape from the authorities, one of the pirates raises his hand 
into the air and shouts, “Long live the revolution!”, and Donald says only the symbol of 
law and order, the Navy, can save him and his nephews. The message here is that 
Caribbean revolutionaries—like Castro of Cuba, for example—actually want to create 
oppressive regimes to enslave society and only the American empire can bring freedom 
and order. Thus, Mattelart (1973) suggests why the final scene in Full Metal Jacket is 
appropriate. The young marines marching past the ruins of Huế sing the theme song of 
the Walt Disney Corporation’s mascot because the corporation and its capitalist, 
consumerist, imperialist values have raised them. Through its media they learned that it 
was their duty to bring freedom and order to those “oppressed” by communist 
revolutionaries across the world, whatever the cost. Indeed, entertainment is not simply 
innocent fun. 
The theme of this chapter will be the symbiotic relationship between the US 
military, communications, and media. The chapter will attempt to demonstrate that the 
history of the relationship between the military and entertainment is long and that this 
has led to a cross-pollination of themes and techniques between the entertainment 
industry and the military. The relationship discussed here is relevant to the KONY 2012 
video because, in a manner reminiscent of Ellul’s (1968) conception of “sociological 
propaganda”, the video’s creators were influenced by the themes and aesthetics of 
popular military shooter video games and military-themed action films and that this 




The influence of military shooter games and military-themed films is important 
because the target audience of KONY 2012 was American youth (from teens to early 
20’s). According to statistics, 47% of gamers are between 18 and 49 years old, and 
many children younger than 18 are avid gamers10. One video game that will be 
discussed in this chapter, America’s Army, was developed by the US Army specifically 
to garner a rating that would make it suitable for the majority of teens. Other shooter 
games developed with military support are also aimed at the teen and young adult 
markets.  
The argument of the chapter is that KONY 2012 represents an instance of the 
convergence and merger of entertainment and military. Furthermore, it is argued that 
the convergence of these two fields has progressed to a point that a separation of 
motives is almost impossible and that we now live in a time when military logics have 
over-coded themselves onto society by means of virtual reality and simulation. KONY 
2012 exists within a circuit between the military and the entertainment industry. The 
video is informed by media products that were created either by the military or with input 
and assistance from the military. On the other end of the equation, the KONY 2012 
video sought to give the military cause for a humanitarian intervention in a foreign state, 
thus completing the circuit.  
 
The Military Complexes 
 
President Dwight D. Eisenhower first introduced the term “military-industrial 
complex” (MIC) in his farewell address to the nation on January 17, 1961, the eve of the 
inauguration of President Kennedy. Eisenhower warned Americans that they should 





guard against the influence, “sought or unsought” of the powerful amalgamation military 
power, the defense industry, and government. Later, in the late 1960s, the 
communications scholar Herbert Schiller researched the importance of 
telecommunications technology and industry in the military-industrial nexus, adding an 
extra “C”, for communications, to the MIC. Schiller was a true pioneer in researching the 
ways the military-corporate nexus controlled both the technological structure of 
communications technology and influenced the nature of the content that was delivered 
to audiences through that technology.  
Before Schiller’s groundbreaking research there was little attention paid to 
the commoditization and weaponization of the electromagnetic spectrum by this 
nexus. Schiller’s research differed with the contemporary optimistic attitude 
towards revolutions in communications technology is represented by theorists 
like Daniel Bell. Bell’s The Coming of a Post-Industrial Society was published the 
same year as Schiller’s The Mind Managers but 
With the help of people like Dallas Smythe and George Gerbner, Schiller 
worked to fill this intellectual blindspot by describing what amounted to a 
military-industrial-communication complex. The complex was comprised of 
a powerful set of networks that linked the military, intelligence agencies, 
large businesses, particularly military contractors, and major media along 
with their increasingly powerful allies in the computer, communication, and 
information technology sectors (Mosco, 2001, p.193) 
Schiller astutely recognized the tendency of the marriage between the military 




Department of Defense contract researchers will produce…a large portion 
of the new scientific and technical knowledge becoming available. One 
consequence of this pattern is that entirely new fields of study, as well as 
their practical application, become the exclusive preserve of the Armed 
Forces (Schiller, 1970, p. 171) 
Military development and innovation of new technologies such as radio for 
communications, computers for targeting systems and anti-aircraft guns, radar for 
tracking, and orbital satellites for communications and surveillance, yielded new 
segments of the natural world that could be used for military purposes, but the military’s 
close relationship to industry and the business world allowed these new technologies to 
be passed into the hands of private corporations:  
Missing in virtually every account of freewheeling entrepreneurs and visionary 
venture capitalists is the military’s role, intentional and otherwise, in creating and 
sustaining Silicon Valley. For better and for worse, Silicon Valley owes its present 
configuration to patterns of federal spending, corporate strategies, industry-
university relationships, and technological innovation shaped by the assumptions 
and priorities of Cold War defense policy. (Leslie, 2000, p. 49) 
The military also makes use of technology developed by private enterprise for the 
consumer market. Examples of this include the use of a modified version of the video 
game Doom for training Marines, and US Air Force’s creation of a supercomputer from 
1,760 Sony PlayStation 3 consoles (Zyga, 2010). 
Telecommunications and media and their use for entertainment and recreation 




private industry. The relationship in this field was first described as the Military-
Entertainment-Complex (MEC) by J.C. Herz (1997). This new complex reveals the 
extension into new areas which Schiller noticed and is manifested in everything from 
television shows, comic books, Hollywood blockbusters, and triple-A videogames. 
Media theorists use the word “militainment” to describe the products of the military-
entertainment-complex. According to Stahl (2010), militainment is:  
State violence translated into an object of pleasurable consumption. Beyond this, 
the word also suggests that this state violence is not of the abstract, distant, or 
historical variety but rather an impending or current use of force, one directly 
relevant to the citizen's current political life (p. 6) 
Talk of militainment and the MEC picked up in the early 2000s with the start of 
the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, in the wake of Pentagon press packages broadcast by 
evening news programs, and the trend of “embedding” reporters with military units: 
There's a new alliance in Hollywood: the military-entertainment complex. The 
networks need a new twist on reality TV, the genre that has cooled since 9/11—
or perhaps, in part, because of it. The Pentagon has a p.r. issue: How do you 
maintain public interest in a war that could stay on simmer—an air strike here, a 
wiretap there—for years? The symbiotic solution: send reality TV to war 
(Poniewozik, 2002, p. 20) 
During the early days of Gulf War II and the “War on Terror” The Department of 
Defense and various branches of the military collaborated with television networks and 
movie studios to produce entertainment content such as reality television shows, 




entertainment industry because “the military [saw] what television analysts call 
''militainment'' as one of the most effective ways to get its message across, free of the 
filters of a critical press corps” (Seelye, 2002). For the audiences watching this 
programming and content becomes their only experience and knowledge of “war”. 
“Reality TV” shows such as “Profiles from the Front Line”, “Military Diaries”, and 
“American Fighter Pilot” gave American audiences a taste of military life. These shows 
were a part of the trend of “embedding” that began during the Second Iraq War, when 
journalists began to live and travel with groups of soldiers deployed in Iraq.  
The avowed purpose of embedding was to bring a more authentic and objective 
experience of the events of the war to the American citizenry, especially since the first 
Gulf War had come to be described as a “video game war”. While the programs’ 
producers claimed that they had “carte blanche” when creating the shows  
Each show also goes in, at least figuratively, with a military escort. The producers 
are "casting" their shows and say they have final cut, though they will screen 
episodes for the military to ensure they don't give away secrets. But Washington 
can pull the plug anytime (Poniewozik, 2002, p. 20)  
But one wonders how much latitude the producers have since military personnel review 
scripts before the shows are given the final edit and broadcast. Speaking of his 
experience on the television drama JAG, James Eliot, the star of the show, said: “We 
send our scripts to our [Pentagon] liaison and they weigh in on it...,” but the scriptwriters 
and producers were careful not to offend the liaisons, “because they certainly lend a 




The case of JAG is quite instructive and demonstrates the extent to with the 
simulation of the military and war that exists on the screen becomes indistinguishable 
from reality, or rather, shapes the way viewers conceive of reality by offering the only 
version of an event or process that viewers can easily experience:  
This is a fictional television drama exploring what a military tribunal, as proposed 
by President Bush, might look like...Because the real tribunals, which have not 
yet been scheduled, are to be open to newspaper and magazine reporters but 
not to television cameras, ''JAG'' is offering the first and perhaps only visual 
version of the tribunals that millions of people will see. That version to be 
stamped on the public consciousness, with the power and immediacy of images 
and action, will show conscientious ''JAG'' officers treating terrorist suspects to 
many of the rights of the American justice system (Seelye, 2002). 
The “tribunals” in question are military courts (different from courts martial) that exercise 
jurisdiction over enemy soldiers. The last time the United States government used 
military tribunals to try foreigners occurred during World War II in the 1942 Supreme 
Court case, Ex Parte Quirin. Controversially, after the invasion of Afghanistan, President 
Bush and his administration desired to try imprisoned individuals, both foreigners and 
citizens, as “enemy combatants”; a designation that would allow them to fall under the 
purview of military jurisprudence and would allow the common law protections of civilian 
courts to be withheld from them.  
The Bush administration’s attempt to carry out these tribunals was contested by 
the Supreme Court as unconstitutional. Since decades had passed since any actual 




tribunals would be the only experience and source of knowledge most Americans would 
have of these kinds of military-judicial proceedings. The producers of the television 
show JAG collaborated with the US military, tailoring the scripts in order to give a 
positive portrayal of the tribunals even though the use of tribunals was controversial. 
The example from JAG shows how the close relationship between the entertainment 
industry and the military shapes the content of entertainment media in an attempt to 
influence the opinions of audiences.  
 
Spectacular War and the Virtual Citizen-Soldier 
 
 Roger Stahl (2010) explains militainment as the result of a transition from 
“spectacular war” and the corresponding “citizen-spectator” subject, to “interactive war” 
and the corresponding “virtual citizen-soldier”.  “Spectacular War” arises during the 
social-economic mode termed “The Spectacle” by French theorist Guy Debord. The 
citizen-spectator is the subject of spectacular war. The citizen-spectator is passive, 
disconnected, and alienated, and war is a “televised consumable” similar to any other 
consumer commodity. Propaganda in the spectacle avoids engaging in rational appeals 
and arguments in favor of fostering disengagement:  
Whereas propaganda rationally engages with argument and narrative, the 
spectacle forgoes persuasion in favor of fostering disengagement. Whereas 
propaganda addresses an audience that matters, the spectacle presumes an 




of why we fight, the spectacle loses itself in the fact that we fight (Stahl, 2010, p. 
31).  
It should be noted here the similarity between Debord’s concept of the spectacle and its 
irrational injunction to action and Ellul’s concept of orthopraxy.  
As opposed to previous years when the military relied on conscription, which 
made the successful waging war more subject to public opinion and public support of 
military engagements since most male citizens were also potential soldiers, the US 
military in the post-Vietnam era relies on voluntary enrollments. Stahl (2010) explains 
that this removes citizens from the direct negative consequences of military 
engagements and thus brings an end to the era of the citizen-soldier, the citizen 
subjectivity typified by World War II propaganda which dismantled the boundaries 
between the frontline and the home front. The citizen-soldier was replaced by the 
citizen-spectator. The first Gulf War was the first real demonstration of this stage of 
evolution in the presentation and propaganda of war. The war’s video game quality was 
commented upon by many, and the spectacular nature of its media presentation 
prompted French philosopher Jean Baudrillard (1991) to pen the essay “The Gulf War 
Did Not Take Place”. Baudrillard’s argument is not that the Gulf War was an illusion or 
some kind of elaborate hoax. Rather, when he says that the Gulf War did not take 
place, he means that the spectacular nature of the war, the constant stream of images 
and information broadcast to television and radio, outstripped and eclipsed the actual 
experience of the war:  
Since this war was won in advance, we will never know what it would have 




a chance of fighting would have been like. We will never know what an 
American taking part with a chance of being beaten would have been 
like...But this is not a war, any more than 10,000 tonnes of bombs per day 
is sufficient to make it a war. Any more than the direct transmission by 
CNN of real time information is sufficient to authenticate a war. 
(Baudrillard, 1995, p. 53)   
Baudrillard’s argument is that the incredible asymmetry of destructive power held 
by the Coalition forces (the US and its allies), combined with the desire of the Coalition 
to limit casualties on its side and a seeming unwillingness to actually destroy the war-
making ability of Saddam Hussein—evidenced, in a famous instance, by the failure to 
stop Hussein’s massacre of Shia and Kurdish populations—precluded anything 
resembling an actual struggle between two opposing forces from taking place. The one-
sided nature of the war was evidenced by battles such as the Battle of 73 Easting, in 
which the US 2nd Armored Division completely obliterated the Iraqi Republican Guards’ 
Tawakalna tank division while taking almost no casualties and dealing 600-1,000 
casualties to the Iraqis. Baudrillard’s assessment of the war is echoed by Noam 
Chomsky (1992), who said: “As I understand the concept of ‘war’, it involves two sides 
in combat, say shooting at each other. That did not happen in the Gulf” (p. 51). 
 As J.C. Herz explains, the Gulf War was a boon to the videogame industry. 
Immediately following the conflict several companies released video games that were 
either based on or referenced the conflict. This convergence of the spectacular military 
conflict and the entertainment industry is not just a mere coincidence, as the two fields 




commentary...registered the striking resemblance between the “missile cam” and 
spotter plane footage of targets being destroyed and the screens of contemporary 
combat-based video games” (Crogan, 2011, p. 1).  
This is exactly what Baudrillard argued; the conflict—or at least the way it was 
presented—did not “feel” like a war. At the time, both the news media and the US 
military made much of the high technological level of the US weaponry; ordinance were 
described as “smart bombs” that were “surgical” in their precision when destroying 
enemy targets, presumably reducing or eliminating “collateral damage”. However;  
The rhetoric of a war of precision weapons delivering surgical strikes obscured 
the fact that the vast majority of military ordnance was not precision guided; that 
area bombing was more prevalent than precision targeting; and that...many of 
the “smart” weapons...were far less effective than was made out in the press 
briefings. (Crogan, 2011, p. 1) 
However, there were connections between the Gulf War, the military, and the 
videogame industry at a deeper level. The relationship between videogames and the 
US military goes back to the beginnings of the former as a separate field of recreational 
entertainment and involves all levels, from funding to technological development. 
Similar to the crucial involvement of the military in the birth and development of Silicon 
Valley, the development of technology critical to video gaming, such as graphical 
displays and virtualization technology basically started in the US military. Discussing the 
importance of the SAGE (Semi-Automated Ground Environment) project to the 
development of computers and information technology, Patrick Crogan (2011) states; 




development projects in the 1950s–1960s” (p. 6). SAGE led to major advances in 
computing technology such as innovations or improvements in, “Magnetic core memory, 
graphic display techniques, simulation techniques, digital data transmission over 
telephone lines, and computer networking”, all of which are necessary for computer 
gaming and online networked gaming (p. 7).  
A two-way exchange exists in which the military provides funding and research 
for the early stages or prototypes of technology and said technology is then passed to 
private enterprises who develop consumer products from it. The transfer also works in 
reverse and there are many examples of consumer products being picked up by the 
military for its use. One of the best examples of the first type of transfer is Lockheed 
Martin, America’s largest defense contractor. In 1993 GE Aerospace, whose 
technological pedigree extends back to the Visual Docking Simulator used for the Apollo 
lunar landings, was acquired by Martin Marietta (Bryant, 1992). In 1995 Martin Marietta 
merged with Lockheed to form Lockheed Martin (Lynch, 1994). Previously, GE 
Aerospace was developing real-time 3D graphics technology, which in 1991 lead to a 
contract with SEGA Enterprises Ltd., then the largest manufacturer of arcade games in 
the world (Lenoir, 2000). Sega was looking for a way to improve the 3D graphics of their 
games and the partnership with GE Aerospace led to the implementation of GE 
Aerospace’s technology in Sega’s famous Model 2 (1993) and Model 3 (1996) arcade 
gaming boards. When GE Aerospace was acquired by Martin Marietta, and later when 





In 1995 Lockheed Martin wanted to expand into other areas of the consumer 
market and established Real3D as a separate division to focus on developing consumer 
graphics products (Lenoir, 2000). Real3D produced the R3D/100 two-chip graphics 
engine, which was used in Sega’s Model 3 arcade board11. Sega also adapted a Martin 
Marietta (Lockheed Martin) tank simulator for commercial release as the arcade game 
Desert Tank (1994). In 1996 Real3D teamed up with Intel and Chips and Technologies, 
Inc. to market Real3D's technology to the PC industry (Lenoir, 2000). Real3D was 
eventually spun off into a separate company in 1997. The company continued to work 
with Intel and Chips and Technologies but closed in 1999 and its assets were sold to 
Intel. In addition to Real3D’s intellectual property, Intel inherited a pending lawsuit levied 
against Real3D by 3dfx Interactive, producer of the popular “Voodoo Graphics” graphics 
accelerator card. The lawsuit was settled when 3dfx agreed to cease legal action in 
exchange for Real3D’s patents, for which in turn 3dfx would allow Intel access to its own 
technology (Smith, 2000; Smith 2001). 3dfx later went bankrupt and was acquired by 
rival NVidia.  
It is also interesting to note that the Japanese arcade and video game company 
Sega’s connection to the American military begin with the very origin of the company 
(Plunkett, 2011). Sega originally started as an American business based in Hawaii, and 
was originally called Service Games, a company founded by Marty Bromley which 
provided coin-operated slot machines and other amusements to American military 
bases. After slot machines were outlawed by the American government, Bromley took 
advantage of America’s military presence in Japan and began to sell his slot machine 
games there. In 1964 Service Games merged with Rosen Enterprises, a company 





founded in Japan during the aftermath of World War II by American David Rosen, a 
soldier in the US Air Force. After merger Service Games was renamed to SEGA 
Enterprises Ltd.   
As already mentioned, the flow of products and technology goes in the opposite 
direction as well, from the consumer entertainment goods sector back to the military. 
Stahl (2006) explains how, beginning in the 90s, “As the commercial gaming market 
exploded, the military commissioned modified commercial games (mods) as quickly as 
they could be developed” (p. 117). One of the best examples is the classic first-person 
shooter Doom. Doom was modded by Marine Lieutenant Scott Barnett and Sergeant 
Dan Snyder for use by the Marine Corps in training soldiers. The resulting game, Marine 
Doom, was “Found to be successful in teaching repetitive decision-making on the 
ground,” and, “its 1997 introduction served as a prototype for the further military use of 
commercial first-person shooters (p. 117). Other commercial titles have been picked up 
by the military as well: “In 1999, the Navy used the commercial release of Fleet 
Command by Jane’s Combat Simulations. In 2001, the Army commissioned Ubi Soft 
Entertainment’s Tom Clancy’s Rogue Spear: Black Thorn for help in training soldiers to 
fight terrorists on urban terrain” (p. 117).  
This cross-pollination between the US military and video game developers is 
more than an interesting historical footnote. The military’s involvement in the simulation 
of war and the virtualizing of reality signals a new stage of development in the citizen’s 
relationship to war. Whereas the Gulf War was the epitome of spectacular war, the 




Derian’s (2001) Virtuous War) and the birth of the subjectivity of the virtual citizen 
soldier:  
The blurring of the lines between citizen and soldier initiates a ‘‘third sphere’’ of 
cultural production. This third sphere is a symptom of the larger social 
militarization, of the recoding of the social field with military values and ideals. 
The new discursive universe gives birth to a hybrid identity, what I call the virtual 
citizen-soldier. The virtual citizen-soldier is produced by the changing 
configurations of electronic media, social institutions, and world events (Stahl, 
2006, p. 125)  
The movement from the spectacular to the virtual is a movement from the exterior of the 
subject to the interior of the individual. While the spectacle holds the audience 
transfixed and dumbfounded, neutralizing the capacity to rationally analyze the events 
flashing before their eyes, the new trend is to simulate reality and embed the audience 
within the simulation. However, the new reality is over-coded with the values and 
ideology of creators of that virtual world, allowing even greater influencing of the minds 
of the audience by controlling what they believe is “natural” or “real”. This is the most 
potent form of propaganda yet devised. 
Once again, the world of videogames and entertainment media demonstrates the 
efficacy of this kind of propaganda strategy. The military and the entertainment industry 
have only strengthened the relationships detailed above. The military has realized the 
potential of video games, both for the training of soldiers, as in the example of Marine 




example of the use of such games for recruitment is the US Army’s America’s Army 




 Released on July 4, 2002 (Independence Day), America’s Army is a videogame 
that was specifically developed by the Army for the purposes of recruitment. In the late 
90s and early years of the new millennium the military’s recruitment was low overall and 
officials were searching for ways to increase enlistment without increasing cost. The 
inspiration for the development of America’s Army happened in 1999 when Army 
Colonel Casey Wardynski noticed the popularity of military games while shopping with 
his sons. Wardynski was the director of the Army’s Office of Economic and Manpower 
Analysis. Wardynski realized that such a game could help solve the Army’s recruitment 
problems and recommended that the Army develop a military-themed game for such a 
purpose (White, 2005). According to Wardynski and two co-authors of a military report, 
the game allows the Army to recruit soldiers “at a cost that is 10 to 40 times cheaper per 
person-hour of mindshare than traditional media” (Wardynski, Lyle, and Colarusso, 
2010, p. 31). The game was designed to make players comfortable with considering the 
Army as a possible career. Wardynski explains that, “[The Army wants] kids to come 
into the Army and feel like they've already been there”, and that the game is “designed 
to give them a sense of self-efficacy, that they can do it” by allowing them to experience 
what it’s like to be a soldier (White, 2005). 
 America’s Army is a squad-based game that was originally divided into two parts: 




training as a new recruit. Players are given basic weapons training and are punished for 
mistakes like shooting a drill instructor by being sent to Fort Leavenworth (White, 2005). 
“Operations” on the other hand, features combat missions, and an actual raid conducted 
in Afghanistan was the model for one of the early missions (Stahl, 2010).   
 In America’s Army, both teams play as Americans, although they see the 
opposing team as “terrorists”. Wardynski says that allowing players to play as terrorists 
would not give them the chance to experience the values of the US Army. The Army’s 
concerns about allowing players the chance to become terrorists are not baseless. The 
2009 video game Call of Duty: Modern Warfare 2 contains a mission in which an 
undercover CIA operative must participate in a massacre at an airport in order to gain 
the trust of a terrorist cell. The graphic mission immediately provoked criticism and 
backlash from those who thought that it promoted terrorism and gun violence (Stuart, 
2009). Therefore, America’s Army is realistic, but not in any way that might damage the 
reputation of the Army or its recruitment efforts. This is also evident in the lack of 
realistic displays of violence or gore. Enemies when shot only emit a light, pink mist to 
indicate they are wounded, and when their bodies fall to the ground they disappear 
(Stahl, 2010). This lack of overt displays of violence allowed the game to garner a T 
rating, suitable for players 13 years of age and older (Stahl, 2010).  
Thus, America’s Army is a highly realistic game about the military and combat 
that nonetheless does not extend realism to the violence of war. This serves the Army’s 
financial, marketing, public relations, and recruitment purposes by allowing the game to 




preventing that audience and potential recruits from associating negative experiences 
with the Army, which might negatively impact recruitment and public opinion.  
Wardynski claims that the purpose of the game is not recruitment, but describes 
its function as one of communication and education. The colonel argues that the game 
simply shows the Army as a high tech and cool organization (Stahl, 2010). It should be 
remembered that the distinction between propaganda, marketing, public relations, and 
educational materials is incredibly murky, and even if Wardynski’s statements about the 
purposes of the game, evidence indicates that the game has had a positive impact on 
enlistment numbers (Stahl, 2010).  
Despite the murkiness of the distinctions between the different strategies and 
purposes of molding and affecting public consciousness, the novelty and uniqueness of 
America’s Army must be noted and examined. In keeping with the notion that 
propaganda these days has been empowered by virtuality and simulation by gaining the 
power to shape the audience’s experience of reality in a visceral way, it should be noted 
that, in contrast to past marketing, America’s Army does not make any kind of 
arguments or claims that can be held up to scrutiny by rationality. In fact, it might be 
better to say that the game itself is one, grand rhetorical act or process, whose purpose 
is to influence by means of affect and experience; what literary theorist Kenneth Burke 
called “identification”. Rather than appeal to logic, the game creates “an immersive 
cultural universe” which allows the player to learn about the Army and form positive 
associations and identifications with the organization (Stahl, 2010, p. 109).  
It is this immersive rhetorical universe that makes America’s Army more than just 




purpose of the game more than increasing enlistment, but helping players to accept the 
“validity of [the] army’s worldview and operations” (Løvlie, 2008, p. 71). Borrowing the 
Barthe’s concept of “anchoring”, Løvlie (2008) explains that the game’s above-
mentioned adherence to the rules of the US Army, and the refusal to allow players to 
assume the role of terrorists, “are all ways of anchoring the game experience in a reality 
that the US Army wants the players to consider as their own: as potential US Army 
recruits” (p. 86). By “anchoring” the gameplay with rules from the real Army, the game 
gives an interpretative frame to the player’s experiences. The rhetoric of the game 
diverges from the overt style usually associated with propaganda and marketing and 
instead “is a rhetoric of modesty, responsibility, and moral authority; avoiding unrealistic 
excesses and rebellious play” (p. 86). “Modesty, responsibility, and moral authority while 
avoiding excesses” are the values and the image that the US Army wants to portray to 
the American public and the world, especially during a time when it is embroiled in 
unpopular wars in several foreign countries.  
 
“Death from Above” 
 
 The fourth installment of the Call of Duty military shooter franchise, Modern 
Warfare, demonstrates the extent to which the virtual has merged with the real, 
demonstrating prime example of what Der Derian (2009) calls “virtuous war” in which 
the “the production, representation, and execution of war” is “seamlessly merge[ed]” (p. 
xxxvi). Virtuous War: 
projects a technological and ethical superiority in which computer simulation, 




simulation, media dissimulation, global surveillance, and networked warfare 
combine to deter, discipline, and if need be, destroy the enemy (Der Derian, 
2009, xx)  
Games like America’s Army and those in the Call of Duty franchise present what Stahl 
(2010) calls “clean war”, which is “a manner of presenting war that maximizes viewer 
alienation from the fact of death in order to maximize the war’s capacity to be 
consumed” (p. 25).  
This quality of clean war/virtuous war is on full display in one of Modern 
Warfare’s most memorable missions, “Death from Above”. In this mission, the player 
controls the guns of an AC-130 gunship. The AC-130 is a close-support aircraft that has 
been in use by the US Air Force since the Vietnam War and exists in a variety of 
configurations. During the early stages of the Gulf War II and Afghanistan wars the 
Pentagon would release infrared gunsight footage from the AC-130 to news networks 
(Stahl, 2010). The in-game mission is virtually indistinguishable from the AC-130 
footage from Pentagon press releases and harkens back to the infrared missile sight 
footage from Gulf War I; “Through the greenish wash of a night vision camera lens you 
watch the luminous shapes of men on the ground running at full pelt for cover. It’s a 
scene as grimly and dispassionately realistic as any late-night news report” (Parkin, 
2014). In fact, the in-game simulation was so lifelike that people visiting YouTube in 
search of footage of real AC-130’s were deceived by a player who had posted in-game 
video from the mission (Stahl, 2010). 
The Death from Above mission is an example of Virtuous War, an instance when 




simulation look “queasily real”, but it “makes you realise [sic] that taking lives from the 
comfort of a cockpit and using a flickering monitor can look weirdly like playing a video 
game” (Edge Staff, 2017). Waging war from behind a screen resembles playing a video 
game even more these days. The US Army has started to use the game controllers 
from the Xbox 360 video game console to control robot drones and as an interface for 
its new laser-based weapons (High Energy Laser), and the US Navy is using them for 
submarine periscopes (Collins, 2014; Dransfield, 2014; Golson, 2014; & Grossman, 
2017). The reasoning is that the today’s soldiers grow up using video game controllers 
and are comfortable with them. The Navy wants to continue to incorporate technology 
that young soldiers are familiar with and in the future, wants “to bring in sailors with what 
they have at home on their personal laptop, their personal desktop, what they grew up 
with in a classroom,” such as tablet-style touchscreens (Vergakis, 2017).  
Already young soldiers who played Modern Warfare’s Death from Above mission 
are using the very same controllers and taking out targets that appear on screen, from 
thousands of miles away. This convergence of the experience of recreational video 
games and actual war will only accelerate as drones take the place of manned aircraft 
(Bumiller, 2012). Although real drone pilots say that what they do is not like a video 
game, and although they are right, the technological similarities cannot be ignored. If 
Modern Warfare’s Death from Above can come so close to mimicking real life would 







 This chapter has sought to retrace the connections between the military, 
technology, media and entertainment, and war. The relationship between the military 
and the development of communications technology and mass media stretch back to 
the beginnings of broadcast technology and was one of mutual dependence. This 
relationship blurs the distinctions between entertainment, advertising, marketing, 
propaganda, and education such that “the techniques employed by propagandists, 
game developers, writers and filmmakers regularly overlap” (Power, 2007, p. 285). 
 With the advent of video games—especially those of the late-generation, 
graphically intense variety— the lines have blurred even further, to the point that the 
motives and prerogatives of the military can design games to encourage the formation 
of values, opinions, and worldviews by both affording the opportunity to take on new 
identities and constraining the ability to see the world from a different point-of-view: 
Now the danger lies in the media’s power to ‘substitute’ realities. With the 
appearance of a global view comes the disappearance of the viewer-
subject: in the immediacy of perception, our eyes become 
indistinguishable from the camera’s optics, and critical consciousness, 
along with the body, goes missing (Der Derian, 2001, p. 215)  
Games like America’s Army and Call of Duty exemplify the birth of Stahl’s virtual 
citizen-soldier. The movement from the spectacular to the virtual is internally directed; 
both into the viewer and into the virtual world. Whereas the spectacle lies before the 
eyes of the audience, the virtual swallows the participant, immersing him in the 




experience of the game their opinions are shaped, they learn new skills, and 
emotionally align with the desired values of the game’s designers:  
Many recent video war-game releases are not so much ‘realistic’ but cinematic, 
in that they reproduce not the real-world experience of war but the theatrical 
experience of war...As immersive/interactive movies about the experience of war, 
they permit gamers to see themselves on screen as the noble hero, in the 
Pentagon’s latest version of the noble war fantasy. Here, the player of the game 
is the story (Power, 2007, p. 285) 
Realistic, graphics-intensive video games may be more effective at cultivating opinions 
and patterns of thinking than other media such as television, cinema, and radio, 
because games mix several different media and engage the player’s vision, hearing, 
and physical responses. A study by Naomi Rokotnitz (2008) of both the theatrical and 
cinematic versions of Stephen Jeffrey’s 1994 play, The Libertine, examines “how 
preconscious neurological, visual, auditory, and motor circuits may be accessed and 
influenced in order to provoke both the sensation of physical disgust and the moral 
judgments of indignation and rejection” (p. 399). Rokotnitz uses recent research on 
mirror neurons and how “drama and cinema may maximize audiences’ conscious and 
unconscious mechanisms of simulation” (p. 406). Rokotnitz explains that mirror neurons 
are only activated by “goal-related behaviors”; in other words, a person’s mirror neurons 
can only be activated by witnessing the behaviors of other people which are understood 
as intentional or as bearing meaning.  
In light of this recent neurological research the enhanced opportunities for 




becomes apparent. For example, home video game consoles have been using 
controllers that have a “rumble feature” that gives physical feedback according to how 
the player’s character in the game moves or is hit for almost two decades. Thus, video 
games are a genre that has much greater propaganda potential than others.  
One notable feature of the KONY 2012 video is that, in the same way that it 
borrows features of different genres of film like documentary and action, it borrows 
themes and visual cues from video games as well. For example, the part of the video 
that introduces viewers to Joseph Kony and the problems in Uganda looks very much 
like a mission briefing scene from a Call of Duty game, even down to mimicking the 
heads-up-displays (HUDs) filled with indecipherable information and numerical 
parameters. Watching the KONY video the similarities are uncanny, and it is apparent 
that military shooter video games and military action films affected the design and 
editing of the video. The fact that Invisible Children, the NGO that released the Kony 
video, stated that one of its goals was to convince the American government to send 
military forces to Uganda to assist in Kony’s capture make the similarities to recruitment 
advergames all the more real. KONY 2012 is a video that apes military shooter games, 
games which were in turn funded and developed with assistance by the US military. 
When the video results in actual military assistance and “boots-on-the-ground” we have 
“Mission Accomplished”.  
This removal of any serious discussion of the possible violence and destruction 
that could occur as a result of military intervention makes the KONY 2012 video an 
example of Stahl’s (2010) concept of “clean war”; televised “clean war” removes all 




from the language of warfare through the mobilization of euphemism” (p. 26). KONY 
2012 mixes its propaganda and emotional appeals with highly-polished entertainment 
with a cinematic quality. Most internet videos are unable to hold the attention of viewers 
for more than a few seconds, KONY 2012 was incredibly remarkable in that it is a video 
with a runtime of almost thirty minutes and it managed to garner 100 million views in a 
few weeks. 
KONY 2012 was able to reach such levels of popularity and influence in our 
current environment of attenuated attention spans because it was entertaining and 
engaging, it drew viewers into its story with compelling characters, intelligent pacing, 
and polished visuals. But nowhere within this engaging media is there any hint of the 
consequences of American military involvement in Uganda. Even though the video is 
replete with images of suffering Ugandans and alludes to the violence of Kony’s LRA 
this is all rooted in long-standing tropes of African misery and poverty, not a true 
analysis and discussion of the consequences of military violence. KONY 2012 presents 
a sanitized version of US military involvement as an unequivocal force for good without 
examining the effects such involvement might have. That Invisible Children actually 
succeeded in their campaign to push the Obama administration to send “military 
advisors” to Uganda makes KONY 2012 an example of “clean war” entertainment.  
Invisible Children’s activities were an integral factor in the passage of the 2010 
Lord’s Resistance Army and Northern Uganda Recovery Act. Perhaps unwittingly, the 
organization had aided US military strategic designs for Africa. Prior to the turn of the 
millennium, Africa was not a priority for the US military; in 1995, the Department of 




(Thurston, 2010, p. 51). This started to change in 1998 after the Al Qaeda attacks on 
US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. The rise of China as an economic power and its 
search for fossil fuels to feed its economy also helped to draw the US military’s attention 
to Africa:  
Chinese oil companies have already established a significant presence in 
Sudan—the Chinese National Petroleum Company (CNPC) now owns 40 
per cent of the largest oil-producing company in Sudan, the Great Nile 
Petroleum Operating Company—and in January 2006, the Chinese state-
controlled  energy company CNOOC announced a $2.3 billion deal to 
acquire a 45 per cent stake in a major off-shore Nigerian oil field that is 
managed by the French oil firm Total; China is avidly seeking investment 
opportunities in Angola as well. According to Michael Rannenberger, the 
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Africa, China now obtains 
approximately 30 per cent of its oil imports from Africa and 'China hopes to 
increase this proportion in the years ahead. (Klare & Volman 2006, 304-
305) 
In light of the changing geopolitical situation, the American government 
and military began to shift focus to Africa. A 2011 congressional report stated 
that “In recent years, analysts and U.S. policymakers have noted Africa’s growing 
strategic importance to U.S. interests. Among those interests are the increasing 
importance of Africa’s natural resources, particularly energy resources” (Ploch 
2011, p. 1). The growing geostrategic importance of Africa after the initiation of 




increasing economic involvement on the continent prompted the Department of 
Defense to create a new unified combatant command for Africa, AFRICOM 
(Africa Command).  Prior to the creation of AFRICOM, US military operations in 
Africa were divided among three commands: US European Command (EUCOM), 
US Central Command (CENTCOM), and US Pacific Command (PACOM). The 
creation of a dedicated combatant command signaled Africa’s growing 
importance to the US military.  
 Contrary to their stated aims, Invisible Children’s promotion of legislation 
authorizing military involvement in Uganda will most likely worsen the situation in 
the country, rather than improve it since “the net effect of AFRICOM is a 
militarization of the U.S. presence in Africa, of African states, and of African 
societies,” since, “The expansion of the military becomes an end in itself, which 
can be deployed in the service of any of a number of agendas” (Branch, 2011, p. 
224). Once the military “genie” is released from the proverbial bottle, the damage 
that can result will be difficult to predict and impossible to reverse.  
Indeed, even before the KONY 2012 campaign, in December 2008, the 
US military supported Ugandan forces in an operation whose purpose was the 
capture of Joseph Kony and destroy the LRA (Gettleman and Schmitt, 2009). 
The attack, called Operation Lightning Thunder, was a failure. Kony and his army 
escaped into northeastern Congo and neighboring nations, attacking villages and 
massacring the local population (Rice, 2009).  
Northern Ugandans were aware of the outcome of the failed operation. Although 




have been heavily invested for years in bringing the conflict between the LRA and the 
Ugandan military to a close. In 2010 a group of religious leaders from the northern 
Ugandan ethnic group the Acholi sent two representatives to Washington, DC to 
advocate for a peaceful, nonviolent solution to the conflict. The group, the Acholi 
Religious Leaders’ Peace Initiative (ARLPI) released a statement at the time: 
Almost two years have passed since the collapse of the Juba Peace talks 
resulting from the launching of a regional military offensive known as, [sic] 
“Operation Lightning Thunder” in December of 2008...Rather than containing the 
conflict, this offensive [,] like the ones before it [,] caused the LRA to flee to other 
regions in the Sudan, Democratic Republic of Congo, and Central African 
Republic [,] where [,] to this day, attacks against the civilian population continue 
unabated. 
As individuals who have been laboring for sustainable peace in the 
region [,] we, the Acholi Religious Leaders, are greatly concerned with the 
plight of those suffering as a result of the continued violence. As the peace 
talks were the closest the region has come to ending the war, we are 
calling on all actors to desist from hostilities, prioritize civilian protection, 
and engage in a transformed regional approach to ending the conflict that 
is based on the pillars of non-violence and dialogue. (Acholi Religious 
Leaders Peace Initiative, 2010) 
The sentiments of the ARLPI were echoed by other northern Ugandans 
interviewed by Finnegan (2013b) during eight months of ethnographic research 




advocate named Santo said that the proposed LRA bill would not be appropriate 
“As long as it emphasizes [a] military approach,” and pointed out that even with 
all of the bombing during Operation Lightning Thunder the LRA was left 
unscathed (Finnegan, 2013b, p. 156). Finnegan also interviewed a man named 
Kevin who is a former Invisible Children employee. Kevin wondered about the 
LRA bill:  
Is that [in] the interest of northern Uganda or the interest of the 
organization Resolve Uganda [one of Invisible Children’s partner NGOs] 
and the rest? Certainly, there is no way you can say the military option is 
[in] the interest of northern Uganda…They are just playing around with 
partly our interests and putting their interests at [sic] play as well” 
(Finnegan, 2013b, p. 157) 
Unfortunately, Invisible Children gave the opinions of Ugandans like the ARLPI, 
Santo, and Kevin no chance to be heard in the KONY 2012 video. Military aid has not 
improved the situation and as of 2017, the United States has spent almost $800 million 
in the effort to capture or kill Joseph Kony and the LRA has now spread throughout the 
Central African Republic, South Sudan, Sudan, and the Democratic Republic of Congo, 
though their numbers are reportedly severely diminished (Cooper, 2017).  
The next chapter will examine how Invisible Children’s KONY 2012 campaign 
was not an isolated event but rather it was the product of discourses about new 
techniques of governance that came from the US Department of State. In both its tactics 
and aesthetics KONY 2012 resembled other youth-led, seemingly spontaneous political 




CHAPTER 5: THE INTEGRATED SPECTACLE: MANUFACTURING DISSENT WITH 
NETWORKS AND PROPAGANDA 
 
Our product is a lifestyle…The movement isn’t about the issues. It’s about my 
identity. We’re trying to make politics sexy (Rosenberg, 2011)  
 
Branding is propaganda...what it boils down to is manipulation and seduction. 
That’s the business we’re in. That’s the business of life (Jansen, 2008, p. 135) 
 
This chapter will argue that the KONY 2012 video is an example of new 
propaganda by examining the institutional complex from which it arose and the 
relationships of its creators to that complex. I will attempt to demonstrate that, despite 
the much-vaunted potential of Web 2.0, social-networking technologies to empower 
individuals and to challenge traditional centralized hierarchies, these same technologies 
can work in the other direction in order to maintain and extend systems of control and 
domination. Much has been made of late of “network economies”; “peer production”; 
“the sharing economy”; “assemblages”; and “multiplicitous”, “heterogeneous”, 
“distributed”, “rhizomatic”, networks. The argument of this chapter is not that these 
concepts are inherently flawed or have no practical utility or that they will not bring 
actual benefits; rather, the argument presented here is that too much attention has been 
paid to how these techniques and modes of organization are liberatory and not enough 




Proponents of the above enumerated concepts describe those concepts in 
dichotomous terms; centralized governments and the like represent the “bad old way of 
doing things”, and the new distributed networks represent a qualitatively “better” and 
inevitable future. To think that oppression cannot occur within a distributed network, or 
that such networks cannot be used in the service of power is mistaken. Systems adapt. 
Systems are resilient. Systems are dynamic. There is no reason to believe that new 
techniques and modes of organization cannot be used by traditional centers of power 
and there is much evidence to suggest that this is indeed happening.  
Today, decentralized and distributed networks can be used to foster Ellul’s 
orthopraxy, the unthinking “right action” of a politically significant segment of the 
population. The internet and social media allow propagandists to penetrate into social 
groups and relationships, delivering branded content with a message that bypasses the 
rational and critical faculties of the targets and works at an emotional level. 
In this chapter the KONY 2012 and Invisible Children, the NGO that created and 
disseminated the video, will be compared to another political intervention that focused 
on social media and culture, “Zunzuneo”, a Twitter-like messaging app that was created 
for the Cuban market by USAID. Zunzuneo will be examined against the backdrop of 
other related attempts by the US to manipulate Cuban culture—one, a scheme targeting 
the Cuban Hip-Hop community, and other, which involved transporting youth from other 
Latin American nations into Cuba to foment civil unrest—and by comparison to similar 
interventions in North Africa and the Balkans. KONY 2012 and these other interventions 




implemented them. The chapter will argue that KONY 2012 is propaganda in that it is an 




While the work of Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri is widely recognized as being 
a landmark in the theorizing of the political importance and revolutionary potential of 
networks, John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, two analysts working for the RAND 
Corporation, beat them to the punch by several years. Once again, the military was at 
the cutting edge, not only of technology but this time of post-modern social theory. In 
the early 1990’s, changes in technology, communications, and geopolitics led to a new 
Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), “a new era of warfare dominated by the American 
military's mastery of the conventional battlefield” (Hoffman, 1995, p. 366). The new era 
was effectively demonstrated by the US performance in Gulf War I in which the US 
completely dominated Iraqi forces. However, military strategists realized that “the 
revolution [would] have little if any impact on American military capabilities so far as 
countering terrorism, insurgency, or guerrilla warfare are concerned” and American 
experiences in situations like the problems the US encountered in Somalia underscored 
the need to prepare for those new forms of asymmetrical conflict (Hoffman, 1995, p. 
367). 
Arquilla and Ronfeldt (1993) analyzed the new situation and foretold changes in 
global struggles, military and otherwise, that would require a turn away from orthodox 




future to which military affairs were headed. In a seminal policy paper for the RAND 
Corporation, they described netwar as:  
Information-related conflict at a grand level between nations or societies. It 
means trying to disrupt, damage, or modify what a target population 
“knows” or thinks it knows about itself and the world around it. A netwar 
may focus on public or elite opinion, or both. It may involve public 
diplomacy measures, propaganda and psychological campaigns, political 
and cultural subversion, deception of or interference with local media, 
infiltration of computer networks and databases, and efforts to promote a 
dissident or opposition movements across computer networks. Thus, 
designing a strategy for netwar may mean grouping together from a new 
perspective a number of measures that have been used before but were 
viewed separately (p. 144) 
In other words, netwar represents a new entry on the spectrum of conflict that spans 
economic, political, and social as well as military forms of “war.” In contrast to economic 
wars that target the production and distribution of goods, and political wars that aim at 
the leadership and institutions of a government, netwars would be distinguished by their 
targeting of information and communications. Like other forms on this spectrum, 
netwars would be largely nonmilitary, but they could have dimensions that overlap into 
military war.  
Arquilla and Ronfeldt (1993) reach a conclusion about the struggle between 
networks and traditional organizational structures within the realm of military affairs: 




The future may belong to whoever masters the network form” (p. 40). Arquilla and 
Ronfeldt’s recommendations did not go ignored, indeed, they mentioned that the US 
was already locked in a netwar with Cuba 
In some respects, the U.S. and Cuban governments are already engaged in a 
netwar. This is manifested in the activities of Radio and TV Marti on the U.S. 
side, and on Castro's side by the activities of pro-Cuban support networks around 
the world (p. 145)  
The KONY 2012 and Zunzuneo interventions are examples of netwar put into action, 
the difference being that the latter was netwar directed outward, while the KONY 2012 
campaign was netwar directed internally, with the intent of leading to some military 
effect in a foreign nation. In other words, these were examples of networks being 
mobilized against other networks. 
 
The Integrated Spectacle 
 
 The concept of netwar has such utility because it is multidimensional, including 
communications, media, politics, and military and the way that these factors are 
influenced by new, decentralized networked forms of organization. There is a felicitous 
congruence between the three types of networks and the three types of “spectacle” 
theorized by the French Situationist Guy Debord. Baran (1964), in his RAND 
corporation-funded memorandum, On Distributed Communications: Introduction to 
Distributed Communications Networks, identified the three types of networks: 




exist a central node and an array of terminal “client nodes”, each connected to the 
central node but not to each other. A decentralized network exists when there are 
several central nodes, connected to each other, with each central node connected to its 
own sub-network of client nodes. A distributed network exists when both the central 
nodes and the client nodes in the subnetworks have many connections between each 
other; client to client, client to central node, and central node-to-central node.  
 Debord (1998) posits three types of spectacular power: the concentrated, the 
diffuse, and the integrated. The concentrated spectacle gives rise to totalitarian 
governments such as Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union, while the diffuse spectacle is 
exemplified by post-war American consumer culture (p. 8). Debord said that the 
integrated spectacle, the third form, has “tended to impose itself globally” (p. 8). Debord 
explained that the integrated spectacle “shows itself to be simultaneously concentrated 
and diffuse,” and that, “the controlling centre has now become occult: never to be 
occupied by a known leader, or a clear ideology” (p. 9). Therefore, in terms of types of 
networks, the concentrated spectacle corresponds to a centralized network, the diffuse 
spectacle corresponds to a decentralized network, and the integrated spectacle 
corresponds to a distributed network. Such is the power of the integrated spectacle that 
Debord says of it; “When the spectacle was concentrated, the greater part of 
surrounding society escaped it; when diffuse, a small part; today, no part” (p. 9).  
 The concept of the “occult” controlling center is important. Apparently, the original 
title of one of Debord’s last works, Comments on the Society of the Spectacle, was 
“Treatise on Secrets” (Bratich, 2007). Debord preemptively and astutely recognizes 




realized that simply because such networks lack an overt control center this does not 
mean that control is not being exerted. That control is simply “occult” and this very 
secrecy is aided by the diffuse nature of exchanges within such distributed networks.  
 
The “Third Sector” and Democracy 
 
 In liberal capitalist democracies, according to the standard view, power is located 
in two distinct fields; either in the formal structures of government, or the elite power 
located in the private sector. In the age of neoliberal drives for privatization, the debates 
about whether the private sector or the state can more efficiently provide services such 
as education or healthcare are perennial. However, such discussions begin from a false 
dichotomy, namely, the idea that the state and private sector are mutually exclusive 
entities and effectively different. Under such a view, the formal differences between the 
two sectors are more important than whatever practical effects each has on society, 
preventing any analysis of how the state can use private forms to govern and how the 
private sector increasingly carries out functions traditionally considered the preserve of 
the state, such as security and policing. The strict dichotomy also usually focuses on 
either centralized, bureaucratic, state institutions or private, profit-making, corporate 
enterprises, leaving out many important institutions that wield power and affect society, 
such as churches and cultural organizations, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), 
government sponsored enterprises, quasi-nongovernmental organizations, private 




Such entities of the type listed above form a “third sector” of power and 
governance in liberal democratic societies. This third sector includes what is usually 
called the “nonprofit sector”, which includes churches, private educational institutions, 
charities, foundations, and the tax-exempt organizations covered by section 501 (c) (3) 
of the U.S. Internal Revenue Code.  In neoliberal capitalist societies this sector 
functions largely as what Roelofs (2003) calls a “protective layer for capitalism” (p. 22). 
Despite its many charitable endeavors, the nonprofit sector is effectively “a system of 
power which is exercised in the interest of the corporate world” (Roelofs, 1995, p. 17). 
Private foundations, such as the Rockefeller, Ford, and Carnegie foundations, perform 
this function by providing unprofitable services to the public, such as cultural activities or 
charitable services; providing work and creative outlets for intellectuals who may 
otherwise become radicalized; and by keeping activists and intellectuals busy with work 
in organizations that do not offer the employment guarantees and benefits of state-
sector work and which depend almost fully on support from foundations for their 
survival. Essentially, the mostly tax-exempt nonprofit sector and foundations are a 
parallel locus of governance alongside the official state apparatus. In fact, the nonprofit 
sector and the big foundations should not be considered in isolation from each other, 
since members of the same elite class fill the ranks of both government and the 
leadership of the foundations.  
One of the ways that the private foundations maintain social stability and 
preserve the status quo is by funding scholarship and research, sometime creating 




of the public in order to facilitate social-engineering, charitable foundations supported 
social scientific research, and that, 
It can even be argued that the whole disciplinary system in the social sciences 
was created by the Rockefeller funding he first President of the University, 
William Rainey Harper, initiated a new disciplinary system, which was 
enormously influential. It led to the formation of the departmental structure of the 
American university, which was internationally unique (p. 583) 
According to Parmar (2015), the foundations and the scholarship they funded worked to 
govern social change, such as the global movement towards decolonization that 
erupted after World War II: 
Foundations facilitated the penetration of liberal American concepts of law, 
property, and social order throughout the world by cultivating networks of 
Western-educated elites in numerous countries. By funding academic work in 
area studies, political science, economics, and sociology, the big foundations 
created intellectual hubs radiating influence well beyond their immediate locales. 
Such networks were established in strategically important countries...where a 
small group of scholars favoring Western- style modernization over nationalist 
development could influence doctoral students in the region. They would, in turn, 
train thousands of other teachers (p. 679) 
Domestically, the foundations sought to manage the social change brought about by the 
Civil Rights and Black Power movements which were influenced by the global 
decolonization phenomenon. The Ford, Carnegie, and Rockefeller foundations 




Foundation support for the civil rights movement was directed toward more 
conservative (or “moderate”) organizations, sidelining more radical and even 
revolutionary organizations, which were responsible for more of the actions and 
direction of the civil rights and larger black liberation (or black power) movement 
(Marshall, 2015, p. 776) 
There are other third sector entities which do not have their beginnings in the 
private sector, but which come from the state. In the United States there are a number 
of quasi-autonomous-non-governmental-organizations (QUANGOs) which have been 
created by federal legislation and are mostly or partly funded by the government. This 
group includes NGOs such as the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), The 
National Democratic Institute (NDI), and The International Republican Institute (IRI). 
These organizations were created in the 1980s as a part of the Reagan administration’s 
agenda to combat the Soviet Union by, “foster[ing] the infrastructure of democracy, the 
system of a free press, unions, political parties, universities, which allows a people to 
choose their own way to develop their own culture, to reconcile their own differences 
through peaceful means” (The Heritage Foundation, 2012)12. The Reagan 
administration planned to do this by founding several autonomous, government-funded 
organizations for “democracy promotion”. These organizations were to be built on the 
model of the West German stiftungen13; non-governmental organizations that were 
each tied to one of (then) West Germany’s political parties and received funding from 
the West German treasury. The stiftungen had been involved in democracy promotion 







work outside of Germany since the 1960s (Lowe, n.d.). Provisions for the establishment 
and funding of the NED were made in P.L. 98-164, which became law in 1983. Soon 
after the creation of the NED, four other affiliated organizations were created: the 
Center for International Private Enterprise (CIPE), The National Democratic Institute 
(NDI), the International Republican Institute (IRI), and the Free Trade Union Institute 
(later organized as the American Center for International Labor Solidarity, ACILS). The 
NED was to “serve as the umbrella organization through which these four groups and 
an expanding number of other private sector groups would receive funding to carry out 
programs abroad” (Lowe, n.d.). Each of the four subsequent foundations are affiliated 
with important institutions or organizations within American politics; the NDI is affiliated 
with the Democratic Party, the IRI is affiliated with the Republican Party, the CIPE is 
affiliated with the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, and the ACILS (now called the Solidarity 
Center) is affiliated with the AFL-CIO.14  
Despite President Reagan’s lofty rhetoric, the real purpose of his push for 
democracy promotion was “to restore by subtler means the aggressive imperial 
prerogatives exercised during the Truman, Eisenhower, Johnson, and Nixon years” 
(Sussman, 2010, p. 44). In fact, the NED, like the NDI and IRI, was intended “to serve 
similar purposes to, but avoid the stigma of, the CIA and designed to be a semi-
autonomous, semi-private overseas ‘democracy promotion’ instrument of the U.S. 
government” (Sussman, 2010, p. 45). Indeed, the first acting president and co-founder 
of the NED, Allen Weinstein, has said that, “a lot of what we [NED] do today was done 
                                                 
14 Ignatius (1991) comments on the “democracy promotion” activities of the AFL-CIO: “Working mostly in the open, 
it helped keep the Polish trade union Solidarity alive in the dark days of martial law during the early 




covertly 25 years ago by the CIA” (Ignatius, 1991). The NED and its affiliates are able to 
do this kind of work—such funding political opposition groups in foreign nations and 
supporting the production of propaganda materials such as television and radio 
programs for foreign markets—because, although they receive most of their funding 
from the federal government, they are nominally autonomous and do not have to report 
on their activities as much USAID and other formal branches of the government.  
In fact, the creation of the NED, CIPE, NDI, IRI, and related foundations as part 
of President Reagan’s democracy promotion agenda was a shift in the tactics used to 
promote U.S. global interests from the covert actions of the likes of the CIA to overt 
actions. By being overt and public, the activities of organizations such as the NED gain 
a veneer of legitimacy, whereas the covert actions of the CIA drew public scorn during 
the Vietnam War Era and the “dirty wars” and Iran-Contra scandal of the 1980s. Ignatius 
(1991) calls the NED the “sugar daddy of overt operations” and posits that, “The old 
concept of covert action, which has gotten the agency into such trouble during the past 
40 years, may be obsolete. Nowadays, sensible activities to support America's friends 
abroad (or undermine its enemies) are probably best done openly”. According to 
Ignatius (1991), the NED was very active in the Soviet Union during its last days, and 
also in other Warsaw Pact nations of Eastern Europe during the same period. Praising 
the NED’s methods, he adds, “Covert funding for these groups would have been the 
kiss of death...Overt funding, it would seem, has been a kiss of life”.  
 In the original legislation which contained the proposal for the NED, H.R. 2915, 
funding for the foundation would come from the United States Information Agency 




Solidarity Center, who receive their funding through grants from the NED. The USIA 
was founded in 1953 and was, in the words of Charles Z. Wick, director of agency 
during the Reagan administration, “America's arsenal in the war of Ideas” (Wick, 1985, 
p. 16). The agency descended from the World War II Era Office of War Information 
(OWI) and other propaganda agencies created during the Truman Administration such 
as the Office of International Information and Cultural Affairs, and the United States 
International Information Administration (Guth, 2002). These disparate agencies were 
consolidated during the Eisenhower administration into the USIA, whose purpose was 
to, “to submit evidence to peoples of other nations by means of communication 
techniques that the objectives and policies of the United States are in harmony with and 
will advance their legitimate aspirations for freedom, progress and peace” (Wang, 2007, 
p. 25). In other words, the purpose of the agency was to produce propaganda targeted 
at foreign populations that would convince them to equate America’s foreign policy 
goals with their own well-being. This type of propaganda was in large part pioneered by 
the USIA and is called “public diplomacy”. According to Culbert (2010), public diplomacy 
is, “a form of diplomacy that goes beyond what one government official says to 
another—it is intended, often, to influence foreign publics, and is generally indirect in 
its effects,” that would have been “unthinkable” as a diplomatic practice before the 
1980s (p. 422). The USIA was dissolved in 1999 during the Clinton administration and 
its duties and activities devolved to other agencies such as the Broadcasting Board of 
Governors (BBG), which oversees U.S. government-funded broadcasters such as 




 These entities are not monolithic. The NDI and IRI, for example, are affiliated 
with the U.S. Democratic Party and Republican Party, respectively. Accordingly, each 
espouses a more “liberal” or “conservative” worldview—within the comparatively narrow 
political spectrum that exists in the United States—and their activities reflect this. 
Another example, different from the semi-autonomous NDI and IRI, The Center for 
American Progress (CAP), is a liberal think tank founded by John Podesta, former Chief 
of Staff under President Clinton and Counselor under President Obama. The CAP 
receives donations from a number of private foundations15 such as the Ford 
Foundation, the Sandler Foundation, and the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation. 
George Soros’ Open Society Foundation is also a key supporter (Blumenfeld, 2003). 
The CAP’s sister organization, the Center for American Progress Action Fund is the 
advocacy organization that houses the blog ThinkProgress, which is an “in-house full-
fledged, ideologically driven news organization” that works to counter the conservative 
media messages of think tanks like the Heritage Foundation and right-wing blogs like 
The Daily Caller (Smith & Vogel, 2011).  
The leadership of President Obama’s transition team in 2008 was pulled from the 
CAP, and the think tank produced a public policy manuscript, Change for America: A 
Progressive Blueprint For the 44th President, offering suggestions for Obama’s 
administration (Scherer, 2008). In 2007, a member of the CAP, Gayle Smith, and a 
member of another think tank, the International Crisis Group, created the Enough 
Project, “In response to a lack of organized public constituency to respond to deadly 
conflicts and mass atrocities in East and Central Africa”.16 The Enough Project 






partnered with the NGO, Invisible Children, for their KONY 2012 campaign and to raise 
awareness of the activities of the LRA in Northern Uganda. 
There are many other such NGOs and think tanks founded by individuals within 
government or private industry, and many of these have links to the government-funded 
NGOs like NED or the two major American political parties. Though there are conflicts 
among the members of these various entities over key ideological points, they operate 
within an ideological framework of US global hegemony and support for the spread of 
liberal democracy and, perhaps most important, free markets. For example, the NDI 
openly admits to supporting opposition parties and civil society groups in Serbia in an 
effort to oppose former president Milosevic and the “Centralized governance structures 
[that] have held Serbia back in terms of making its political system fully open and 
participatory;” the NDI “started its Serbia program in 1996…and supported opposition 
parties and civil society groups…in defeating Milosevic at the ballot box”.17  
To draw attention to the power and influence of these organizations is no 
exercise in “conspiracy theory”. One does not need to subscribe to a belief in a world 
controlled by a cabal of shadowy figures, gathered together in smoke-filled rooms, 
colluding to oppress the peoples of the world in order to realize that these third sector 
entities form a massive diffused network that is an integral part of maintaining America's 
global power. This network is a feature of the system, not some aberration; it is a 
manifestation of a type of governance structure that cannot be reduced to “government” 
in the traditional sense, but rather is a governance structure; as such, it produces new 
forms of propaganda for the control of opinions and the promotion of certain behaviors. 
As an extension of American primacy, the propaganda produced by this network 





promotes what Ellul (1965) called “orthopraxy”; “an action that in itself...leads directly to 
a goal, which for the individual is not a conscious and intentional objective to be 
attained, but which is considered such by the propagandist” (p. 22). 
   
Zunzuneo, Otpor!, and Youth Movements Mobilized as a Political Weapon 
 
 US government clandestine or covert “democracy promotion” (regime change) 
programs in foreign nations are a clear example of the occult nature of power within 
decentralized and distributed networks.18 One example of such covert activity with 
special relevance to the KONY 2012 campaign is the group of covert actions the US 
targeted against Cuba during the same time as the Kony campaign was starting. There 
are three different campaigns of interest here, but chief among these is the creation of 
Zunzuneo, a Twitter-like messaging service developed by The United States Agency for 
International Development (USAID) for the Cuban market. The word “Zunzuneo” refers 
to a colloquial name for the sound made by the Cuban hummingbird. Zunzuneo is most 
relevant to KONY 2012 because of the use of social networking technology as a political 
weapon, however, the other two examples also demonstrate the use of culture as a 
political weapon and the covert workings of distributed networks.  
 The existence of Zunzuneo was revealed by an Associated Press investigation, 
published on April 4, 2014 by Butler, Gillum, and Arce. The program was launched 
shortly after the 2009 arrest by Cuban authorities of Alan Gross, a contractor hired by 
                                                 
18 A covert action is specifically defined in US Law. A covert action is not merely any secret government activity and 
there are government restrictions. First, covert actions must be approved by the President and must be reported 
to the Congressional intelligence committees and the Speaker of the House and minority leader, and the majority 




USAID for another clandestine program that sought to expand internet access to 
Cubans using “sensitive technology”. The purpose of Zunzuneo was to build up a user 
base of mostly young Cubans through “non-controversial content” until a critical mass 
was reached, after which political messages critical of the Cuban government would be 
disseminated through the network with the goal of instigating spontaneous “smart mobs” 
and protests against the government. USAID staff referenced the role played by text 
messages and social media in the protest movements in Moldova, Egypt’s Tahrir 
Square, and Iran’s “Green Revolution”. The aim was to “renegotiate the balance of 
power between the state and society”.   
 The service was built through a shadowy network of shell companies located in 
various countries and financed by a foreign bank. USAID contracted with Creative 
Associates International, a for-profit, Washington, D.C.-based company that has made 
millions from federal contracts. Creative Associates obtained a list of Cuban phone 
numbers from a “key contact” at Cubacel, the state-owned Cuban cellphone provider.  
Noy Villalobos, a Creative Associates employee received assistance from her brother, 
Mario Bernheim, who was then working for a technology company in Nicaragua. 
Villalobos wanted to know if it would be possible to encrypt mass text messages and 
hide the contents of the messages from surveillance. Bernheim advised her that hiding 
the messages from surveillance would not be possible but by sending the messages 
from mirrored computers located in various nations the identity of the sender could be 
masked (Butler, Gillum, & Arce, 2014).  
 As the project began to grow it was obvious that Bernheim’s company was not 




contracted with Denver-Based tech company Mobile Accord to manage the project. To 
cover their tracks the agency found a UK company that was able to set up a corporation 
in Spain to run Zunzuneo. To handle the expenses, a separate company called 
MovilChat was created in the Cayman Islands. Eberhard and USAID sought to recruit a 
CEO and management team for the company but did not reveal the true nature of the 
service to them.  
 Around the same time as the Zunzuneo program was underway, USAID was 
supporting other schemes to undermine Cuba’s government. One scheme involved 
sending Latin American youth to Cuba under the guise of tourists or students interested 
in teaching HIV prevention. Another involved infiltration of Cuba’s Hip-Hop movement to 
destabilize the government. Creative Associates was involved in both of these 
schemes.  
 The Youth sent to Cuba came from Venezuela, Costa Rica, and Peru. The 
program lasted two years and was operated from a base in Costa Rica. Some of the 
youth were sent to Cuba under the cover of teaching HIV prevention workshops and 
other teams were sent to Cuban university campuses with the mission to recruit 
students “with the long-term goal of turning them against their government”. In a 
statement USAID claimed that the purpose of the HIV workshop was to enable “support 
for Cuban civil society while providing a secondary benefit of training in HIV prevention” 
(Butler, Gillum, & Arce, 2014). However, documents show that the purpose of the 
workshop was to identify “potential social change actors,” and one of the Venezuelan 




HIV only once, noting that HIV prevention furnished the “perfect excuse for treatment of 
the underlying theme” (Butler, Gillum, & Arce, 2014).  
 The teams sent to universities used the “cover story” that they were going to 
Cuba to visit friends. Teams of Venezuelan and Peruvian students visited dorms and 
students at a University in Santa Clara and kept detailed files on them. They identified 
student complaints and assessed the leadership qualities of potential recruits. The 
Venezuelan team identified a group of 30 students who possessed the requisite 
organizational capabilities to “rebel against the government”. The targeted Cuban 
students were unaware of the true intentions of Venezuelan and Peruvian youth who 
visited them and considered them simply as friends.  
 Concurrently with the previous two programs, USAID was operating a program to 
infiltrate the Cuban Hip-Hop community, starting in 2009.  The “mastermind” of this 
program was Xavier Utset, a veteran of anti-Castro protest movements who at the time 
worked for Creative Associates. The Cuban hip-hop program was run by Rajko Bozic, a 
Serbian music promoter, and the scheme was inspired by the youth movements that 
helped to oust Slobodan Milosevic. A front company called Salida was set up by 
Creative Associates and based in Panama.  
 Bozic target a rapper named Aldo Rodriguez and his group, Los Aldeanos, who 
were one of the most popular Cuban hip-hop groups at the time. Bozic’s goal was to 
build “youth networks for social change” and he promised to help Aldo and his group 
create a TV project that would feature the group and that would be distributed 




Associates had determined that Cuba was not ready for a revolution and planned for the 
operation to last at least a decade.  
 Creative and Bozic planned to co-opt famous Cuban and Latin American 
musicians, such as Cuban nueva trova legends Silvio Rodriguez, Pablo Milanes, and 
Colombian rock star Juanes. Creative and Xavier Utset planned to convince Los 
Aldeanos to join Juanes on stage during a planned concert in Cuba. In order to judge 
the potential impact of such an appearance Creative Associates used Zunzuneo to 
administer a poll asking Cubans whether Los Aldeanos should join Juanes at the 
concert. Juanes declined to perform on stage with the group but he thanked them after 
his performance and he met with them at a hotel after the concert. During this meeting 
pictures were taken with Juanes, Aldo and one of his friends, and Silvito Rodriguez, the 
son of Silvio Rodriguez. The group’s manager, Melisa Riviere, claimed that the 
acknowledgment at the concert gave Los Aldeanos “unprecedented prominence” in 
Cuba.  
Only one Cuban knew the true purposes behind Bozic and his involvement in the 
Cuban hip-hop scene, a Cuban video jockey named Adrien Monzon, a “contact of 
highest confidence”. After Bozic was detained when trying to enter Cuba and his 
equipment and hard drives were confiscated, he ceased all plans to return to the 
country. Monzon took over leadership of the operation and located 200 “socially 
conscious youth” and connected them on a site called Talentocubano.org. In January 
2010 Monzon went to Europe along with some young musicians from Talento Cubano 




Serbia to perform at the popular EXIT Festival; the rappers received similar training 
while there.  
 As evidence of how opaque and covert the USAID Cuba programs were, when 
Bozic attempted to wire $15,000 to Cuba in order to help Monzon’s Talento Cubano 
infiltrate an art and music festival organized by the family of Cuban nueva trova 
musician Pablo Milanes, the US Treasury Department froze the transaction. Los 
Aldeanos performed at Cuba’s Rotilla Festival in August 2010. Rotilla is a three day 
electronic music festival and is the country’s largest independent music festival. During 
their performance Los Aldeanos harshly criticized the Cuban government and the police 
forces. Rotilla Festival had been supported financially since 2006 by Bozic and EXIT 
Festival and it grew immensely during that time. The founder of Rotilla, Michel Matos, 
expressed shock and surprise that the Serbians were working for USAID and said that 
he would never knowingly accept financial support from an organization working for the 
USA.  
 In the end, USAID’s plan to use hip-hop to cultivate anti-Castro youth for 
revolution against the Cuban government failed. Bozic moved onto other projects in 
Tunisia, Ukraine, Lebanon, and Zimbabwe. Adrian Monzon moved to Miami and started 
working at a Papa John’s pizzeria. Aldo was unable to make a living as a rapper and the 
Cuban hip-hop scene began to fade since that time. Xavier Utset left Creative 
Associates and took a position working for USAID.  
 





 Although the USAID schemes to subvert Cuba’s government were criticized 
harshly once the AP broke the story—Senator Patrick Leahy called the Zunzuneo 
scheme “dumb, dumb, dumb”—the end of those programs was not the last time nor the 
first that an American agency would attempt to use social media technology and popular 
culture as weapons to sabotage unpopular foreign regimes (Butler, Gillum, & Arce, 
2014). After the end of Zunzuneo the United States Office of Cuba Broadcasting (OCB) 
started its own Zunzuneo-like program called Piramideo (Pyramid).19 The USAID 
schemes in Cuba were predated by decades of US psychological warfare operations 
targeting that nation. The OCB, which oversees Piramideo, also directs Radio Marti and 
TV Marti, formerly called Radio Free Cuba, which is a radio broadcaster modeled on 
Radio Free Europe from the Cold War Era. These two broadcasters create anti-
Castro/anti-communist programming targeted at the Cuban population with the goal of 
stoking dissatisfaction with the Cuban government and political unrest. They are direct 
predecessors of Zunzuneo and Piramideo.  
Arquilla and Ronfeldt (1993) refer to Radio y TV Marti in their article as an 
example of Netwar. These two broadcasters are just two entities within a global web of 
US agencies that exist to carry out psychological warfare and netwar against regimes 
that the United States considers inimical or unfavorable. Radio and TV Marti are 
governed by the International Broadcasting Bureau (IBB), which is governed by the 
Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG), and independent agency of the US 
government. Other broadcasters that exist within the IBB are Voice of America (VOA), 
Radio Free Asia, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, and Middle East Broadcasting 
Networks, which oversees Arabic language broadcasters AlHurra and Radio Sawa 





(Levine, 2015). Together these broadcasters make up one section of a global 
propaganda network used for perception management and netwar.  
The case of USAID’s programs in Cuba has connections to previous US activity 
in the Balkans. It is no accident that the Serbians Rajko Bozic and Bojan Boskovic were 
involved in these Cuban programs. In Post-Cold War Serbia the US used similar 
programs to support the youth movement, Otpor! (Resistance), that led to the ouster of 
Slobodan Milosevic.  
Otpor was a protest movement founded by a group of Serbian students on 
October 10, 1998 in Belgrade, by participants of the previous, failed student protests of 
1996 (Cohen, 2000). The movement used nonviolent means to criticize Milosevic’s 
administration; for example, in one stunt members painted Milosevic’s face on a barrel 
and rolled it down a street, if passers-by inserted a coin into a slit in the barrel they 
could have a chance to strike his likeness (Rosenberg, 2011). Otpor also made 
extensive use of graffiti, peppering slogans such as “Gotov Je” (“He’s Finished”), and 
“Vreme Je” (“It’s Time”) around Belgrade. They were sophisticated in their use of visual 
iconography; their logo was a clenched, black fist on a white background (or 
alternatively, a white fist on a black background), which was a co-option and reference 
to the image of a red fist used by various socialist movements (Cohen, 2000).  
Otpor was supported by “extensive financing from the United States”, which they 
received through US NGOs and governmental agencies like the National Endowment 
for Democracy (NED) and USAID (Cohen, 2000). According to Paul B. McCarthy, an 
official in the NED, “from August 1999 the dollars started to flow to Otpor pretty 




the largest recipient” (Cohen, 2000). The NED transferred the funds directly into Otpor 
accounts outside of Serbia. Members of Otpor met with McCarthy in Montenegro and 
Hungary. They also met with Madeleine Albright in Berlin. There, Albright told leaders of 
the group, “We want to see Milosevic out of power, out of Serbia and in The Hague” 
(Cohen, 2000). According to William D. Montgomery, the former American Ambassador 
to Croatia, “Milosevic was high priority for Madeleine Albright” (Cohen, 2000). It is 
unclear how much the US spent in the effort to oust Milosevic, but USAID estimated $25 
million by late 2000; Otpor members also claimed that they received “a lot of covert aid” 
from the US (Cohen, 2000). 
Slobodan Homen, a member of Otpor, admitted that “We had a lot of financial 
help from Western nongovernmental organizations”. One of these nongovernmental 
organizations was the International Republican Institute (IRI). Daniel Calingaert of the 
IRI claimed that he met Otpor leaders “seven to ten times” in Montenegro Beginning in 
October 1999 (Cohen, 2000). From October 1999 to November 2000 the IRI spent $1.8 
million in Serbia and Calingaert says that some of that money was “provided direct to 
Otpor” (Cohen, 2000).  
From March 31 to April 3, 2000, the IRI arranged a seminar at the Budapest 
Hilton or twenty Otpor leaders. The seminar was taught by Robert Helvey, a retired US 
Army colonel who trained them in the use of non-violence to destabilize governments 
(Cohen, 2000). The lessons Helvey imparted to the young Serbians show that the 
colonel has a keen understanding of netwar and the constraints placed on the use of 
conventional military force asymmetrically: “There is an enormous price—domestic and 




still may hold the externalities of power, but he is steadily undermined”, he told them 
(Cohen, 2000). Helvey taught the Otpor leaders how to identify key constituencies and 
demographics that support a regime, such as the police or military, and to subvert the 
leader's’ power by co-opting or subverting these groups.  
After the abdication of Milosevic, some of the Otpor leaders began to export what 
they had learned to other nations. The two most important of these are Srda Popovic 
and Slobodan Djinovic. After Milosevic stepped down, Popovic entered politics and won 
a seat in the Serbian parliament and advised Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic until his 
assassination in 2003. Djinovic founded Serbia’s first wireless internet service provider 
and is the leader of the country’s largest private internet and phone company. These 
two founded a new group in 2003 on a trip to South Africa, the Center for Applied 
Nonviolent Action and Strategies, or CANVAS. The organization teaches the methods 
of nonviolent struggle to groups from various countries and has been involved with 
protesters from most, if not all, of the nations which experienced so-called “color 
revolutions”. Djinovic himself traveled extensively throughout Eastern Europe. He went 
to Georgia Georgia in 2002 and founded Kmara!! (“Enough”) and hosted Georgia 
students in Serbia. These students participated in the Rose Revolution that ousted 
Eduard Shevardnadze. He also spent months advising Pora (“It’s Time”) in Ukraine, in 
the lead up to the Orange Revolution. Popovic, Djindjinc and the other alumni of Otpor 
have been called “modern mercenaries” (Beissinger, 2006, p. 20) 
While Otpor and similar student-led opposition groups in other Eastern European 
nations were mostly portrayed in American media as spontaneously generated, 




disaffected and angry Balkan and Eurasian youth, the truth is much different. Groups 
like Otpor in Serbia, Kmara in Georgia, and Pora in Ukraine are the offspring of 
extensive American and Western European political cultivation in the Balkans and 
Eastern Europe, dating back to the 1980s, when the NED “began handing out generous 
doses of dollars in every corner Yugoslavia” (Engdahl, 2004, p. 239). In the early 1990s 
“USAID provided $175 million in media assistance to Eastern Europe and the former 
Soviet states during the 1990s, which included the training of over 10,000 media 
professionals” (Sussman, 2010, p. 140).  
What the Black/Bulldozer Revolution in Serbia which ousted Milosevic and the 
other “Color Revolutions” which erupted subsequently, quite apart from being native-
born uprisings of the popular will, are the results of what Sussman (2010) calls a 
“revolution template”, the US strategy of “packaging, exporting, and spreading 
democratic revolution like a module across a broad array of settings, irrespective of 
local circumstances” (Beissinger, 2006, p. 21). This template makes use of modern 
tactics of electioneering like focus groups and exit polls, psychological manipulation, 
branding, and the use of slogans in order to create “short-term, euphoric political 
upheaval” that makes those who participate feel empowered while power is shifted from 
one group of elites to another (Sussman, 2004, p. 140). In this process of exporting 
commodified “democratization”—in reality, regime-change—, nonviolent revolution of 
the kind taught to Otpor by Colonel Helvey, is merely a cost-effective, non-militarist 
option for removing leaders who threaten to disrupt the plans of American interests for 
the region or who have fallen out of favor with Washington. Similarly, the concept of 




American interests because it lends a sort of capital, in the form of legitimacy, to any 
new regime.  
In the “Color Revolutions”, student-led opposition groups like Otpor function as 
“political technology” for opposition elites, tools that can be “mobiliz[ed] rapidly for street 
protests or the hostile takeover of official buildings or other state property” (Sussman, 
2010, p. 168). These highly mobile groups of youth are used tactically as political 
weapons, against an incumbent regime. These are the “smart mobs” which USAID and 
Creative Associates hoped to generate and control through Zunzuneo and the 
infiltration of the Cuban hip-hop scene. Youth and youth culture are explicit targets of 
the democracy-promotion NGOs, as was evident in Eastern and in Cuba. The EXIT 
Festival that began to support Cuba’s Rotilla Festival has strong links to Otpor20 and its 
co-founders (Eror, 2017).  
Nonviolence, social media, and popular culture are now more tools in the 
“democracy-promotion toolbox” of agencies like USAID, along with others such as 
“training for lawyers, journalists, political party leaders, and trade unionists; direct 
financial aid for civil society organizations; and exchanges and scholarships for 
students” (Adesnik & McFaul, 2006, p. 7). In a March 2005 Freedom House report 
directed by Adrian Karatnycky, a senior scholar at Freedom House, and Peter 
Ackerman, chair of its board of trustees, the authors argue that support for “people 
power” in the form of civic resistance groups is one of the most effective “mechanisms 
by which democracy replaces tyranny” (p. 4). They urge that Western democracy-
promoting civil society organizations need to “implement a paradigm shift in [their] 
priorities in order to promote and strengthen” movements like Otpor and other “civic 





groups as a means of ensuring that there is civic pressure on the new authorities to 
continue down the path of liberalization and reform” (p. 10).The authors view such 
support as not only a good in itself but as “investments in civic life” which have the 
benefit of being “minimal—a matter of millions of dollars or less,” and which are, “far 
less expensive than major military expenditures and far less costly than the normal bill 
for large development programs” (p. 10). In other words, cultivating pro-
American/Wester student groups and directly funding cultural events and opposition 
media outlets is a more cost-effective means of regime change.  
Although Ackerman and Karatnycky argue that nonviolent protests and civic 
groups are the best way to ensure peaceful transitions to democracy, they and their 
revolution-exporting colleagues overlook evidence that “the outcomes of revolutionary 
upsurges are highly unpredictable and just as often lead to failure and prolonged civil 
war as to democratic success,” and that, “one of the unintended consequences of the 
attempt to export democratic revolution could be the inadvertent stimulation of 
repression, ethnic conflict, and even civil war,” such as the violent military response of 
the Uzbek government following the 2005 protest in Andijan and the military coup that 
followed the 2011 Tahrir Square protests in Egypt (Beissinger, 2006, p. 21). In fact, the 
Uzbek protests worked against US geostrategic interests in the Central Asian region 
when the president of the country, Islam Karimov, expelled the US military following the 
Andijan massacre (Walsh, 2005).  
As in many other cases, the US supported Karimov despite awareness of his 
regime’s brutality, which is another point that Ackerman and the revolution exporters 




operations are governed by repressive regimes that were supported by the West. In the 
case of Karimov, the US paid his government $15 million to maintain bases in the 
country after 9/11. According to Craig Murray, a former British ambassador to 
Uzbekistan who was fired for criticizing Western support for Karimov, other than the 
payments for the bases there had been “no significant investment from the west for a 
while,” and Russian and Chinese state-owned companies have stepped in to fill the void 
(Walsh, 2005). 
Former Otpor members and CANVAS were also involved in what would become 
probably the most publicized and vaunted incident of popular uprisings; the so-called 
Arab Spring, that swept through North Africa and the Near East.  
 
Soft Power and “Digital Democracy” 
 
CANVAS not only exported their techniques to nascent youth movements in 
other nations, they licensed their intellectual property as well. Otpor’s signature clinched 
was used by youth opposition groups in Eastern Europe and Central Asian and the logo 
showed up in the Egyptian protests against President Mohamed Morsi, used by a group 
called the April 6 Movement (Joksic & Spoerri, 2011). One of the leaders of that 
movement, Mohammed Adel, had gone to Belgrade, Serbia in the summer of 2009 to 
train with CANVAS after the failure of an organized demonstration (Rosenberg, 2011). 
The April 6 Movement also received training and funding from an organization linked 




The formation of the Alliance of Youth Movements (AYM) was supervised by 
Jared Cohen, a former US State Department employee and current CEO of Jigsaw 
(formerly Google Ideas) (Bratich, 2011). On December 3-5, 2008 the AYM inaugural 
summit was held at Times Square in New York (Shapiro, 2009). The summit21 was 
funded by Facebook, Access 360 Media, Google, YouTube, MTV, Howcast, Columbia 
Law School and the U.S. Department of State and leaders from 17 organizations from 
15 countries were invited. Among the invitees were Save Darfur Coalition, Genocide 
Intervention Network, Burma Global Action Network, an unnamed Cuban group that 
was supposed to participate remotely, and Invisible Children. The Youth leaders were 
assembled in part to work to create a manual for youth empowerment (U.S. Department 
of State, 2008). Howcast planned to use the field manual developed at the Summit as 
the foundation of an online hub where emerging youth organizations could access and 
share tutorials and tips on how to use social-networking and other technologies to 
“promote freedom and justice and counter violence, extremism and oppression”. The 
hub — (http://howcast.com/youthmovements) — which is no longer active, would 
include instructional videos about organizing social movements online, with titles like, 
“How to Use Twitter to Effect Social Change”, and, “How to Protest Without Violence” 
(Howcast, 2009 & Howcast, 2009). Howcast, which was started by former Google and 
YouTube employees, is a company that hosts a website that posts instructional “how-to” 
videos that teach viewers how to perform various tasks or gain skills (Creswell, 2009). 
The Alliance of Youth Movements was an expression of a new trend in foreign 
policy thinking within the US State Department. Ritter (n.d.) explains that a shift 
occurred during the latter half of the Bush administration when officials noticed the 





pitfalls of military interventions. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice wanted to focus on 
“smart power” and “digital democracy policies” with the goal of “harness[ing] the 
potential of Muslim youth to effect political change in their respective countries through 
the allure of American Culture and values as communicated via tools of social media”. 
During the Obama administration Secretary of State Clinton continued the focus on 
“digital diplomacy” and the ideas of Jared Cohen, the former Google employee who 
would go on to lead the formation of AYM, were particularly influential at this time. 
During the Iranian “Green Revolution”, Cohen convinced the leadership of Twitter to 
delay scheduled maintenance for the service so that protesters in Iran could continue to 
post information.  
 
KONY 2012 and the Otpor Template 
 
The effectiveness of this digitally diplomatic soft power should not be overstated. 
It is obvious that the “Green Revolution” was not successful in inciting a revolution 
against the Iranian government, and the protest movement in Egypt resulted in the 
Egyptian military staging a coup d’état. Plainly, the soft power method of engineering 
regime change has not been able to affect the foreign policy directives of the United 
States with complete reliability. Indeed, the possibilities of failure and unpredictable 
change were openly admitted at a special briefing to announce the AYM initiative. When 
asked about the wisdom of supporting opposition movements, peaceful or otherwise, in 
countries that are allies of the US or that the US supports financially, then 




reaffirmed the American commitment to supporting “pro-democracy” groups whether or 
not such support places the US at odds with foreign governments. However, the point 
should not be missed that this is an explicit aspect of US foreign policy. This much was 
realized by Mubarak before the coup, as he raided the offices of foreign NGOs in Egypt, 
accusing them of supporting the opposition and subverting his government.  
The participation of Invisible Children in the AYM summit is significant. The 
organizations and youth leaders gathered at the summit worked with the State 
Department and leaders of tech firms to share knowledge of tactics of nonviolent 
struggle and online opposition movement organization. By the time of the summit, the 
State Department had been involved in supporting and promoting this kind of bottom-up 
agitation for at least a decade, going back to the involvement of the NED in Serbia, 
supporting the Otpor movement. The NED, which receives a portion of its funding from 
the US Department of State through USAID and is subject to congressional oversight, is 
listed as a partner of Movements.org, which is the new name for the Alliance of Youth 
Movements. By the time of the summit, the State Department would already have a 
reservoir of techniques and tactics, such as the use of logos and branding, and the 
transformation of public spaces through the use of posters, graffiti, stickers, and 
spontaneous events. These were all techniques that Otpor used in Serbia, and 
subsequently exported to other countries like Ukraine, Georgia, and Egypt.  
Invisible Children, as a participant in the summit would have made important 
personal contacts, and would have been able to benefit from the knowledge that was 
later to be compiled in the online “field manual”. The KONY 2012 campaign and video 




used distinctive branding that co-opted and re-appropriated iconography and aesthetics 
from revolutionary left movements. The campaign even had its own version of the Otpor 
fist; two raised fingers, forming a “V”, on an arm raised in the air, which appeared on 
campaign promotional materials and posters. Whereas Otpor used “Gotov Je” (He’s 
finished), Invisible Children used the phrase “Make Him [Kony] Famous” on posters 
bearing Joseph Kony’s likeness. 
 Invisible Children’s “Cover the Night” event was to be a miniature version of 
Otpor’s widespread use of posters and stickers bearing the visage of Milosevic, along 
with catchy slogans critical of his regime. Cover the night, which was a worldwide event 
planned to happen on April 20, 2012, aimed to “plaster ‘every city, on every block’ 
around the world with posters, stickers and murals of Kony to pressure governments 
into hunting down [Kony]” (Carroll, 2012). Cover the Night, while it failed to achieve its 
immediate goals, was an event identical in form to Otpor’s tactics of using posters and 
stickers to convert public spaces into politicized spaces in furtherance of political aims.   
Wittingly or unwittingly, Invisible Children were partners with individuals with ties 
to the highest levels of American government. Invisible Children’s main partners are two 
other NGOs that focus on the central African region; Resolve Uganda and the Enough 
Project. Resolve Uganda produces the “LRA crisis tracker” which publishes updates of 
LRA activity, presumably so that civilians can avoid the group. The Enough Project is an 
NGO that works to stop atrocities in several different central African nations, particularly 
Congo, South Sudan, and Uganda. The Enough Project was founded in 2007 by John 
Prendergast and Gayle Smith. John Prendergast is a former director for African Affairs 




African Affairs at the National Security Council. Smith was appointed as head of USAID 
in 2015 by President Obama.  
Prendergast has been involved in many charities and NGOs dealing with various 
issues pertaining to peace and development in Africa, such as Not on Our Watch, the 
Satellite Sentinel Project, the Save Darfur Coalition, the Darfur Dream Team Sister 
Schools program, and the Raise Hope for Congo program. He has also written a 
number of books, such as Not on Our Watch, co-authored with actor Don Cheadle, and 
The Enough Moment: Fighting to End Africa's Worst Human Rights Crimes, both 
published in 2007. Prendergast has worked extensively with celebrities and cultural 
figures to draw attention to African issues such as Darfur and “conflict minerals” from 
Congo.  
Prendergast’s charitable activities have drawn criticism, especially because of 
what some see as a well-meaning but very naive and limited understanding of complex 
issues in Africa. A Ugandan scholar, Mahmood Mamdani, has leveled harsh criticism at 
the work of Prendergast and one of the NGOs with which he is involved, the Save 
Darfur Coalition. A debate between Mamdani and Prendergast was held at the 
Columbia University School of International and Public Affairs on April 14, 2009, 
presented by the university’s Institute for African Studies (Columbia, 2009). During the 
debate, which was commented on by Kircher-Allen (2011), Mamdani argued that Save 
Darfur and Prendergast had “turned the world into an advertising medium” and that the 
Save Darfur Coalition “has not created or even tried to create an informed movement, 
but a feel-good constituency”. Mamdani also made an interesting comparison between 




combat: “[Save Darfur’s] focus is increasingly shifting from college students to high 
school kids. These are Save Darfur’s version of child soldiers” (Kircher-Allen, 2011).  
These statements may not be an exaggeration considering the tenacity with 
which Save Darfur lobbied the Obama administration to resolve the crisis in Darfur. The 
organization strongly criticized President Barack Obama’s special envoy to Sudan, 
retired Air Force General Scott Gration. In a letter to the president, the Save Darfur 
Coalition said that the Obama should order Sudan to implement a 2005 peace deal that 
ended Sudan’s civil war and to also remove President Omar Hassan al-Bashir and that, 
if the government in Khartoum would not comply, that “targeted military action” should 
be used (Charbonneu, 2009). 
Mamdani’s objections to the work of the NGO Save Darfur and the Enough 
Project co-founder Prendergast could also stand as an analysis and critique of the 
methods of democracy-promotion by means of “digital diplomacy”. The export of Otpor-
style, branded “revolutions” that eschew discussions of issues in favor of focus on 
image really is the transformation of the complicated world of geopolitics and political 
power struggles into an “advertising medium” united by short-term, euphoric, explosions 
of passions masquerading as true, democratic participation in the governance of a 
society. And the explicit policy of targeting youth to do the work of destabilizing foreign 
governments or of pressuring US legislators to intervene —militarily if need be— in the 
affairs of foreign nations, while less brutal than forcing them to kill or rape enemies, is 
not any more respectful of their intelligence or human worth outside of being political 







The argument of this chapter is that the “third sector” of (I)NGOs, private 
foundations, think tanks, and development agencies form a system of governance in the 
form of a distributed network. This network exists alongside the apparatus of the state 
as traditionally conceived, but is not “the government” per se. Its locus of power is occult 
and integrated within the society. The examples from this chapter—Zunzuneo, 
Piramideo, Otpor, and the use of culture as a means of effecting American foreign 
policy—demonstrate that propaganda can be understood as a technology of 
governance; in other words, it is a means of managing individuals, groups, and political 
forces to achieve political objectives and to maintain a political status quo.  
With this understanding we can view KONY 2012 as an instance of the diffused 
network of governance aiming its power on the American population itself. KONY 2012 
was not the first time this happened; the Save Darfur Coalition’s activities are a 
different, but related, example of elements of the third sector governance network 
propagandizing the American public in order to achieve the goal of American 
intercession into the affairs of Sudan. However, KONY 2012, as the biggest viral 
internet event at the time, was possibly the most successful attempt at influencing the 
American public in this way.  
An explanation for why such propagandizing is necessary is that the 
interventions Invisible Children, and their government-linked partners the Enough 
Project, wanted the US government to make lacked legitimacy. By 2012 the United 




decade, and the American public had grown past war-weariness. Given the goal of the 
campaign (i.e., to “Get Kony”) would require military involvement in an area of the world 
most Americans would not view as immediately impinging upon national security 
interests, legislators and policy makers would also be hesitant to lend support to such 
an operation. In this case, legitimacy would be a type of political capital that needed to 
be won in order to perform the political work of entering into another foreign military 
adventure. KONY 2012 and its propaganda, aiming to create masses of youth and 
anger against Joseph Kony by “making him famous”, would be able to generate the 
needed legitimacy by engineering an Otpor-style pressure movement that would force 
legislators to assent to involvement. Jason Russell says precisely this in the KONY 
2012 video:  
For Kony to be arrested this year, the Ugandan military has to find him. In 
order to find him, they need the technology and training to track him in the 
vast jungle. That’s where the American advisors come in. But in order for 
the American advisors to be there, the US government has to deploy 
them. They’ve done that, but if the government doesn’t believe the people 
care about arresting Kony, the mission will be canceled. In order for the 
people to care, they have to know, and they will only know if Kony’s name 
is everywhere. (Invisible Children, 2012) 
The recent scandal following news of the deaths of four American soldiers in the 
African country of Niger supports such an interpretation (Timm, 2017). Most Americans 
were probably unaware of their nation’s military involvement in the country, and news of 




administration, although US soldiers have been in Niger since the Obama 
administration. 
Invisible Children’s partnership with the Enough Project and its participation in 
the Alliance of Youth Movements demonstrate direct connections to the State 
Department and suggest that Invisible Children would have had access to nonviolent 
“democracy promotion” techniques used the NED, NDI, IRI, Otpor, and CANVAS. A 
comparison of the tactics of the KONY 2012 campaign and Otpor’s anti-Milosevic 
activity shows many similarities and the former seems to be highly influenced by the 
push for “digital democracy” and “people power” that was a focus of the State 
Department at the time, the difference being that KONY 2012 was an application of 
digital democracy domestically. Or, given the centrality of military intervention to 
Invisible Children’s plans to “get Kony”, it was an instance of the waging of netwar 
against the American people; a protracted campaign that used propaganda to change 













CONCLUSION: PROPAGANDA IN A POST-SOCIAL MEDIA AGE 
 
 This essay has sought to elaborate a new definition of propaganda as a 
rhetorical activity and a technology of governance by using the massive viral internet 
video KONY 2012 as an example. First, neutral understanding of propaganda was 
advanced, which allows for the understanding of how propaganda functions, without 
value judgements. Next, John Dewey’s response to Walter Lippmann’s lack of faith in 
democracy was discussed and the use of partitioning populations to facilitate subject 
formation was explored. The third chapter examined Stuart Hall’s system of en-coding 
and decoding texts and augmented it with a multi-dimensional model and some 
understandings of the dynamic nature of society from the Russian semiotician Yuri 
Lotman.  
The fourth chapter examined the KONY 2012 video as an example of 
“militainment”, military-themed entertainment that has been sanitized of references to 
actual violence and that serves to promote an acceptance of militarism. The fifth chapter 
examined how the KONY 2012 video was informed by concepts and techniques of 
governance emanating from the United States Department of State during the time of its 
release and how the Kony phenomenon is related to similar “manufactured” popular 
movements in other parts of the world. What follows is a speculation on the future of 
propaganda in a post-Web 2.0 age and what forms propaganda might take in such an 
environment. 
 





 In the age of participatory online media and social networking technologies a 
much subtler understanding of propaganda and free communication is needed. 
Technology enthusiasts who see great promise in the liberatory potential of the 
networked world argue that new collaborative online technologies have circumvented 
the old power structures of centralized media and journalism, ushering in an age of 
participatory culture in which there are no boundaries between producers and users 
(Jenkins, 2006; Benkler, 2007; Bruns, 2008). For such researchers, propaganda, control 
of information, and disinformation can be overcome with popular technologies like 
Google, Facebook, and YouTube which are collaborative, free, and open. Such an idea 
is quite naïve. There is ample evidence to show that, not only are these new 
technologies not as free and open as they seem, but they can also be used as more 
effective vehicles of propaganda and governance.  
 An example of how even user-made content is affected by traditional hierarchies 
is the recent, so-called YouTube “Adpocalypse”. YouTube, which is owned by Google, 
is funded—like traditional media—by advertiser revenue in part drawn from a revenue 
sharing scheme in which YouTube splits the proceeds from ads shown during a video 
with that video’s creator (a similar system exists for websites not owned by Google 
through its AdSense program). YouTube takes forty-five percent of the funds and the 
content creator keeps the remaining fifty-five percent (Rosenberg, n.d.). On March 17, 
2017 the Times of London published an article titled; “YouTube Hate Preachers Share 
Screens with Household Names”. In the article, the Times revealed that ads for private 




running on YouTube alongside videos posted by the likes of the former Ku Klux Klan 
Imperial Wizard David Duke and Wagdi Ghoneim, and Egyptian-Qatari extremist 
Islamist preacher who allegedly praised Osama bin-Laden (Mostrous, 2017).  
 This news caused several high-profile companies to pull their ads from YouTube. 
Soon after the publication of the Times article, on March 21st, Google Chief Business 
Officer Philipp Schindler published a blog post in which he stated that Google intended 
to “tighten safeguards” to ensure that ads only appeared with the content produced by 
approved creators (Schindler, 2017). A Business Insider article revealed that more than 
250 prestigious companies had pulled their advertising from YouTube and estimated 
that the site would lose around $750 million in ad revenue (Rath, 2017).  
 The loss in revenue did not affect only Google, many content creators saw 
precipitous declines in their incomes. Many creators who believed they had posted 
innocuous videos suddenly realized that some of their most popular content had been 
removed from the site. This threatened the livelihoods of creators who had built 
businesses on the YouTube platform and used it as their primary source of income 
(Hess, 2017; Alba 2017). The resulting impact to independent content creators was 
dubbed the “Adpocalypse”. The situation has become so bad that many creators that 
used YouTube as their main income stream have resorted to using Patreon, a service 
that allows fans to make small monthly donations to online content creators of their 
choice.  
One explanation for the adpocalypse is that the placement of ads is controlled by 
an algorithm that screens out material that may be sensitive or offensive. This method 




to target ads based on an individual’s preferences; therefore, a neo-Nazi who is looking 
for hate videos might see an ad for Toyota if he shopped online for a car recently. But 
the algorithm cannot perfectly distinguish between the subtleties of videos containing 
political satire or sexual jokes and those that may promote violence or be pornographic 
in nature, so with YouTube’s stricter policies the creators who are most affected are 
innocent. One creator lamented, “It’s getting so bad that you can’t even speak your 
mind or be honest without fear of losing money and being not ‘brand-friendly’” (Hess, 
2017). 
 Two important points from this case that counter the argument that sites like 
YouTube are creating a new collaborative culture and economy are immediately 
apparent. First, YouTube in its funding structure and operations is no different from 
traditional media companies. YouTube is only superficially “free”—in both the senses of 
“unfettered” and “gratis”—and makes profits by selling audiences to advertisers 
(Smythe, 1977). The second point is connected to the first. Not only is YouTube 
identical to traditional media companies in terms of its profit-making strategy, its profit-
generating is more intensive. The adpocalypse happened as a result of programmatic 
advertising. In order to target ads specific to each individuals’ habits and interests, 
YouTube, through its parent company Google, has to collect an enormous amount of 
data on each person who uses its site. This amounts to surveillance on a massive scale 
of the hundreds of millions of people who visit websites that participate in Google’s 
AdSense program. Far from being a bastion of independent media making and 





However, censorship is a rather crude method and the type of propaganda that 
this essay has discussed is much more subtle and effective. The propagandistic 
potential of the internet lies not in brute-force censorship but in the careful guiding of 
attention and shaping of perceptions and meanings.  
An important example of the propagandistic potential of social media is a study 
published in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (PNAS) in 2014. The 
study was performed by a member of Facebook’s Core Data Science Team and a 
professor and graduate student from Cornell University’s departments of 
Communication and Information Science. The study tested whether emotional 
contagion, the passing of emotions from one person to another, was possible over 
online social networks without in-person contact. The study was massive (N=689,003) 
and all the subjects were randomly selected but not informed. The authors stated that 
users had consented by agreeing to Facebook’s Data Use Policy when they began 
using the site. By manipulating the probability of positive or negative posts appearing in 
the users' news feeds the authors studied whether the emotional content of users’ 
status updates changed, which would indicate that they were influenced by the 
emotional content in their news feeds. The study used the presence of emotional words, 
drawn from the Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count system (LIWC). The authors found 
that:  
The results show emotional contagion…for people who had positive content 
reduced in their News Feed, a larger percentage of words in people’s status 
updates were negative and a smaller percentage were positive. When negativity 




emotions expressed by friends, via online social networks, influence our own 
moods, constituting…the first experimental evidence for massive-scale emotional 
contagion via social networks (Guillory, Hancock, & Kramer, 2014, p. 8789)  
The researchers found that the effect was small but meaningful given the many 
daily experiences that could affect a person’s mood and the massive scale of the study. 
Whether or not the use of emotion words is evidence of an actually experienced 
emotion is another question, but it is obvious that the authors of the study succeeded in 
at least affecting the behavior of the subjects of the study.  If behavior and even emotion 
can be manipulated by means of online social networks the ability for such technology 
to amplify the rhetorical power of propaganda is vast.  
 Bearing in mind that propaganda is not simply about censorship or transmitting 
falsehoods, but rather is a technology for shaping perceptions and effecting 
governance, we can view, “participatory media platforms as conduits for governance,” 
that, “manage a field of communicational processes, practices, and expectations” 
(Langlois, 2012, p. 100). One of the ways that communications and expectations are 
managed online is through algorithms that generate results for search engines or 
determine what news and posts users see when they log into a website like Facebook. 
Google’s PageRank algorithm determines a site’s relevance in part by the number of 
“backlinks”—links to the site by other websites, similar to citing an academic article—
that connect to it, while Facebook uses a similar count of backlinks and also analyzes 
the user’s friendship network.  
 On the internet, even without direct appeals, propaganda works by “enact[ing] 




according to its relevance” (Langlois, 2012, p. 101). Even if the effects are small, as in 
the emotional contagion study, given the massive numbers of people using the internet 
and the massive amount of data contained there, there is great potential to manipulate 
what Lippmann called the “pseudo-environment” of the mind: “the process of 
governance on participatory media platform is about defining degrees of 
meaningfulness through the attribution of cultural values, the shaping of cultural 
perceptions of the platform, and the setting up of a horizon of communicative 
possibilities and agencies” (Langlois, 2012, p. 103). 
 Today and in the future, propaganda is and will be much more than what Dewey 
called “bunkum”. Dewey perhaps underestimated the propagandists, for they were 
constructing a system of managed, limited democracy which was the rival of Dewey’s 
own educational-political view of a democratic society. Given the possibilities for 
governance and control afforded by propaganda it is difficult to think of any effective 
means education could have for countering it, even if education were redesigned along 
Deweyan lines. Perhaps, as Wimberly (2017) ponders, “If propagandists have mobilized 
public opinion as a means to transform who we are, then there may not be a ‘true’ 
subject left to liberate; the liberated subject may need to be created first” (p. 108). If this 
is the case, then perhaps the place of education would be to serve as a type of 
democratic counter-propaganda, to combat the propaganda of governance and to 
shape new subjects for a democratic society.  
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